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                  Abstract 
Uselessness in Reserve?  An exploration of the laugh track, “media” and the frivolous   
 
Dylan Cree, PhD  
 
Concordia University, 2017 
 
  
Within contemporary media studies the notion uselessness is either under-examined or 
given short-play as representing quantifiable loss. Registered as material waste or as mechanical 
deficiency measured by what is useful that which is useless gets categorically parsed and 
dismissed as an irrelevant by-product of a medium’s operations. However, by definition, 
uselessness resists being instrumentalized and assigned a knowable role. Furthermore, as the 
thesis argues, when considered materially, what is deemed useless to the optimal workings of a 
technological medium, whether wanted or not, surreptitiously impacts the reserve of procedures 
that delimit the workings of a media formation. Though the notion uselessness, as informed by 
Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of Etienne Bonnot de Condillac’s account of the 
frivolous/uselessness, is paradoxical in kind and indeterminate in effect, the thesis proposes that 
uselessness is far more integral to media formations than contemporary discourse permit. 
Accordingly, media theorists need to foster other approaches that allow engaging such an aporia. 
For directly exploring uselessness in media, the laugh track holds promise as an instance 
in which a media formation makes useless its production. However, to examine the laugh track 
by how it may be illogically constituted – as opposed to conventional examinations of how the 
laugh track functions or serves broader interests – requires deployment of certain expansive 





exploring the laugh track as its own paradoxical system. His approach helps to investigate the 
operational attributes that re-codify the laugh track’s material registry as a redundant system of 
archivation, a uselessness in reserve.   
Ultimately, Zielinski’s anarchic approach permits drawing radical implications beyond 
technological and communicative-governed formulations of media. The laugh track may be 
explored much like how Giorgio Agamben speculates about the gesture. For Agamben the 
gesture may be experienced as a “pure means” or an activity liberated from content and purpose 
dictated by apophantic principles. Accordingly, independently of means/end instrumentalist 
thinking the laugh track may be encountered by how it, integral to its mediatic operations, 
paradoxically maintains its productivity through a gesture – of never-ending archival actions – 
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The main idea for Uselessness in Reserve? is to further the often incidental discussion 
within contemporary analyses of media that entertains impotence, un-programmability, 
unproductiveness, in short, uselessness. On the face of things, this would appear to be a 
discussion that issues a challenge to the use-oriented biases of current programs of analyses and 
that assumes a binary opposition. Perhaps then, a challenge is afoot. However, though 
uselessness is readily cast as obvious counterpart to a category of the useful, my interest is to 
attempt to suspend this binary formulation. Rather, I wish to give play to the possibility that 
uselessness is, and most uselessly so, integral to what takes form as what gets assumed as being 
of use.
1
 Mindful to avoid committing the sin of contradiction by making use of the useless, my 
exploration is thus guided by the questions: Is, and how might, a discourse on uselessness be 
possible?  
To grapple with how uselessness may be in play within an experience of contemporary 
media, I focus my exploration around the paradoxical character of the laugh track as a system of 
production. Instead of simply treating it as a function within a specific cultural production (i.e., 
TV sitcom), I consider it as techno-archival media formation. The laugh track is organized by its 
own principle of disposability for systematically rendering it as a productive dud. Productive of a 
laugh for sure, but always a process pre-mediated within an un-registerable laughing that, as I 
will attempt to explore, defies being purposive.   
                                                          
1
 In a sense, it is arguable that uselessness is unquantifiable, however it is never really reducible 
to its unquantifiability – as that would render it of characterizable use (perhaps poetically). 
Further, though an etymological query may be useless for the following enterprise I note the 
Greek word for “useless” is anofelís. Curious factoid: in 1818 anofelís became the name of the 
genus of mosquito that transmits malaria.   
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For probing into the laugh track as its own discrete media formation I gain much traction from 
methods and insights of media archaeologists Wolfgang Ernst and Siegfried Zielinski. Though 
media archaeology is seemingly a readymade fit for this media specific exploration, we are, in 
turn by such methodology, prompted to reflect on our access and approach to its archival 
peculiarity. Thus, my analytic, though centred on the elusive and perhaps fruitless proposition of 
accounting for uselessness, also entails a confrontation with presuppositions at core to the 
discursive practice of media archaeology.  
General Ideas for the Project  
  “Uselessness in Reserve? An exploration of the Laugh Track, “Media” and The 
Frivolous” involves thinking through the relation between a discourse on media and “the 
frivolous.” The relation is explored through the concrete manifestation of the modern 
technological radio and television broadcast practice of producing and archiving laughter. My 
dissertation plans aside, what literature there is on the laugh track assumes it to be a media 
formation with a particular constitution as device/function for broader social or cultural interest 
and as mechanism that conveys something that either conceals an anxiety or some kind of 
production-related inadequacy. Accordingly, we really only have an intellectual reserve of how 
theories of media and of sound theory purposefully constitute our experience of the laugh track.  
By itself, the patented “Laff Box,” a beacon of invention in the history of the modern 
laugh track, appears to stand as a source of intrigue. Its inventor Charley Douglass, much like an 
over-bearing archivist, went to extraordinary lengths to conceal both the re-generative workings 
of his machine and the visceral contents of its production. Sure the Laff Box represents a 
fascinating period of inventiveness in laugh track lore but its treatment also serves to tip us off to 
a more technical and media specific insight. That being, at the very instance of generating a 
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simulation of an idealized audience response the Laff Box is also a compiling of recorded and re-
recorded or encoded and re-encoded, effectively always already, remediated data that constitutes 
a particular system of archivation. Needless to say, again in keeping with a general survey of the 
literature, no laugh track theorist has followed up on such a tip. Forget for the moment my 
thinking that the laugh track is a paradoxical medium, not much is actually written on the laugh 
track as a materio-mechanical formation. Thus, another approach is required to re-position the 
discussion of canned laughter from being predominantly analyzed as TV sitcom-action related 
phenomena to being an archive-authorized electronic artefact.  
Alternatively, to doing cultural history, I pursue the laugh track somewhat informed by a 
media archaeological approach.
2
 Media archaeology rejects the cultural and classical historian’s 
linear or category delineating strategies that would ultimately reduce the laugh track to being a 
tool within a broader scheme of production. Generally speaking, media archaeology gets us to 
engage the de-narrativization inherent in the dispersed and dispersive nature of any database’s 
structure. Accordingly, media archaeologists like Wolfgang Ernst prompt discourse focused on a 
medium’s own generative capacity.3 Along these lines, to some extent at least, I examine the 
laugh track. I attempt to explore the laugh track as a self-regulating medium with its own 
historically distinct formation of archival procedures.  
However, simply changing approaches does not necessarily mean that my exploration is 
then free and clear from the implications of theorizing that imparts a purpose to media 
formations. A mere shift to media archaeology does not make my exploration of a particular 
media formation immune to the designs of a use/useless metric. Before any approach it would 
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 See Wolfgang Ernst’s “Media Archaeography: Method and Machine versus History and 
Narrative of Media,” Media Archaeology:Approaches, Applications, and Implications. Erkki 





appear there presides a formidable theoretical system that restricts engaging the laugh track as 
that which is understandable in terms of a condition of technology and as having a purpose to 
communicate. Generally speaking, this means that media of whatever form is governed by a 
program of instrumentalization – of what is useful, purposeful and achieves results. Effectively, 
apart from a particular interest in the constitution of the laugh track I have a more general 
interest, a provocation. I look to challenge how media, media formations should be engaged, my 
main concern being that goal-oriented analysis prevents us from experiencing media formations 
in other ways. Instead, I ask of discourses on media: what about that which is partitioned off, 
overlooked, disregarded, in fact, at times, openly dismissed as without purpose, as pointless, as 
frivolous? Further, what role, if indeed we may call it a role, does the frivolous, a rather 
indeterminate and seemingly un-categorizable notion, have in the making and structuring of any 
form of discourse? Specifically applied to my dissertation Uselessness in Reserve? I take up 
thinking through the very functions of questioning and thinking by which, in the constructing of 
a discourse on media, we somehow come to dismiss, displace and discard from our supposed 
communicative acts that which is considered frivolous, useless or inconsequential to our 
analysis.  
Towards these ends Jacques Derrida, through his deconstructive reading of the 18
th
 
century empirical linguist Etienne Bonnot de Condillac’s perplexing account of the useless, 
provides some direction.
4
 Derrida traces the useless or the frivolous, as Condillac refers to the 
useless, to being a self-contradicting but necessary function of any signifier within Condillac’s 
linguistic system. Derrida exposes, the frivolous is somehow, in its uselessness, integral to the 
sign. Though of no use to the sign, the frivolous, which by Condillac’s definition is absolutely 
                                                          
4
 See Jacques Derrida’s The Archeology of the Frivolous: Reading Condillac. John P. Leavey Jr., 
trans. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1980, orig.1973.   
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useless, is a part of the sign, it is structurally purposeful (admittedly indeterminately and 
contradictorily). It is in this sense that I explore the constitution of the laugh track system of 
production. In Part Three I state: “the laugh track as archival formation is constituted as a 
conundrum. Laughter is made purposeful by making useless its being purposeful. To simulate 
the immediacy of laughter, through the very referencing mechanisms for archiving it, the laugh 
track makes an artefact of laughter. Which means: to be presented as laughter, laughter must then 
already be exhausted and spent. Within the system of the laugh track’s functioning laughter is 
thereby already put in reserve. Parallel to Condillac’s contradictory account of the sign, within 
the laugh track system, laughter is instrumentalized as useless. Here, laughter, in being a tool, is 
what I take to be paradoxical. It is uselessness in reserve. More to the point, it is a uselessness of 
a potential use. Its repeated functioning must always be defunct to be spent again.” 
Though Derrida’s deconstruction of Condillac’s account of the sign provides some 
traction for thinking through the particular contradictory nature of the frivolous or uselessness of 
a media formation, with respect to gaining distance from a program of instrumentality that pre-
authorizes our understanding of media I actually gain much more from the anarchistic 
promptings of both contemporary philosopher Giorgio Agamben and media anarchaeologist 
Siegfried Zielinski. In short, Agamben’s notion of the gesture5 diverges from the instrumentalist, 
propositional and oppositional framing by which we may declare something as knowable. 
Rather, a gesture, as thought by Agamben, represents an alternative mode of engagement to the 
orthodoxy for positing a means/end structure. It is this means to end thinking that supports an 
instrumentalist characterization of and engagement with media and technology, and in particular, 
                                                          
5
 See Giorgio Agamben’s “Marginal Notes on Commentaries on the Society of the Spectacle,”  
“Notes  on Politics,” in Means Without Ends: Notes on Politics. Cesare Casarino and  




the laugh track. So, in following Agamben, not only do we gain insight into the mechanism 
contributing to our remaining blind to how the laugh track is constituted as well as blithely 
reinforcing a way of examining the media object we also come to engage how a media formation 
may not be examinable. And this is exactly where Zielinski comes into play.
6
 Extending Michel 
Foucault’s thinking on the archive in The Archaeology of Knowledge, Zielinski unfetters media 
from known, knowable, in short determining conditions. Zielinski circumvents the archive and 
puts into question the material gathering point of the technological authorized to determine 
media as mediative. Effectively, Zielinski strips the archive of its presumed authority. He 
attempts to explore media formations as unbounded by epistemic parameters. In effect, the past 
of media formations may be irretrievable, if retrievable at all, by one system of registration. 
Applying Zielinski’s insight we may thus approach the laugh track as an archival formation that, 
even within its very quantification processes, is also other than instrumental. That is, as a media 
formation the laugh track may be explored in ways that defy purposiveness and use/useless 




Although Agamben and Zielinski provide the general philosophical questions for 
engaging the laugh track in ways that challenge an instrumental bias, I still had to contend with 
the laugh track media formation as having an assumed status, role, specifically being referred to 
as “a function” within a system of communication. So in order to explore how the laugh track as 
its own media formation might be constituted I grappled with the significance of the term 
                                                          
6
 See Siegfried Zielinski’s  Deep Time of the Media: toward an archaeology of hearing and  




“function” that rather tacitly designates the category for determining what a media formation is 
and does. To be clear, this critical engagement with function in no way dissolves or even 
dispenses with function. In fact, although “uselessness” may be my main interest, in certain 
respects my entire project is under the spell and authority of function. Actually, as things play 
out over the course of my dissertation, the genitive variants of function provide the grammar 
governing what might slip the rules of our readily accepted conceptions of function. To clarify, 
mine is not a terminological quarrel. Rather, it is a conceptual entanglement in which I, certainly 
not discounting standard applications of function, explore how function may otherwise be 
conceived. My point is, the laugh track may indeed be a function, however our conception of 
function need not be restricted to or for relating a broadly understood backdrop for a things being 
(a part of) media.   
Typically, the term function represents an analytical investment in a causative force, 
mechanism or trigger. By treating a media formation as a function the theorist commits to a 
course of descriptions that reinforces a frame of analysis divorced from experiencing, for my 
purposes, the laugh track by what it does and how it is formed independently of who or what 
productive regimen it may serve. In this respect, Michel Foucault’s account of the archive in his 
The Archaeology of Knowledge, though focused on discourse formation, points the way for 
engaging the specificity of things unfiltered by the scrim-effect of a generalized notion of media.  
For Foucault, the archive is not a particular discourse or instrument of discourse, nor a platform 
or medium – the point being, the archive is not an isolable and potential sequence of intersecting 
events on a timeline. Foucault shifts focus away from conceiving of media formations 
etiologically and as relationally bound. He gets us to attend to the force and formation of a 
system. Alternatively, he calls the archive a system of its functioning. In this way, functioning 
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precedes epistemological import and our accounting for productive gain. Functioning refers back 
to the system it forms indicating that and how things are being operationalized. In this sense, we 
engage function as the ongoing re-instituting of particular determinations that maintain a system 
as formation or process. Accordingly, whether for discourses or media, we explore formations 
non-causally. That is, as procedural or in terms of things that are of rules and generative of rules.  
In step with Foucault, as stated above, Zielinski unfetters media and invention from 
knowable and determining conditions. He explores media formations unbounded by the 
epistemic parameters that comprise the more conservative accounts of media archaeologists like 
Wolfgang Ernst who limits his analysis to what can be seen and said. Alternatively, Zielinski 
rejects treating media inventions as formations that operate only within the goals of functionalist 
practices, techniques and technological ideals. Accordingly, I contend in Part Three: “Zielinski’s 
media anarchaeology attends to inventions as their own practices, techniques and possible ideals 
that may have nothing to do with ergonomic or optimal design for achieving system 
functionality. Zielinski, within the inventive process encounters possibilities of defunctness. This 
is not to say he discovers that particular media may become defunct, unusable or obsolescent. 
Rather, unusability and defunctness is a possibility of an invention. Within the genesis of any 
media formation is the potential for an unaccounted for and inexplicable impotency.” 
Challenging the generative and, to use a gamer expression, completionist presumption of media 
as a function predicate we may instead investigate the traits, integral to a broader and perhaps 
lesser determined technological condition, that ensure a system of archivation is inaccessible. 
Further to my assessments of Zielinski my general point is that: “ways of considering function 
and use may be expanded. Within the purported functioning elements of a system are other-
functioning, perhaps non-functioning, elements. Thus, what functions is not only to be reckoned 
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with in terms of a system’s designed operations. Perhaps we may also understand a system’s 
workings, whether or not by design, by its non-transformative elements.” 
 
Project Challenges 
Given the conceptual elasticity of uselessness, the fostering of an expansive vision of the 
archive as anarchive, destabilizing the standard notion of function, one of my main struggles was 
with how to actually construct or organize the text. That is, more than the challenges to the terms 
and conditions for examining technological media formations, how could I make my dissertation 
into a system of assemblage that did not endorse nor readily comply with theories and analyses 
which are organized around the gravitational pull or potency of systems, and no less, around 
certain potent systems of thinking – in other words, it struck me as problematic, even 
contradictory, that I might be advancing a decisive and robust account of something so 
inconsequential and indeterminately unproductive as uselessness.  
Though I do not spend time overtly working through the machinations of Georg 
Bataille’s notion of excess7 and Martin Heidegger’s reflections on the modern technological 
condition,
8
 in so many ways, their, what I consider, potency-oriented analyses, are influential for 
both my dissertation and for the theories of many of the thinkers I do directly engage. In fact, it 
may be argued that Bataille’s Hegelian system-busting notion of a general economy that 
engenders unproductive expenditure and Heidegger’s existential analytic concerning the essence 
                                                          
7




 See Martin Heidegger’s The question concerning technology, and other essays William Lovitt 





of technology authorizes my particular exploration of uselessness and the laugh track. On the one 
hand, my notion of uselessness as flummoxing absolute impertinence and unbounded 
disposability, like those afforded by Bataille’s volatile materialist reality in which a society’s 
needless sacrifices or excesses in rituals of giving represent untamed forces that defy, wreck and 
over-ride the regulated metrics of the punctilious bean-counter’s balance sheet for the reconciling 
of profits and losses, reaches past strictures of reason. On the other hand, by exploring the laugh 
track as an archival media system pre-determined by a reflexive technicity I may also be read as 
following Heidegger’s thinking that our being in the world, independent of any conscious 
deliberation, is technologically enframed, a standing reserve. 
 
No doubt, for exploring uselessness and the laugh track, Heidegger and Bataille provide 
much guidance for unearthing certain ontological and materialist pre-determinations. However, 
at uselessness’ most troublesome conceptualization is a sense of impotency. Uselessness, as I 
explored within a mediatic system, may be immeasurable, without quantifiability. My thinking 
here is that the unquantifiable “form” and “force”9 of a system, its unspecifiable lack, that is to 
say its uselessness, eludes the very potent implicit pre-cedent conceptual frameworks offered by 
Bataille and Heidegger. Certainly, Bataille and Heidegger, in very different ways, in their 
respective accounts of unproductive expenditure and the essence of technology, point towards a 
lack. Heidegger’s examination of technology, all at once, brings attention to the potency and 
impotency of this gathering or mode of ordering that makes the world a host of resources. 
Technology is not just a dominant presence, it is sheer presence. And its robustness occurs at the 
expense of man being at play in the world. Thus, the modern technological condition 
                                                          
9
 Throughout my dissertation “form” and “force” as well as “system” are frequently deployed. 
No less than as I do with “function” these terms may be exposed to similar questioning.  
11 
 
incapacitates or renders impotent other possibilities of being in the world. In contrast, Bataille 
brings our attention to what cannot be controlled – to the very forces that our rules before which 
standards for determination, systems for ordering, containing and restricting will always falter. 
He brings attention to super-abundant energies, to excesses that are, implicitly and explicitly, an 
exertion indicating other and unknowable systems of allowances. By Heidegger’s account of 
technological orderings and by Bataille’s vision of uncontrollable economic systems, impotence 
is always implicit as an un-desired and unavoidable consequence. I have no truck with the fact 
they do not directly explore impotence as a part of a mode, mechanism or system. Ultimately, 
my problem with these two thinkers is that their sense of lack is circumscribed by, for Heidegger 
dwelling, and for Bataille expanding within – the always emerging determinations of what is 
potent.  
Alternatively, two anarchists along with two post-structuralists permit more effectively 
engaging the possibilities of the non-potential of impotence. Agamben’s gesture that suspends 
the means/end calculus, Zielinski’s anarchive that expands archivation into unreachable 
temporalities, Derrida’s deconstruction that trips up of Condillac’s linguistic system as 
unavoidably hosting an aporia and Foucault’s idea that historical discourses play out in 
accordance with a lawless circuitry of the archive all opened up conceptual paths that unlocked 
analysis of the laugh track media formation from commitments to philosophical determinations 
for what is knowable and possible. Further, specifically thinking through Agamben’s notion of 
gesture and Zielinski’s poetic engaging of invention, I came to conceive of structuring my 
dissertation so that it put into question maintaining a standard functionality and goal of its textual 
parts. Beyond the usual progressive academic partitioning of the text that advances through such 
mechanisms as table of contents, introductions, main parts, chapters, titles, sub-
12 
 
passages/footnotes, appendices, references, in three distinct areas of the text I made trope and 
gesture of the bracketed, the abyss and an infinitely looping archive. That is, in parallel with the 
designated three parts that formally organize the whole of the dissertation, I offered three 
divergent elements that break with the continuity of a particular academic format for analysis. 
Accordingly, the potency of argument that is implicitly executed by a contiguity or integrity of 
assemblage is fractured by three very overt and distinct gestures.  
 
To close out my prefatory remarks I will briefly outline the nature of these gestures. The 
entirety of Part Two titled Laughing Outside the Box, sandwiched in-between the theoretical 
groundwork focused Part One and the speculative musings of Part Three, was placed in 
parentheses. Apart from the object of analysis being the history of the laugh track the graphic 
partitions place the contents of Part Two within the broadcast industry practice for cueing the 
sitcom editor to insert laughter. Through this graphic trope, the history of the laugh track may 
thus be severed from the main of the dissertation. It interrupts the overall narrativo-philosophical 
mediation. Instead, we bump into the laugh track history – from Bing Crosby to M*A*S*H* to 
Charley Douglas’ Laff Box – as its own mediatic congestion, of a collision of rules that are 
somehow in formation. Independent of this parenthetical gesture, coming on the heels of Chapter 
Twelve in which I examine various computer/algorithmic conundrums (glitch areas, integer 
overflow, the Donkey Kong kill-screen and programmed Easter eggs), in the would-be chapter 
thirteen – I say would-be because it is an un-chaptered section – the text stands as a frivolous 
gesture. Nested within the very fabric of my broader analytical engagement we are taken on a 
pointless Easter-egg treasure hunt for a truth that is sidebar and yet significant for its being 
sidebar. Rather frivolously, in A Pre-programmed Abyss... I lead the reader down a rabbit-hole in 
13 
 
which I explore a notion of the frivolous. Lastly, the third gesture comes at the end of the 
dissertation in the form of an appendix. I transform the Archive of American Television’s on-line 
audio recorded interview with laugh track sound engineer Carroll Pratt into its own Laff Box. In 
the spirit of Friedrich Kittler’s Marshall McNietzsche’s reflexive engagement with the 
typewriter, this officially sanctioned archived material is made into a mechanico-textual 
temporo-numeric trope of itself. It re-codifies its material registry as a redundant system of 
archivation. With each of these three gestures the text slackens its theoretical flexing and 
muscularity. Much like with the affects of laughter these moments and passages within the text 
derail the laugh track – a uselessness in reserve – from being conceived as a formulation unified 













A Circumscribed Technicity  
The broader objective of my analysis is to explore the possibility of uselessness in the 
actual functioning of media. The laugh track represents an instance of a media formation that 
eludes operating by notions of use or exchange value. However the theoretical framework by 
which it has been conceived as a cultural phenomenon has no use for exploring the possibility of 
uselessness. Alternatively, I propose an analysis that focuses on the laugh track’s archival and 
technological properties. This shift from a qualitative-type assessment to an engagement with a 
medium’s quantificatory mechanisms permits, as I shall explicate, encountering the ordering of 
its inventive process. We thus move from a human-authorized version of media to one in which 
media is explored as auto-generative. Of course, this move does not then justify a general 
pronouncement on uselessness as being an inhabitant of the realm of the non-cultural. Nor does 
it cinch the laugh track as being inherently useless. For starters, uselessness, of which there can 
be no decisive definition, is not necessary to a technological formation. In short, uselessness is 
not necessarily necessary. However, as we will come to consider, uselessness represents a 
conundrum to the way in which purpose and useful, by a certain logic, are often conceived. I will 
return later to a more sustained account of uselessness after discussing how to approach the 
laugh track. For that I will examine Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of Etienne Bonnot de 
Condillac’s notion of the frivolous. At any rate, the laugh track, as the technological reserve of 
laughs, can never achieve its promised mediatic prowess of replicating the live. The laugh track’s 
portended immediacy is always stunted by its very mechanicality. Instead, rendering laughter as 
tool means the laugh track can only ever be a by-product of repetition and quantification. 
15 
 
Nonetheless, the conversation does not end here. The pre-stunting of the laugh track’s historical 
transformation as media configuration opens onto very penetrating questions about how the 
laugh track is a by-product manufactured within a broader system of storage and transferability. 
And, how, as auto-generative formation, it may modulate its own limits, its mediation. Thinking 
the laugh track as a system of exhaustion that is a productive resource of exhausted material thus 
requires approaching media by directly engaging how it is technologically constituted. This, 
however, means going against a formidable system for absorbing technology within the 
theoretical machinations of cultural history. Accordingly, we first need to do a certain amount of 
theoretical undoing. 
Literature specific to the laugh track often either relies on or assumes a certain ineffable 
potency that has been attributed to laughter by certain 20
th
 century philosophers. In spite of 
populist characterizations of being a universal language, laughter is analyzed for its non-
linguistic or extra-discursive impact. Laughter has been theorized by philosopher Henri 
Bergson
10
 as a relief mechanism in the socialization process. Conversely, laughter has been 
declared by Georges Bataille
11
 as radically sovereign non-productive expenditure that neither 
reinforces social order, nor is reducible to a communicative act. For both Bergson and Bataille, 
laughter is thought more in terms of a bodily gesture than by the determinations of spoken 
language. It is considered a rupture to the economy of rules governing discursive practices. 
Manifest as spasms, both auditory and bodily, laughter is thus felt as independent of, and, even 
as a violation of reason and regulated behaviour. Tinged by either the analyses of Bergson or 
Bataille (at least within the Humanities), laughter, as the mechanical auditory construct of the 
                                                          
10
  See Henri Bergson’s Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic. 
11
  See Georges Bataille’s Inner Experience. 
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broadcast industry’s regime of production, is then truly a mischievous force. At once, laughter is 
a fake and dupe feature of entertainment while being a representation of an implicit unspeakable 
viscerality, a catalyst that is “seriously” felt as integral to the human experience. The laugh track 
truly has peculiar status. We note that all sorts of production elements of TV, radio, cinema are 
“cheated” or entail optical or aural trickery of some kind, but the laugh track has often been12 
dubbed an unnecessary add-on. It is considered external to production in its assumed and 
industry imposed representation of what and how an attending audience would “genuinely” 
respond.  Effectively, for laugh track theorists, this tension between the counterfeit and what is 
essential and/or real puts one in an awkward theoretical position. It involves treating this 
recorded track as a diegetic, extra-diegetic or “faked essential response.” 13  
 Analysis of the laugh track is well-rooted in explanatory models for media that, by 
pushing canned laughter to the margins of their classificatory methods and explanations, have 
made the laugh track into a trope of technicity. Further, the laugh track has been brought into the 
discursive fold of cultural historical analysis as a superfluous industry gimmick. It has 
questionable import for and impact on the broadcast experience.  Accordingly, from the 8
th
 
edition of the Bloomsbury Dictionary of Media and Communication, we find a somewhat 
pejorative account, 
                                                          
12
 We note with Sound and Performance theorist Jacob Smith that recorded laughter was 
received quite differently prior to the laugh track. The era of broadcasting provides the frame of 
another politic between audience and broadcast transmission. It supported a new ideal of the real 
and verisimilitude readily centred out as a dubious studio tactic compared to other so-called 
effects that at worst may be dismissed as ‘cheesy’ or a tired trope for playing up cheap sentiment. 
13 This is, no doubt, to presume that there is a condition of verisimilitude, as well as that laughter 
is its own force or medium of communication. 
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It [canned laughter] functions as a stimulus to audience laughter with the 
hint that all of us listening or watching are ﬁnding the programme funny. 
There is no room on the laugh track for the dissenting sounds of those who 
wish to express a contrary view. (Bloomsbury Dictionary of Media and 
Communication, 154) 
Within the hierarchy of cultural knowledge, the laugh track is assigned the fate of a supplement. 
There is parallel here with the Bergson/Bataille theorizing of laughter as unscripted visceral 
outburst. The laugh track, regardless of being established within the practices of broadcast 
production, is seen to violate respectable productivity as gauged by standards of verisimilitude 
and authentic communication. In all, the laugh track is grasped as the manipulative broadcast 
industry’s14 by-product.  Entirely artificial in kind, it executes a sinister objective to condition an 
audience response. As we shall explore, not all theorists align with the Bloomsbury definition, 
nonetheless, this negative sentiment prevails. For a number of theorists, the laugh track mostly 
underscores and masks the broadcast industry’s insecurities and greedy designs on profits. At 
any rate, although one readily marginalizes the laugh track by the manner in which it may be 
characterized as instrument within an industry’s productive process, it still gets assigned a 
positivistic status. It is thus validated through being a fraud, a baldly deceptive tool for the 
representation of an idealized audience. Accordingly, the laugh track is fixed within the domain 
of cultural knowledge both as a derided form of expression and as “technical device.”15 It is 
                                                          
14
 Ironically, the industry is the standard-bearer of realism. 
15
 The theoretical path for the laugh track then appears rather crooked. Quirkily, due to its being 
only a machine replication (a re-recording even) of a “universal human expression” it effectively 
violates what true laughter is felt as. Its positivity, its mediacy, is thus cast by theorists as an 
inherent failure. Even so, at each turn the general idea is that the laugh track remains productive. 
In short, to the media theorist the laugh track has a status as a cultural entity. 
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knowable. It is a “thing” of knowledge that relays a truth about the character and quality of a 
particular ideological or ontological kind of broadcast transmission experience.  
However, in its presumed transparency as a function within a productive apparatus, the 
laugh track’s culturally rationalized technicity actually serves to mark our deafness, perhaps even 
dumbness, towards its material history as a media formation. I contend, though, that the very 
absorption of the laugh track within the positivist frame of a media knowledge production 
apparatus is not simply an omission due to a theoretical blind spot amongst cultural history 
biased media theorists. Rather, the readable cultural play of a laughter-producing device is 
implicitly but necessarily marked against an assumed category of nonknowledge.  This category 
represents the “incomprehensibly monotonous mechanical operation” for generating sounds of 
laughter. As such, this “mechanical operation” that holds place for a productive nonknowledge 
apparently never needs to be examined. The laugh track is readily relegated to being a technical 
invention in service of a generalized desire. It is a base formation at the margins of the cultural 
historian’s knowledge production process. Effectively then, a line is drawn at the laugh track’s 
brute mechanicality.
16
  In the best of senses, the machine and its essence become proper name for 
representing the contemporary world’s smart tools and/or creative engineering.17 The machine is 
positively cast with the purpose of facilitating fluid and live forms of creativity, feeling and 
meaningful communication. It would appear then that the laugh track is a media formation 
caught in the midst of a theoretical conundrum. It is a conundrum in that, in virtue of attempting 
                                                          
16
 In ironic parallel to the media theorists, it is the very mechanicality that laughter, as social 
sanction according to Henri Bergson at least allegedly, puts in relief. 
17
 The media analysis of cultural historians (certain ones at least) mirrors the early classic cinema 
machine trope as being the source of humorous calamity and fascination. –We recall the faceless 
unrelenting system of order and control emblematic of the industrialized factory against which 
Charlie Chaplin and Buster Keaton, respectively in Moderns Times and The Electric House 
among other famous works, struggle to preserve their humanity.  
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to render laughter as productive resource, the laugh track is a technological contrivance that 
necessarily fails (us).
18
   
 
The Question of Function   
As we shall explore in Part Two, some theorists have greatly advanced the research and 
analysis of the laugh track. Ultimately, however, the status quo definition penned by Bloomsbury 
is maintained. The laugh track is simply understood by how it and for what it functions.
19
 The 
laugh track is readily assigned the status of a mechanism for performing and doing something to 
then be analyzed within a productive frame of media theory.
20
 As just outlined, we enter the 
research and attendant analytic, as already sanctioned within the domains of media studies and 
burgeoning digital humanities. The “laugh track,” loosely referenced within the category of 
studio effects, is considered merely as an entertainment trigger device. Bluntly put, the laugh 
track is presumed to be constituted as a function.
21
  
                                                          
18
 The “necessarily fails us” is a conundrum in that failure is unproductive to us. 
19
  Specifically in terms of what is absent in the audience’s experience of a broadcast mediated 
production. 
20
 For an account of the generative epistemological undergirdings of media theory in 
Communication Studies see Kęstutis Kirtiklis’ “Communication Alone. Epistemology and 




 In attributing “function-hood” to the laugh track what is mostly focussed on is the necessity of 
its presence as simulated immediacy of response. That is, on how the laugh track constitutes and 
influences the at-home audience’s experience.  This focal point or rationale for its being a 
mainstay element of sitcoms (among other productions) is peculiar. As what seems to give the 
laugh track its troublesome appeal is the quality of its presence, which lends a sense of an 
inherently fraught experience. I point this out because, as prominent sound theorist Jacob Smith 
20 
 
The investments of a culturo-historical approach that automatically posits the laugh track 
as function opens us onto a primary organizing problematic for Part One of this dissertation. 
Through my analysis, I am attempting to grapple with how uselessness is debarred from the 
discussion of media. Hence, there is an undercurrent of persistent questioning and challenging of 
standard conceptions of the notion “function.” In terms of function, I focus on what we mean and 
assume or take for granted. I certainly do not claim that the word is being misused by media 
theorists. Rather, I question the presumed authority that ascribing something as a “function” 
bestows upon a media device, element, etc. That is, either for giving explanatory force to one’s 
account or for making sense of the role and purpose of a mediatic activity. Instances of the use of 
the term “function” 22  are rampant throughout the various texts that I look at. By and large, from 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
contends, disembodied laughter uncannily tricks us (or at least appears to) into participation 
alongside an imaginary audience. Interestingly then, what is at stake for theorists is the laugh 
track’s lack of presence and lack of immediacy or rather its particular kind of mediacy. And yet, 
so far, we have only approached it through an analytic that absorbs the “counterfeit” laughter 
producing mechanism within a broader notion of media. What is pushed to the forefront of 
analysis is the laugh track’s purpose as a “live” simulator or active function within cultural 
history (i.e., TV entertainment). Again though, we never consider how it is possible that this 
“source” of or “contributor” to our anxiety or being ill-at-ease is constituted. 
22
 From the Merriam Webster Dictionary we know the first use of “function” to be in 1533. It’s 
derived from the “Latin function-, functio performance, from fungi to perform; probably akin to 
Sanskrit bhun kte he enjoys.” Philosopher/mathematician G.W. Leibnitz, in 1673, theorized 
function specifically “differentiable function” (for relating changes in measurement) as a basis 
for his calculus and half century later mathematician Johann Benoulli refined “function” as being 
an expression indicating mathematical variability and  constants. The social anthropologist 
Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown, also considered to be the founder of structural functionalism, 
in 1935 wrote the essay “On the Concept of Function in Social Science” (see the journal The 
American Anthropologist). Indebted to Durkheim Radcliffe-Brown declares: “As the word 
function is here being used the life of an organism is conceived as the functioning of its structure. 
It is through and by the continuity of the functioning that the continuity of the structure is 
preserved. If we consider any re-current part of the life-process, such as respiration, digestion, 
etc. its function is the part it plays in, the contribution it makes to, the life of the life of the 
organism as a whole.” And further on “The concept of function as here defined thus involves the 
notion of a structure consisting of a set or relations amongst unit entities, the continuity of the 
structure being maintained by a life-process made up of the activities of the constituent units.” 
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The Bloomsbury Dictionary of Media and Communication to any number of the topic relevant 
analyses, media theorists deploy (make function of) “function” as either the following kind of 
noun or verb: “the laugh track is a function of ...;” or, “the laugh track functions to ...” My plan is 
to question if function is to only be circumscribed by a mechanism’s doing of something, 
achieving an outcome, actualizing a potential, or, in keeping with my project, being of use. To 
reiterate my prefatory remarks, I do not plan to discount or dissolve function through such an 
examination, but to explore how it may otherwise be conceived. In other words, how malleable is 
our conception of function and how important is it for thinking about media? And further, when 
one refers to an “operation” or manner of functioning, what investments in causative 
explanations, usefulness, or, at least, potential for a particular outcome, are being made? Over 
the course of my analysis, I entertain function’s variants as theorized across the formulations: 
functioning; functionaries; and, defunct. Directly applied to canned laughter, we will explore if 
and how laugh tracks are inescapably circumscribed by some notion of function.  
Analyzing function brings us to the nub of my thesis with respect to how we may 
experience contemporary media. Need our experience only be circumscribed by instrumentalist 
thinking? To depart from analyzing media in instrumental terms, I draw on Giorgio Agamben’s 
account of the gesture.
23
 His idea is that by being open to things as gestures, rather than by how 
they may be devised to mediate (the world for us), we may experience things as if in their 
immediacy. Considering, for instance, his exploration of language, Agamben offers that we may 
experience language independently of the purposive and propositional confines of discourse and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
We also note function along with form became the 20
th
 century modernist’s mantra for marking 
and perhaps marketing architectural design against the perceived excesses of their predecessors.  
23
 See Agamben, Giorgio. “Marginal Notes on Commentaries on the Society of the Spectacle,” 
“Notes on Politics,” in Means Without Ends: Notes on Politics. Cesare Casarino and Vincenzo 
Binetti, trans. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000. 
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discursive orders by which language is fettered. As a gesture, language is well other than a 
“means to an end” limited to being a vehicle of communication or a holder of information. 
Agamben gets us to engage language as a “pure means.”24 That is, as a doing that is generative 
of unknown possibilities and the experience that may come with such. In effect, I wish to see 
how his thinking on the gesture applies to media and technology. To be clear, by Agamben’s 
gesture I am not positing a counterpoint to function. It does not signify an opposition. However, 
gesture does diverge from the orbit of instrumentalist and propositional framing by which we 
may declare something to be a function. Rather, a gesture, as thought by Agamben, does not 
offer a statement on things. As will be explored, the gesture represents an alternative mode of 
engagement to the orthodoxy for positing the laugh track as mediating function. Further, when 
putting into practice a form of media archaeology, it will help to engage the aporetic constitution 
of the laugh track.  
 
The Laugh Track as Archive 
No doubt, to some, the above characterization of the laugh track as trope of technicity 
collapses as a highly laughable form of caricatured contemporary reflexivity. Nonetheless, by 
lumping it in with a category of meaningless mechanical objects, it does point to a sustained 
strategy for actively negating the laugh track’s material presence. My project, however, involves 
examining the laugh track as a mechanical object. Specifically, as pertains to the technical 
operations and specificity of the laugh track as its own historical material formation. This 
formation, I contend, does not come into being by the knowledge/nonknowledge binary scripting 
of media studies. It is not a product of the ethos and discursive methodology of history conceived 





in terms of culturally meaningful practices and purposes. Instead, at the margins of knowledge 
production, so cast and prepared by discursive explanatory accounts, we may encounter the 
formation of the laugh track as a peculiar reserve. One that makes play of, perhaps as serious 
humor, the material operation of electro-cum-techno-archival systems. Thus, following 
Agamben’s philosophizing of the gesture, I explore the distinct history of the laugh track as a 
discrete media formation.  
Before further discussion of the laugh track as divergent from the conceptual orthodoxy 
of media and Communication Studies, I emphasize that my orientation towards a material-based 
exploration of the laugh track is not rooted in an inverse logic. To reiterate, my intentions are, as 
stated in the Preface, toward taking an open-ended approach. Particular to the laugh track as a 
reserve of uselessness, rather than trying to arrive at a definitive position, my interest is for 
exploring how (by a discourse that permits such, as it were) we may think about technology and 
the archive. With that said, in Part One, I examine conceptions of technology and the archive in 
two ways. In one sense, I explore accounts of technology and of the archive as being governed 
by quantifying processes for organizing and ordering materiality. In another sense, I consider 
how technology and the archive as discrete formations may be broadly thought in terms of an 
implicit ordering (that though supportive of quantificatory schemas is not reducible to such). No 
doubt, especially in that I will be working by the logic of particular media archaeologists, there 
will certainly be difficulties in distinguishing the organizational characteristics and doings of the 
archive from the workings of technology. However, though the classical archive (be it as 
contemporary public institution) is very much a complex technological operation, the archive is, 
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also, as Michel Foucault reminds us,
25
 a temporal and historical registry relating past, present 
and future being and becoming. In fact, for Foucault the archive is a system that maintains (and 
transforms as and by) its own logic. It is a pre-conceptual structuring formation permitting 
subsequent knowledge and media. Foucault thus puts us in position to rethink how to account for 
media. By terms that may be neither instrumentalist nor reliant on tropes of function. Still, the 
notion of function is not made irrelevant to our analytic. Rather we may instead conceive it 
differently from being a causal and a purposive indicator. Needless to say, Foucault's account of 
the archive holds promise for opening onto an alternative account of function.  
 
Media Archaeology and Temporal Regimes 
The audiences that produced the roars, titters, and chuckles 
of the canned laugh tracks these shows splice into their tapes, the 
gags that set them off, the actors delivering the lines, the shows 
themselves – have all long since passed on, many of them dead and 
buried literally as well as figuratively. But the laughter they 
produced or elicited has been immortalized electronically and is 
used over and over in shows distributed throughout the nation, 
throughout the world. (Rose Kohn Goldsen, The Show and Tell 
Machine, 68-69)   
 
                                                          
25
 See Michel Foucault’s The Archaeology of Knowledge. 
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Influenced by Rose Kohn Goldsen’s statement “But the laughter they produced or elicited 
has been immortalized electronically and is used over and over in shows distributed throughout 
the nation, throughout the world” I propose considering laugh tracks to be structured as their own 
databases. The focus now becomes how individuated laugh tracks potentially contribute to, by 
obliquely formed systems of repetition, an ever-expanding program of anonymous and dispersive 
archivation. By this thinking, I plan to examine laughter’s materio-technological transformations 
by exploring how the very mechanisms for designing such an archival system of imitation are 
and have been at work. When studying “canned laughter,” we are confronted with a process that 
is always already technologically mediated. Thereby, the focus shifts away from what the laugh 
track may represent as, within the culturo-political economy of broadcasting, an auditory gestural 
performance.
26
 We, instead, look to explore the laugh track in its own domain of electromagnetic 
inscription. In the simplest sense, laugh tracks are sound assemblages of recognized, 
appropriated, described and catalogued types of laughter (i.e., giddy, nervous, riotous). The 
laugh track media formation is an archival system. It is a particularly configured temporality. By 
this thinking, the laugh track not only occurs in a generalized time (of media and history), it is 
also a time-making registry activated by its own temporal regime.    
In Parts Two and Three, re-orienting the discussion of the laugh track as archival 
formation, I will rely on the approaches of certain media archaeologists. Their non-linear and 
non-narrative approach brings us closer to experiencing the laugh track and media more as 
Agamben’s idea of a “pure means.” They help to bring some clarity to the generative forces that 
organize and determine our experience. Wolfgang Ernst explains this approach in detail:  
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 The voicing of sentiment likely directed at a humorous situations. 
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Media archaeology understood as an analysis of epistemological 
configurations (both machinic and logic) does not simply seek a 
redemption of the crude beginnings of forgotten or misread media of the 
past, nor is it confined to a reconstruction of the crude beginnings and 
prehistories of technical media. Rather than being a nostalgic collection of 
“dead media” of the past, assembled in a curiosity cabinet, media 
archaeology is an analytical tool, a method of analyzing and presenting 
aspects of media that would otherwise escape the discourse of cultural 
history. As long as media are not mistaken for the mass-media content, 
they turn out to be non-discursive entities, belonging to a different 
temporal regime that, to be analyzed, requires an alternative means of 
description. (Wolfgang Ernst, “Media Archaeography,” 240) 
 
Ernst departs from approaches that ascribe purpose or function to a technological device or 
object. Instead, Ernst directs us to consider how the highly active, technologically coercive 
generative processes, independent of historical placement, maintain and permit particular modes 
of information transmission and storage.  In this approach it then becomes necessary to explore 
media as their own formations of rules, protocols, temporalities and time-limiting processes. 
Ernst further explains:  
With   an   extended   concept   of   the   archive,   a   media-archaeological 
approach to the past must mean that media cannot be made into   
“historical”   objects   of   research   only. Different   media   systems,   
from library catalogs to microfilming, have influenced the content as well 
27 
 
as the understanding of the historical remains of the archive itself 
(Wolfgang Ernst, Digital Memory, 28).  
 
Media archaeology opens onto the possibility of exploring historical formations by being 
attentive to a medium’s particular generative operations. Accordingly, I will focus on the 
proliferation of laugh tracks as that which have been generated by their own formation of 
archival procedures. By this reflexive archivological analytic, I thus explore the laugh track as a 
non-discursive process with its own materio-archival formation, one that may be conceived as its 
own self-regulating mediating force.  
 
Techniques of Knowledge (problematic methodology for the laugh 
track) 
Re-setting the terms for an historical account of the laugh track is no real victory of one 
methodology over another. It is not the trumping of cultural history in favor of that possessing a 
rudimentary and non-speculative constitution wherein the laugh track is then somehow grasped 
in its pure state. If anything, it is its own problematic. The laugh track experienced through 
media archaeology actually triggers challenges to how we may think of “generativity.” Further, 
questions arise, at the mathematical limits or very thresholds of mechanized temporal 
containments, over the authorizing mechanisms of Ernst’s form of media archaeology. Ernst’s 
media archaeology, in effect, leads us to questionable limits. His theoretical reflexivity, as 
applied to the archive and his general emphasis on measured time, is instructive for launching a 
non-narrative history of the laugh track. However, Ernst’s form of media archaeology leaves 
little room for considering the formation of machines apart from being organized by an 
actualized notion of what they are designed to do.  Fortunately, media archaeology also serves as 
28 
 
springboard to a more radicalized or anarchic analytic of media formations. Conversely, I gain 
traction by Siegfried Zielinski's media anarchaeology. Zielinski’s approach dwells within the 
shadows of processes that subvert their own registration mechanisms for archivation. Through 
media anarchaeology, I may navigate the utter and perverse pointlessness of the laugh track as 
system of archivation. The point being, considered this way, the laugh track eludes being 
described from an estimable point of mechanical production and reproduction. To put otherwise, 
an account that only ascribes to media a practicable generative directive is of “no use” for 
formations with unplanned redundancies. As I will develop in Part Three, canned laughter entails 
an archival structure of production whose object is made purposeful by making useless its being 
purposeful. Zielinski's formulation of the anarchive permits us to grasp how the archival system 
that hosts the excesses of laughter is a perversion of its law of rules. Zielinski thus helps to 
articulate where and how, beyond the regulatory mechanism of the archive, such a law may 
always already be broken. That is, for how a mediatic system limitlessly regulates its content and 
its systematic programmability through, not only (re)producing more laugh track (as the systems 
of itself) but by multiplying its processes for replicating laughter, for how as archive the laugh 
track becomes the quantified repeating of repetition itself. 
Media Anarchaeology and the Inaccessibility of Certain Possible 
Quantification   
Media archaeology begins by rejecting the idea that history can be reduced to tidy 
narratives.
27
 It also insists that techniques of analysis need be developed to describe media 
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  See Wolfgang Ernst’s “Media Archaeography: Method and Machine versus History and 
Narrative of Media,” Media Archaeology:Approaches, Applications, and Implications. Erkki 
Huhtamo, Jussi Parikka eds. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011, pp. 239–255.  
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formation by its particular materiality.
28
 Furthermore, it locates the very possibility of analysis in 
techniques born of the very technology media archaeologists seek to analyze.
29
 Thereby, 
accounts of canned laughter, and more generally any media formation, are in some way or 
another determined by the very terms and rules governing the operations of machines. Like 
Wolfgang Ernst, Siegfried Zielinski considers media formations as discrete temporal regimes. 
However, emphasizing the need to explore the variety of inventive processes that support media 
formations, Zielinski, far more than Ernst, treats both “temporality” and “regimes” as entirely 
discrete. Zielinski professes a need for accounting for media that, apart from contending with the 
mechanics of a mediatic device, explores its formation as processes that may entail a kind of 
under-calculus. That is, a discrete system may defy a standard time measurement represented by 
the predictive logics of algorithmic computation. Put another way, Zielinski, who systematically 
challenges the authority of the archival record,
30
 is very suspicious of the general frame by which 
the media archaeologist Ernst presumes an arche or origin. For Ernst, the archive prescribes the 
source of what may come into being as media. If anything, as Zielinski tells us, media 
formations, including  supportive materials (i.e., documents deemed particular to an invention) as 
well as archives themselves, are at best indicators of what may not be contained in a record, but 
part of the invention process.  
To slow the forward movement of Ernst’s media archaeology, Zielinski introduces the 
idea of recessive or non-phenotypic elements in media formations.  He gets us to grapple with 
“trial and error” as being useful and maybe not so useful. Not all inventions “see the light of 
day,” nor do all inventions work. However, non-realized, non-working media are still, in some 






 The archive is often presumed as the object/artefact sanctioning or purpose-giving authority. 
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fashion, of media history and more importantly are of, in some way or another, the general 
processes of making and inventing.
31
 They should not be readily discounted from the makings 
and workings of machines in current or past circulation.  Furthermore, Zielinski also prompts us 
to explore elements of media formation beyond the narrow strictures of seeming relevance. 
Commenting on the task of the anarchaeologist in accounting for the rich mixture of disciplines 
and interests that often inform an invention Zielinski writes, 
Magical, scientific and technical praxis do not follow in chronological 
sequence for anarchaeology; on the contrary, they combine at particular 
moments in time, collide with each other, provoke one another, and, in a 
way, maintain tension and movement within developing processes. When 
heterogeneous approaches meet, openings appear that, in the long term, 
may even result in relatively stable technical inventions. Porta’s 
experiments to sound out the media possibilities of the camera obscura in 
staging his theatrical performance of moving images with sound or his 
rotating cryptographic devices are examples of this as well as Kircher’s 
combinatorial boxes for mathematical calculations and musical 
compositions or Ritter’s discoveries about electricity and chemical 
processes. (Siegfried Zielinski, Deep Time of the Media, 258-259) 
A media invention, regardless of it being destined for a particular use and having a genesis 
within a particular ordering of technology may, as Zielinski shows, be inspired, informed or 
influenced by completely divergent discourses, musings and activities, for example, interests in 
spiritism, mysticism, arcane poetics and fleeting feelings of love. Zielinski’s anarchaeology runs 
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appositional to Ernst’s positivist genetic plan. He rejects an arche-geneticism that gets instituted 
as the temporal ordering mechanism of an archaeology of media artefacts. Instead, Zielinski gets 
us to consider what is assumed (as useless) and yet haunts Ernst’s temporal regimes. He responds 
by instituting an anarchegenesis (of materialism), a recessive gene in the very workings of a 
regime, practice, in effect, an invention. This greatly complicates, sometimes through a hidden 
subtraction, the reductive mathematical and instrumentalist thinking by which media is 
conceived. As such, if Ernst would lead us to focus on the operations of the laugh track in terms 
of quantifiable, future-making auto-generative instances, Zielinski’s would get us to reconsider 
its very form of generativity. Perhaps, co-extensively with a medium’s being quantifiable, the 
laugh track engenders a pre-disposed defunctness or temporal recess. In other words, we are 
challenged to explore how a medium may host a trace of an impossible-to-trace function 
(perhaps a non-function). In this way, the future of an invention is that which is never, within the 




The Frivolous, Function and Function as Frivolous 
Zielinski is a great help for opening an analytic onto an un-economy of inventive forces 
that expands the study of media beyond measuring how they are generated and generative. In 
effect, he gets us to question an implicit use/useless binary while opening onto less determinate 
forms of a media’s history (which of course doesn’t simply focus one on “the past”). 
Specifically, Zielinski’s work gets us to identify the application of a use/useless metric in media 
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 Zielinski entertains catachresis (at the origin of things) as imbuing temporality in re-
experiencing the measurable and productive. 
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archaeological description while entertaining descriptions that permit exploring seemingly lesser 
potent, even impotent, modalities within rules governing invention. For Zielinski, the value of 
these modalities remains inestimable. Akin to Agamben’s account of the gesture as radically 
indeterminate, by Zielinski’s particular explorations of media, or would-be media, we are never 
in a position to posit impotencies as some form of inventive counter-force or resistance inspired 
by, or for fuelling, creation. In other words, media may elude operating by use or exchange 
value. Following the tenor of Zielinski’s questioning and his challenges to and within media 
archaeology (vis a vis media anarchaeology) we are inspired to consider how uselessness may 
be, non-oppositionally, a part of utility. That is, how uselessness might be accounted for in and 
by our function-oriented systems of knowledge productions. Is uselessness just the proverbial 
necessary noise that competes for channel time with the signal?  – The category of uncontrolled 
affect within that of controlled material effect?  But given the logic of signal/noise use/waste 
metrics, would that not be to simply reabsorb uselessness into being a function? Would that not 
frame uselessness as a use, purpose and invariably a function within the mechanisms of 
transmission and a systems structuring? The issue to address is then how to approach uselessness 
such that it does not only and automatically get turned into another form of use and then to ask 




Jacques Derrida, in deconstructing the 18
th
 century empiricist Etienne Bonnot de 
Condillac’s influential but paradoxical description of the linguistic sign (or core unit of meaning, 
analogy, discourse, etc.), provides us with a rare theorized instance of uselessness as essential for 
generating human knowledge. Derrida unpacks the unintended premise of an inescapable logic 
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 For one: what might this say of “my” knowledge of the laugh track as, by process of repeating 
items in a self-similar way, being useless? 
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entwining Condillac’s positivist account of the structure of a sign’s potency and worth with a 
sign’s unquantifiable uselessness, its inherent frivolousness.  
Frivolity consists in being satisfied with tokens. It originates with the sign, 
or rather with the signifier which, no longer signifying, is no longer a 
signifier. The empty, void, friable, useless signifier ... [and further on in 
the passage] The sign is disposability ... (Jacques Derrida, The Archeology 
of the Frivolous: Reading Condillac, 118-119) 
Here, Condillac’s logic renders the structure of the sign in terms of its functional process of 
“emptying,” specifically what he calls its disposability. By such, the useless or frivolous is, 
impossibly one might think, no mere by-product of signifying.
34
  Rather, frivolity – the 
inestimably useless – must inhere in the very structure of the process of the sign’s functioning. 
That is, in doing its work in the formation of rules, meaning, analogy, discourse, epistemes and 
ultimately knowledge. At any rate, not just restricted to the generative economy of Condillac’s 
empirical linguistic system, we may have a way to engage uselessness that opens onto a different 
conception of function. A way that both slips the conventional implicit binary use/useless and 
describes the unquantifiable aspects of media formations.
35
 In this sense, we may be open to the 
always transforming laugh track’s authorization and maintenance of its own uniqueness. An 
uniqueness that is so by actually making laughter, with respect to the form of “laughter” as a 
category, generic. In effect, the laugh track’s ends are always foreclosed on by its means as 
quantified production and re-production that override laughter’s necessary implied un-
quantifiability. Without question, we will need to contend with how the laugh track operates as a 
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 In an obvious sense, the process of imitation in the re-making or assembling of tracks born out 
of previous canned laughter appears similarly generative, or rather degenerative, to Condillac’s 
sign unit.  
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double registry: physically and symbolically – marking what is to be laughed at while, by design, 




























Introduction (for Part One) 
In Part One I explore the theoretical backdrop for how the laugh track has been analyzed 
and provide a possible basis for how it may be analyzed. The laugh track has been primarily 
approached within the analytical purview of cultural history. This approach restricts 
engagements with media to being circumscribed by purposive indicators of cultural activity or 
production. Analysis is thus limited to considering what is useful and, in course, what is useless 
by an evaluation process that serves a program of planned or desired outcomes. I, however, wish 
to explore uselessness in less evaluative terms. I wish to explore uselessness as integral to a 
media formation. The laugh track, I contend, is a media formation that is predicated on making 
useless its production. Still, before a more detailed examination of this proposition, we need to 
establish the terms for approaching the laugh track. Accordingly, instead of analyzing the laugh 
track from a cultural-historical approach, I propose exploring it as a media formation with 
particular technological and archival configurations. I look to encounter the laugh track within 
and as a version of a materially productive system. The aim is therefore not to over-ride, trump, 
or dispose of the prior work done on the laugh track as it is to re-visit and grapple with some of 
the terms guiding our knowledge production. I attempt to do this by examining how we conceive 
of a medium (the laugh track) that, in its very material formation, presents a complex of 
problems for a cultural account and also by grappling with what is readily considered to be 
media (towards which we as theorists may direct an analytic and claim a domain of study). The 
key term function, as we shall see, raises an epistemological quandary for certain prominent 
models of communication. It is my contention that, in one form or another, a function or 
causative formulation gets posited and does more “work” for the productiveness of a schema 
than may be rightly assumed. As already stated, I have no interest in doing away with function 
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but rather to examine its use and to consider possible alternatives. My thinking is that the laugh 
track may indeed be a function; however, our conception of such need not be restricted to or for 
the relating of a broadly understood backdrop for a thing’s being (a part of) media. In this 
respect, Michel Foucault’s account of the archive will be doubly invaluable. Foucault, in his The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, though focused on discourse formation, effectively points the way 
for engaging the specificity of things unfiltered by the scrim affect of a generalized notion of 
media. And, as I shall explicate, his declaration of the archive as the system of its functioning 
inspires, while still retaining what gives traction in the historical material formation of things, a 
shift away from conceiving of media formations etiologically and as relationally bound. Instead, 
by Foucault we come to explore formations, both discursive and mediatic, as procedural or in 
terms of things being of rules and generative of rules. As departure from the main approaches 
taken towards the laugh track, here in Part One, I will take stock of the manner in which we may 
approach the terms of materiality, technology and the archival that inform, in the coming two 









Chapter One: The “Laugh Track” Defined 
 
The broadcast-formatted laugh track signals a border between the mechanical operations 
of broadcasts and the recorded and/or material realization of the “creating of content” for 
production. As already noted in my main introduction, from the Bloomsbury Dictionary of Media 
and Communication we are provided with the general idea that the laugh track is an added and 
for the most part dictatorial component of the standard broadcast experience: “It functions as a 
stimulus to audience laughter with the hint that all of us listening or watching are ﬁnding the 
programme funny. There is no room on the laugh track for the dissenting sounds of those who 
wish to express a contrary view.” Further drawing on media theorist Brett Mills (The Sitcom, 
Edinburgh University Press, 2010) Bloomsbury circumscribes: 
 
... the laugh track “presents the audience as a mass, whose responses are 
unambiguous and who signal a collective understanding of what is or isn’t 
funny.” It “not only ignores alternative readings of a comedy text, but also 
suggests there is verbal pleasure to be had in going along with the rest of the 
crowd.” In other words, it has ideological connotations. At the same time, says 
Mills, the laugh track reminds individual viewers that they are, in certain 
circumstances, responding diﬀerently from the crowd. (Bloomsbury Dictionary of 




No doubt the laugh track is a tool for manipulation and advancement of a conformist agenda.
36
 
Still, what comes clear in the Bloomsbury definition is the formal or technical relation between 
the main of production and its secondary supportive elements: on the one hand, the creative 
content, or the comedic text; on the other hand, the laugh track, a contrived studio effect and 
external intermediary for those to whom the broadcasted programme is transmitted. Unlike 
music scores or sound effects that are added for dramatic or comedic effect, the laugh track is 
often seen as antithetical to the creative product as well as its democratically idealized form of 
reception.
37
 In all, “canned laughter” represents the external-to-the-base-creation-of-scripted-
action toiling of an audio technician. Such attempts to simulate the potential response of a “live” 
audience to whatever presented material thus only impose a technologically derivative gimmick 
on a work’s broadcast transmission.  
 
Having been posited as not only in opposition to the essence of the broadcast studio art-
form and, as outlined, even an unnecessary component in an art-form’s transmission, the laugh 
track’s use is effectively defined as having a mediating function. Though to some not very good 
at mediating, it is a surrogate and stimulator or, as we shall come to examine in Part Two, even a 
suture. In a nutshell, the laugh track is understood by its use or more specifically its function with 
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 With the caveat that viewers in “TV” and “radio land” might, and this seems rather ironic 
(ironic in that one’s supposed independence results from a dependence or from an instruction to 
laugh), differentiate themselves from the laugh prompt by not responding in kind. The laugh 
track appears to be conceived somewhat in accordance with early Frankfurt mass media theory. 
As that, which by the construction of a generic-sounding audience, promotes conformity. 
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 As proffered in Bloomsbury, canned laughter represents a political threat by depriving the 
viewer the right to assess whether or not something is funny. It warrants their laughter while 
bounding a scene in set-response for consumption, thus limiting the programme’s power for 
playing out as a work of art with potentially unlimited ways of being interpreted. It is seen as an 
intrusive and superfluous technological and ideological function designed to serve the interests 
of broadcast industry visionaries, either for a wanting to streamline the studio-recording process 
or for target-marketing a broadcast network’s product. 
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respect to the valued offerings of the text as cultural production. Nonetheless, other than positing 
a discursive frame for which to make marginal, by Bloomsbury and by others to be discussed, we 
actually lack insight into the make-up or constitution of the laugh track as media formation. 
Simply put: What is the laugh track? 
38
 
The term function represents an analytical investment in a causative force. By treating the laugh 
track as a function, the theorist commits to a course of descriptions that reinforces a frame of 
analysis divorced from experiencing it by what it does and how it is formed independently of 
who or what (productive regimen) it may serve.  In efforts to gain insight into the constitution of 
this so-readily-called “function,” over the course of the following chapters, I attempt to examine 
how the laugh track may be thought and approached as a techno-archival media formation. 
Rather than proscribed by a rationale for it being a media formation, I instead look to explore it 
much like Giorgio Agamben gets us to think about the gesture. That is, in taking a turn towards 
exploring it as its own archival registry, it may be experienced as “pure means,” possibly free of 
content and purpose. Considered this way, the laugh track is not then a trope of laughter that, for 
entertainment purposes, strategically serves to interrupt discourse. Certainly, as with the 
philosophizing of laughter by Georges Bataille and Henri Bergson, the laugh track may also be 
explored as an extra-discursive interruption of rule and order. However, unlike laughter, the 
laugh track is an aporia. Instead of being a breach of rules, it is paradoxically ruled by its being a 
system of exhaustion. As I will come to describe more in Part Three, the laugh track maintains 
its productivity through a gesture – of never-ending archival actions – that renders its product 
useless. For the rest of Part One I examine the laugh track’s orthodox status as a function. In 
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turn, I examine alternative approaches to a discursive model of analysis that explore technology 
and cultural artefacts in their discreteness.  
Comedy Studies and Technology  
 
Although Bloomsbury allocates space for it in their dictionary, in general, the literature 




 century theorist, that can, at a pin’s drop, conduct digitally 
fine-tuned grazing of any cultural history’s landscape, this lack must warrant an opportune smirk 
and chuckle. This is especially so, in a time when the conventionally so-called peripheral or 
secondary elements of cultural production or experience have been promoted to the foreground 
of analysis.
39
 Of course, there is no shortage of broadcast and/or media outlets for laugh-inducing 
practices in contemporary culture. Actually, the forms of comedy and mechanisms for 
disseminating/distributing such are a major growth industry. In fact, and more to the point, these 
particular outlets are also the material for study. In terms of their manifold processes of 
conveyance, they are given considerable attention by and within many divergent academic 
departments, journals etc. No different than in other humanities-related disciplines, the content, 
comedy, is being studied in terms of its being a creative format that, in some form or another, is 
moulded by today’s always rapidly altering technologies. Certainly, comedy itself is considered a 
serious format that engenders potentially valuable “street-level” insight into the intricacies of 
emergent social and political activity. However, the technologies are also registered as having a 
prime role in shaping the wit and craft of the contemporary humorist’s calculations for conveying 
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the comedic message. For some time, analysis of the comedic has been shifting from being 
largely examined as commentary and/or sentiment to engaging the particulars of the medium by 
which the comedic occurs and may be constructed. The digital technologies, it is thought, are 
reframing the terms by which one may research, study and forecast the problems and potentials 
that the developing media’s hold for traditional comedic practices.  
 
Recent scholarship concerning what contributes to the production, dissemination and 
reception of comedy – of what makes us laugh – engages a host of analyses as pertains to the 
role of developments in contemporary technological media.  Often they are: modes of digital 
distribution; social media (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Websites, YouTube); media devices 
(smart phones, digital cameras, camcorders, iPods, tablets); and popular formats for digital 
representation (memes and meme culture). More specific to the technical qualities of production 
and/or post-production, scholars now devote more time than ever before to analyzing changes in 
camera techniques and sound recording/mixing for simulating the “live,” “real” and unscripted. – 
Productions (TV, On-line) deploy pixilated surveillance imagery and/or revitalized vérité/home-
made audio and visual camera tropes for contributing to a sense of immediacy and “liveness” 
aligned with the “real-time” delivery of contemporary modes of transmission.40 Post-production 
software, in terms of expediency, array of visual and audio effects as well as content altering 
capacities, is recognized as radically impacting on current and coming generations of 
commercial/consumer grade comedy. Among the effects
41
 at the disposal of editors is an 
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 For an account of Reality TV and see “Cameras, Reality and Miranda,” Frances Gray, 
Comedy Studies Volume 3, Issue 2, 2012. 
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 Effects have the dual status of being an additive feature for enhancement or extension of a 
specific production’s content (perhaps justifiably by their designed relation). They are also 
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incredibly vast reserve, an archive if you will, of pre-recorded sounds for conceivably simulating 
any associated audio with any recorded visual action. – Those being sounds that accompany 
diegesis and off-screen environments (i.e., the Wilhelm scream, wind, street noise, etc.) and also, 
germane to my research, for approximating or imitating the likely audience response to the on-
screen action (i.e., canned heat, canned laughter, canned clapping).  
Invigorated by the ubiquity of the cyber and its always multiplying material edifices 
comedy scholars wrestle with the “techno-communicative” mechanisms as means of 
transmission and as a visceral extension of the “comedic body.” The question often guiding 
research is: how do these contemporary mechanisms determine the form, content and packaging 
of contemporary comedic affect and relief?  Thus, comedy studies, in terms of both its own 
formation and reception, is becoming absorbed, and perhaps un-comedically so, in(to) what 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
broadly thought to be a part of the category of technological mechanisms by which the content of 
a broadcast production is structured. By film and broadcast industry standards, and, by extension, 
the claims of notable theorists Tomlinson Holman, Robert L. Mott, David Bordwell and Kristin 
Thompson, the manipulation of effects is itself held as its own artistic practice. Effects, whether 
deployed, layered and/or mixed, are often considered to hover over a production, as if they are 
their own design. Though we need be mindful of the importance of theorist Michel Chion’s 
globalist approach to cinema productions – that we cannot study a film’s audio independently 
from its images (and I suppose vice versa) – the media theorist often attends to the practicalities 
specific to whatever production. Effects, though grasped as an industry assemblage, devised as 
being formatable to or universally substitutable for any production, are analyzed as adding to a 
production (and its reception) yet another (distinct) mediating element. When restricted to 
studying comedy, we grasp an effect by “what it does for” a comedy act. Even so, this is 
consistent with effects, when more broadly considered beyond comedic effect. According to the 
once renowned sound editor Marvin Kerner we understand:  
... the function of sound effects is three-fold: (1) to simulate reality, (2) to add or 
create something off scene that is not really there, and (3) to help the director 
create a mood. (Marvin Kerner, The art of the sound effects editor, 11).  
Other than in terms of its implicit instrumentality for facilitating – through simulation that 
supports the sense of the real – the technological is seemingly absent. Perhaps that is the 
effect/affect of an effect. – Effects are to be considered as technique that, more specifically as 




makes routine the comedic routine. No matter, comedy scholars still seek to preserve the visceral 
or bodily as central. They thereby intend to avoid full subjugation of a comic’s offerings within 
“the technological.” In effect, this is the comedy theorist’s authorizing programmatic. In the 
introduction to the Comedy Studies journal’s 2015 special issue media and comedy Peter C.  
Kunze makes clear, 
This special issue of Comedy Studies brings into focus the effects of new 
media on comedy production, distribution and consumption. Indeed, few 
subjects have been as impacted by new media to the extent comedy has. One 
only needs to log on to a social media platform to see a daily barrage of viral 
videos, memes, blog posts, witty Tweets and Facebook statuses. In the digital 
age, the temptation to say ‘everyone’s a comedian’ exists, and certainly the 
technology exists for such possibilities to become true. At the same time, 
however, we must be reticent to surrender to digital utopianism. As the 
following essays argue, new media or, more accurately, digital media create 
novel opportunities and consequences for users to create, consume and study 
comedy. Simultaneously understanding, appreciating and critiquing these 
ramifications become our charge as scholars and critics of humor and comedy. 
(Peter C. Kunze,“Laughter in the Digital Age,” Comedy Studies, 2015, 101)  
  
Comedy studies, it appears, operate within a discursive regimen for reckoning the comical as an 
historically distinct human activity. The comical is, though set in relation to, separable from the 
mechanical or automated systems by which it gets proliferated. An analysis of comedy thus 
proceeds by reading “the technological” and the comedic as two distinct but given functions of 
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the other, so-operating in relation to the other. The general point being that, although forms of 
media are acknowledged as giving shape to content, media is still parsed from content as a tool 
for content’s conveyance and reception. 
 




Drawing on previous literature on the historical 
development of this device and on current practices in TV 
comedy production, I examine concurrences and 
discrepancies in a comparison of the intended functions of 
the laugh track and the ways in which it has been perceived 
by “viewers at home.” (Inger-Lise Kalviknes Bore, 
“Laughing Together?,” 24) 
 
 
Here, examining the kinds of effects that particular laugh tracks may have on audiences,
43
 
TV and media theorist Inger-Lise Kalviknes Bore focuses on certain instances of a designed 
purpose for and actual reception of a laugh track. In part, she foregrounds her research in the 
creative decisions or intentions of an industry practice. That is, given the industry research metric 
guided conceptualization of a TV program’s target-audience, what was meant for the particular 
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 With her focus groups in Britain and Norway. 
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use of a laugh track?  Beyond industry goals, Kalviknes Bore situates her research within the 
broader discussion of Television’s capacity for creating a sense of liveness.44  
Within the context of this wider critical debate [technological immediacy of 
Television and authentic portrayal of reality], the continued use of the laugh track 
in recorded TV comedy can be seen as an attempt to maintain a sense of liveness 
in prerecorded comedy in order both to “borrow” some of the cultural prestige 
associated with live television and to retain the sense of communal laughter 
traditionally associated with popular comedy. (ILKB, 25) 
 
 
In line with the previous statement by Peter Kunze, the laugh track is conceived and analyzed 
solely as a device with respect to the comedic and its reception.  It is under examination as a 
mechanical device that has a specific or “intended” role for mediating between industry and 
audience. In a section of her essay Laughing Together entitled “Theorizing the Laugh Track,” 
Kalviknes Bore further specifies the nature of this role: 
 
The laugh track can be seen to have two key functions. One of these is to offer 
individual viewers a sense that “we” are all watching and laughing at the program 
together, as a collective audience. As Medhurst and Tuck write about the sitcom, 
it “invites the viewer to feel at one with the few dozen people s/he can hear 
laughing, and by extension with millions of others across the country”45 (45). A 
                                                          
44 Moreover, in the above quoted pithy statement Kalviknes Bore makes clear, given much of the 
literature on the laugh track whether in the domain of TV and Media Studies which is inclusive 
of Comedy Studies, that her investigation is a response to what literature there actually is on the 
laugh track. 
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second, related function of the laugh track is to ensure that the comedy feels like a 
“safe” space where it is okay to laugh at people’s misfortunes or transgressions 
(Neale and Krutnik 69).” (ILKB, 24)  
 
It is of no interest of mine to wade into the discussion over the laugh track’s being collectively 
perceived or received, if laugh tracks have affect or not and, if so, how on whatever region of 
audience.  Rather, I wish to point out that buried within the main objective of Kalviknes Bore’s 
particular audience-reception study is the common but rather critical move to appoint the laugh 
track as neutral appearing (technological) “device.” It is thus presumed to be operative for a 
communicative comedic process that conveys “intent” for the broadcast experience. Put another 
way, her analysis, though designed to question whether or not laugh tracks are effective, relies on 
a certain prejudice within media studies. It institutes comedic content as being conjoined with 
technology that, by all existing literature, it would appear, is simply to be thought in terms of 
being a mediating function. In the next chapter I will attempt to identify some of the key 
conceptual movements within the theorizing of communication that re-enforce this dominant 
orientation in the discourse. At any rate, for now at least, we see the laugh track is simply 
thought formulaically. It is just another instance of a mediating component mythically bridging 
the eternal universal communicative divide between sender and receiver or source-of-word 
meant for an intended listener. In this manner, studies on the laugh track are set within and 
shaped by a notion of “the technological” as locale for a kind of lexical resource (the common 
expressions: device, effects, function). It is host that systematically signals the systematicity of 
mediatic relations and actions. We hereby assume the laugh track – neutral in kind but readily 
ascribable as particular function – to be a “device.”  It thus gives the theorist leverage, even 
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poignancy, for explaining conditions, formations as well as the transformations that occur within 
what has been generalized as the current identifiable (and seemingly unified) social practice of 
making comedy.
46
  Effectively, Kalviknes Bore and her respondents have made a trope of what 
is often considered as an industry cliché. Regardless, in maintaining this type of analysis, we 
then foreclose on attempts to address how (the particular) contemporary “mechanisms,” apart 
from their particular effect, are constituted, that is, not as techniques or a trope
47
 of technicity, but 
as discrete technological formations (whatever the technological may indeed be). Thus, 
questions arise, not so much about why the laugh track is theorized with respect to comedy
48
 but 
over how it is that the laugh track gets theorized – over what terms and concepts come to bear on 
it being deemed a function readily absorbed within the comedic.  Beyond questioning Kalviknes 
Bore and the theoretical backdrop for the studying of the laugh track, we are thus prompted to 
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 Sounds that were once (considered) an inextricable part (as regional signifier) of what might 
be called physical comedy/humor are, at least within the tele-technology transmissions, framed 
(simply accessed and categorized) as sound effects. Flatulent noises from whoopee cushions, 
blurting kazoos, punctuating emissions such as rapid honking clown-horns and the ba-dum-bum 
punch-line trope performed on the modern drum-kit are carry-over effects from a pre-digital 
time. As such they are generic signifiers (isn’t that what a function is and does?) of a type of 
humour that in their various versions have been cached within the editor’s digital sound-bank. 
47
 Of course the text that follows is entirely exempt of anything resembling a trope ... 
48
 The why of the theorizing may simply be because the laugh track appears, temporally 
speaking, automatically and directly tied to theatrical expressions of humour as being, perhaps 
poorly as is often underscored, in service of the humorous. As such a connection that may indeed 
be just an innocent associative commonsensical pairing whereby the student or the scholar of 
comedy instinctively takes the typical everyday notion of laughter as being a visceral expression 
inextricably and inexplicably bound to what’s felt to be funny. (This we understand also as 
convention – not merely commonsensical as laughter can seemingly “express” other emotions 
too – and that laughter historically accompanies shows that are humorous rather than dramatic). 
Or perhaps thinking more psychologistically and taking a cue from Jacob Smith, the theorizing 
no different from the presence of laughter on early wax cylinder recordings may be explained by 
a humanizing/socializing impulse to quell a once anxious or uneasy relation with the 
technological.  Still whether born of convention or early 20
th
 century technophobic anxiety the 
theorizing assumes a relationship (perhaps largely one-way) between laugh track and comedy. 
They appear to go hand in hand in a particular manner. 
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ask after the theorized communicative frameworks and the knowledge-making mechanisms from 














Chapter Two: On the Very Idea
49
 of a Function  
That Bloomsbury, Kalviknes Bore, and other TV and comedy theorists largely conceive 
of the laugh track as a function set within the broadcast experience merits clarification on a few 
fronts. Firstly, why does it get assumed as function? And secondly, how within particular 
theories on media and communication is function actually being conceived? In effect, to establish 
how the laugh track gets presupposed as analyzable from within such a perspective on cultural 
production, I expand the discussion to articulate some of the main authorizing mechanisms that 
give order to reading “the technological” as mediatically determined. Examining two prominent 
models of communication, I seek to identify the kinds of epistemological commitments for 
theorizing what gets readily deigned as device, within a “communicative act,” as a function.  
As we come to learn of the reason-based transmission model and of the meaning-based 
ritual model of communication, function is more than a theoretical trope designating technicity. 
It appears, given its particular status as a predicate of knowledge, to do a fair bit of heavy lifting. 
Still, though I argue these models re-enforce an instrumentalized notion of media formations, 
this business of theory is no tidy affair. Through positing a semantic base for making knowledge 
claims, the ritual model, as fostered within its semantic bias, serves to open onto a problematic 
that lends to exploring the laugh track independently of a cultural historical appropriation. 
Questions are thus left unanswered concerning the inexplicable remainder a discursive model 
excludes by its authorizing more meaningful statements. Subsequently, in the coming chapters, 
the discussion will turn to the possibilities for a non-semantic and materialist basis for generating 
a knowledge of things. Accordingly, we may take a few steps towards a non-discursive account 
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 I am alluding to the specificity afforded an analytic with the term “very” for inaugurating  
Donald Davidson’s famous  provisional framing of conceptual schemes. 
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Communication Studies Grounded: Instruments of Knowledge-
making for the Transmission and Ritual Theorists 
  
 
Whether analyzing media in terms of a) the structure of a medium for transmission b) a 
particular message transmitted or c) the technical composition of transmission, it is presumed 
that “communication” of some form or another gets facilitated. In all, the media analyzed by 
media theorists, regardless of their particular approaches, are not simply media in their own right 
but are thought to be media of and for communicating something that has a social purpose. For 
instance, the laugh track is read as a narrative-authorized product and signifier with certain 
culturo-historical relevant investments. The laugh track theorist’s examinations operate 
effectively but solely within the confines of purposes set
50
 by the machinations of industry on-
screen production and the languages of critique centred on the content and dissemination of its 
productions. More generally considered, the purported interaction between a broadcast and its 
audience is often conceived within a formalized system. It is conceived as a materio-
technological passage for messages between the aforementioned two separate but mutually 
dependent coordinates: “sender” and “receiver.” In a limited sense, the coordinates sender and 
receiver serves a pragmatic program of research. They provide the media theorist with a 
determinable process of transmission – a model for fixing or plotting out source and destination 
– that occur within a system/circuit.  In a broader sense, sender and receiver operates as a basis 
for a model of communication, specifically, the transmission model of communication.  
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Aside from a few theoretical divergences, the transmission model’s sender and receiver – 
so-naturalized as identifiable addresser and addressee – provide Kalviknes Bore the terms for 
examining the laugh track under the umbrella of “communication.” Sender and receiver permit 
her, with unquestioned and anticipated regularity, to discover, observe and provide etiological 
accounts of the laugh track for simulating the live.
51
 The content (the message) and the 
mechanism for the orderly delivery of such (the medium) are readily assumed as the object of 
study and basis for a theory. Just as with any message, the laugh track’s conveyed 
sentiment/meanings, its routes of conveyance, the technological systems for its circulation, as 
well as whatever may interfere with the productive functioning of a network of communication 
are termed as “transmission.”52  By the transmission model laugh track theorists proceed to 
abstract “the technological being” of the laugh track from its material reality. The laugh track is 
                                                          
51
 Briankle Chang in his deconstruction of the presuppositions or hidden principle of current 
models of communication reads the sender/receiver as subject/object formulation within an 
economy of a delivery system. He argues it as being governed by an implicit regulatory function 
(Chang even uses this word/language and in a parallel critical manner on p.47) for ensuring the 
terms and ultimate execution of an exchange. Chang refers to this ideal that “governs all 
mediations” by a fixed and determinable exchange as the postal principle (Chang, 
Deconstructing Communication, pp. 45-49). – As an implicit rule that is a fait accompli.  
52
 Appropriately, these elements and processes are coined under this term as its own model for 
communication. The transmission model is derived from both pre and post WWII experiments in 
electronics and applied engineering conducted at Bell Laboratories in the United States. Claude 
Shannon’s essay A Mathematical Theory of Communication systematically sets the primary 
coordinates (sender of signal, channel over which signal is sent, receiver of sender’s signal) for 
explaining and describing how the content or information of our messages are transmitted over 
our communication systems. Though rooted in the mathematical quantification of telephone and 
radio conveyance processes, the Transmission model has long since evolved from its electronic-
centred beginnings. It has come to influence a wide range of perspectives for theorizing 
communication as a cultural exchange. To these ends, surveying various theories of 
communication, David Holmes, in his text Communication Theory: Media, Technology and 
Society (2005), bluntly re-iterates the widely held assessment of the impact of Shannon’s famous 
paper to study of communication: “transmission views of communication ... all but saturated 
communication theory for the most part of the twentieth century.” (p.6) 
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represented by the figure of technology as go-between. Broadly speaking, technology is 
conceived as intermediary. Technology simply designates how (in whatever instance) 
transmissions occur. And the laugh track is subsumed under this designation. It lacks the 
possibility of having a history apart from being an instrument of cognition. By the transmission 
model, the laugh track is not considered as media unto its own and certainly is no aporia. It 
conveys. Even if the transmission theorist were to consider the laugh track as an aporia its being 
so would be parsed as a status. The laugh track would be an apophantic construct. It would be 
knowably insoluble. That is, regardless of the laugh track’s being a perplexing system of 
exhaustion,
53
 completing the line between sender and receiver, it would have residual exchange 
value.  
 
With that said, not all accounts of communication are governed by transmission theory’s 
indomitable positivism. In contrast to the transmission model is the ritual or, sometimes called, 
the interpretivist model of communication. The ritual model places media within the ongoing 
working or “drama” of the social.54 By a ritual account, communication is immersive and 
emergent. Communication is a cultural activity. Going this route, our laugh track theorist would 
lose much of the explanatory traction they are seeking by distinguishing device from message, 
simulated from live, broadcaster from audience, etc. But to James Carey, the ritual theory’s chief 
proponent, abstracting how information gets transmitted from the dynamic of human interactions 
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 That produces already spent material. 
54
 Caveat: “Neither of these counterposed views of communication necessarily denies what the 
other afﬁrms. A ritual view does not exclude the processes of information transmission or 
attitude change. It merely contends that one cannot understand these processes aright except 
insofar as they are cast within an essentially ritualistic view of communication and social order.” 
(James Carey, Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society, p.17). 
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only serves to greatly delimit our analyses.  Contrasting his ritual model with the transmission 
model, Carey asserts: 
 
These contrasting views of communication also link, I 
believe, with contrasting views of the nature of language, thought, and 
symbolism. The transmission view of communication leads to an emphasis on 
language as an instrument of practical action and discursive reasoning, of thought 
as essentially conceptual and individual or reﬂective, and of symbolism as being        
pre-eminently analytic. A ritual view of communication, on the other hand, sees 
language as an instrument of dramatic action, of thought as essentially situational 
and social, and symbolism as fundamentally ﬁduciary.” (James Carey, 
Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society, footnote 4, 27-28)  
 
 
One way the divide between the two models
55
may be understood is by how language is deployed 
as an instrument. Though an instrument for both models, language is productive of the kind(s) of 
knowledge we have of our community/world/reality in distinctly different ways. Specifically, for 
the transmission theorist, language is the message quanta or material that gets sent. For the ritual 
theorist, language serves to carry and develop more rules. Still, for either theory, language is 
conceived of in terms of having communicative value. It circulates within the frame of each of 
its models for making determinable and/or readable activities that may be deemed 
communicative. In the coming chapter, we will examine how contemporary materialists 
approach media as non-human-centred phenomena. Though providing an alternative to 
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 One that is extended through their alignment with other perhaps more established disciplines 




transmission and ritual theories, contemporary materialism is not then offered to guarantee 
experiencing the laugh track as a purified non-linguistic formation. Rather, the contemporary 
materialist’s move away from a human-centric system helps to suspend the apophantic 
constraints that have thus far limited our examination of the laugh track. Their questions 
regarding the indeterminacy of things, media and our relation to them expands approaching the 
laugh track as extra-discursive material registry.    
 
The Function of Function 
 
Of the two theories of communication, the transmission model appears to provide the terms 
and objectives in which the laugh track is primarily identified as a function. In effect, the 
coordinates sender and receiver pre-determine the laugh track as “the technological.” As argued 
in the last chapter, there is more to the claim that the laugh track is a function than registering it a 
trope of technicity. That is, the term “function,” though appearing as an over-used placeholder 
for a complex of operations, is not an innocent short-hand expression. It inscribes causal 
authority to describing communication as a standard system of conveyance. Thus, when labelled 
a device or a function the laugh track is actually sanctioned as an operative within a finite set of 
links connecting broadcaster with audience. Questions arise for our orthodox laugh track 
theorist: Is it the laugh track that affects audiences? Or rather, is it conceptual force of function 
that affects things?  
 
In Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society, James Carey, critiquing the role 
that “function” has for the transmission theorist, makes clear its potency. He identifies function 
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as being a critical expression that lends palpability to the transmission theorist’s formula of 
verifiable procedures and outcomes. Against this mechanistic formulation of cultural exchange 
Carey argues, 
This projection of community ideals and their embodiment in material form 
— dance, plays, architecture, news stories, strings of speech — creates an artiﬁcial 
though nonetheless real symbolic order that operates to provide not information 
but conﬁrmation, not to alter attitudes or change minds but to represent an 
underlying order of things, not to perform functions but to manifest an ongoing 
and fragile social process. (JC, 15) 
 
 From the perspective of a brute conveyance of information, “function” operates within the 
communicative sign-chain between sender/receiver, machine/product, cause/effect. Functions 
appear as empirically observable elements (be it a device, a process) that, much like a key being 
turned in an ignition, triggers, given the desired effect of a medium, an intended transfer and/or 
possible transformation. Carey continues, 
 
If one examines a newspaper under a transmission view of communication, one 
sees the medium as an instrument for disseminating news and knowledge, 
sometimes divertissement, in larger and larger packages over greater distances. 
Questions arise as to the effects of this on audiences: news as enlightening or 
obscuring reality, as changing or hardening attitudes, as breeding credibility or 
doubt. Questions also are raised concerning the functions of news and the 
newspaper: Does it maintain the integration of society or its maladaptation? Does 
it function or misfunction to maintain stability or promote the instability of 
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personalities? Some such mechanical analysis normally accompanies a 
“transmission” argument. (JC, 16) 
 
 
Carey argues that “function” and “effect” impart an imaginary source and start-point lurking 
behind what apparently gets communicated. Function thus ensures that the transmission 
theorist’s observations operate by a pseudo-scientific explanatory sequence. Apart from the 
rhetorical impact that may buffer the transmission theorists’ account of transmission from 
challenge, invoking function signifies specific work has been done. Accordingly, we grasp how 
for Kalviknes Bore, the laugh track as function is much more than a trope of language. It is the 
truth of a medium or system’s relay. Thus, in attributing “function-hood” to the laugh track, she 
can simply focus on the necessity of its presence as the simulated immediacy of a response. That 
is, on how to measure and explain the laugh track’s constituting and influencing the at-home 
audience’s experience.56  Ultimately, all gets tied up rather neatly.  A medium’s message gains 
passage (hopefully pure and uncorrupted) into its desired absorption. With the sender’s supposed 
intended meaning intact ‘the essence of a proposition’ achieves its purpose. Standard observable 
changes will then take place. From this perspective, we then never need to attend to how the 
laugh track may be constituted. All that is important is that, like any other means to an end, it 
constitutes a particular experience. 
In contrast to transmission theory, for the ritual theorist, a message’s primary meaning is 
not the object of a broadcast transmission. Rather, messages are a mode of presentation. They 
provide us with meaningful insight into the kinds of communal bonds or relationships that have 
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evolved through shared values and beliefs.  By this model, a newspaper media outlet and its 
average reader do not constitute a hard symmetry of source and destination. In fact, their 
entwined engagement in the world undermines the need for a rationalist communicative nexus.
57
 
Effectively, function loses its significance and potency as a causal node. It is not representative 
of a system’s springboard, pivot point or spark that directly leads to a consummation of intended 
outcomes. Function has no primary generative status. Rather, if anything, for the ritual theorist, 




Carey shows how function, among other terms, keeps the transmission theorist’s analytic 
securely abstracted from history and tradition. Applying his criticism to prevailing approaches to 
the laugh track, we see that as a medium it has been theoretically pre-mediated.  With that said, 
there may be just a many questions as to whether Carey’s account actually gets us any closer to 
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 Within an under-delineated basis for interaction there is no need for bridging two aligned or 
same-configured poles by some medium, or another. In essence, Carey has thus diluted and/or 
de-universalized the sender/receiver staged dialectic of equivalency. 
58
 Still, the relationship between sender/broadcaster and receiver/community is never entirely 
dissolved (i.e., that which is “the news” and its readers). Rather, each is a co-participant whose 
status in the interaction is just never entirely certain. Carey replaces the productive mechanics of 
an instrumental/rationalist view of modern communication systems with an account of 
communication (through media systems or otherwise) as being an always forming constitutive 
process. The sovereignty of “the” process of transmission and reception, though over-thrown, is 
subjugated. It is but another element amongst elements performing its mediatic operations within 
the communal drama. A news outlet, for instance, is not just a function for triggering results 
within the determinations of an act of transmission. Moreso, it has function and/or purpose that 
serve the ongoing broader makings of our social (whatever that narrative fiction may be).  
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Meaning’s Implicit Other(s) 
 
In his analysis of the transmission model, Carey targets the explanatory force that notions of 
“effect” and “function” lend to actually securing the reception of a transmitted message. He 
debunks the often unquestioned idealized relation between sender and receiver. At issue is the 
assumption that, whatever the medium for conveyance, a transmission system achieves the goal 
of its alleged design. In fact, it is here, apart from terminological violence, that Carey considers 
the transmission model as most suspect. For even in failure, seemingly poor or faulty 
transmission, the message sent has (registerable, measurable) effect. Simply put, one way or the 
other, the transmission theorist imposes a relation that is productive. The transmission model 
appears rigged to read our relations to communication systems as inherently positivist (there is 
always an outcome that is in service of the design of the relation). Instead, rejecting transmission 
theory’s unbounded positivism, Carey makes a point of re-designating “function.” It is no longer 
an etiological term, a trigger mechanism within a transmission. He recasts it as an expression 
highlighting the contingent purpose or role, within the practices of and for whatever communal 
network, a particular statement, act or approach may have. Ultimately, within the broader 
discipline of communication, this represents a shift away from rationalist and acontingent 
formulae to theorizing communication (and its mediations) by a social coherentism and historical 
contingency. More to my interests, we dispense with thinking the laugh track by the 
epistemological requirement that assigns “the technological” a generic designate within a 
broader framework for mediations. Alternatively, by Carey’s approach, theorists like Kalviknes 
Bore and Mills could then look to engage the laugh track within the transforming play of 
emerging informational processes. However, I contend that the laugh track, though losing its 
status as device, would still just be explored as a construct both supporting and supported by a 
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broader system. In essence, the laugh track’s potential as its own media formation would only be 
readable by a social and/or communicative purpose.  
 
Ultimately, Carey’s thinking is plagued by the same explanatory goal of the transmission 
theorist that seeks to make purpose of all things for which its system seeks to account.
59
 Though 
Carey’s constitutive model marks a shift in approach away from assuming a fixed cognitively 
ordered relationship between subject and object, his analytic ‘opens the door’ to having to 
grapple with, albeit as a linguist construct, the conditions of knowledge. The linguistic, though a 
counter to rationalism – which historicizes its form of reasoning as presupposing tradition, habit 
and practice, in order to be rational – must presuppose its own opposite. Meaning forms at the 
expense of the non-linguistic, non-symbolic, pre-conceptual and “specifically” (or maybe 
nebulously) that which might not have sense. However, Carey’s analysis falls shy of contending 
with this implicit opposition, not to mention the “conditions” (please pardon the latent 
Kantianism but) from which it may potentially be formed. Instead, he turns knowledge into a 
human-centric productive game solely made of the terms or symbols by which we give meaning 
to things. Of course, this still limits experiencing the laugh track within yet another instrumental 
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 Ironically, his cosmos of meaning and purposiveness, or form of positivism, may also signal its 
potential demise. If anything, Carey gets us to change the conversation from instrumental 
characterizations of our communicative practices (vis a vis function and effect) to the broader 
economy of forces permitting our meaning-making. 
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Chapter Three: Materialist Shenanigans at the Limits 
of Human Knowledge 
 
For James Carey and other communication theorists, our communications occur within an 
anthropocentric milieu and are mainly conveyed by a linguistic medium. Within this milieu and 
medium, the content of communication is meaningful because, as recognizable products of 
convention or tradition, it is reproducible. Thus, in order for there to be meaning, Carey 
inadvertently, points to limits on the conditions for there to be meaning and knowledge. He has 
implicitly articulated that there is a non-meaningful other from which the meaningful is 
distinguished. Carey does not examine this realm of non-knowledge, nor how it may be 
experienced. Instead, he confines his theory to what is knowable within the supposed coherency 
of social practice. However, the prospect of an indeterminate under-side to meaning and 
knowledge opens onto questions of considerable value to my exploration of the laugh track. 
Specifically questions around how to contend with what is presumed unrelatable and cannot be 
reproduced. Accordingly, we will now examine approaches for problematizing and countering 
the presuppositions of theoretical certainty concerning our mediations. For this I explore recent 
materialist based approaches to knowledge production.
60
  
Within contemporary movements of materialism we encounter, whether in terms of 
applied media or aesthetic based theories, approaches that circumvent object determined subject-
centred accounts for the experiencing of things. Such approaches hold considerable promise for 
exploring the laugh track as its own media formation. Recent incarnations of materialist studies, 
such as Marcel O’Gorman’s applied media theory, approach knowledge as if it were an activity 
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 Effectively, we are pushed towards more traditional philosophical sounding questions for 
establishing the conditions for knowledge, or underpinnings of reason, and for formulating the 
epistemological ground of certainty that makes true or false our observations. 
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or a thing “in the making.” For one, contemporary materialists reject the fixity of rationalist 
epistemology. Rather, knowledge is like an adapting organism within the world. It is continually 
being formed and transformed through how things may come to show themselves. In effect, a 
knowledge’s future trajectory is never determined. For another, contemporary materialists resist 
acquisitive or capture criteria set by rationalist apophantic principles. Things are to be 
encountered unto themselves, within their own possible domain(s) and potential for change. 
Simply put, things are not objects of knowledge or objects of a system of identifiability. The 
materialist thus jostles our thinking about the world from a discursive framework over to one in 
which we are prompted to find new ways to engage with extra-discursive phenomena.  
For my purposes, recent developments in materialism represent a sustained challenge to 
the human-centric philosophical orthodoxy that supports both the transmission and ritual theories 
of communication.  Accordingly, we may re-orient the discussion. We now move from the 
discursive framework for rationalizing media within a broader system of knowledge production 
to modes of engagement that, altogether, decentralize knowledge-making. A path is cleared for 
exploring other approaches to “things” of the world, which includes media and technology, as 
potentially being generative of the so-called conditions for knowledge. This path-clearing, in 
turn, stages the coming analyses of the laugh track. In Part Two I approach the laugh track 
somewhat guided by the research methodology of current media archaeologists. It is by this 
method of description that we may begin to explore the particulars of the laugh track as a 
contemporary archival formation. And one that is a dynamic and variable inventive process. We 
thereby depart from the general mindset of reading “technology” as tool serving cultural 
purposes. Instead, the technology particular to a media formation is generative of more or other 
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media formations. By this approach we may thus encounter the materio-mechanical order of 
things, specifically the laugh track, just as Agamben accounts for the gesture.  
 
Questions of Materiality and the Non-linguistic 
 
Some recent materialist approaches to media provide an alternative to a human-centred 
rationalist basis for our epistemologies. Against the traditional frame for analyzing media, the 
materialist gets us to consider that our knowledge of objects, technology, etc. emerge from the 
very worlds of those formations. The often-thought material counterpart to linguistic-biased 
meaning-making systems is what actually is generative of these systems. Our focus thus shifts 
from universal frameworks for understanding media to a detailed engagement with the 
particulars of the media objects at play. Accordingly, the laugh track is not just a product of a 
larger mediating apparatus that does its part to carry forward a network of cultural interest. 
Rather, we may approach the laugh track media object as its own system. Wherein, it in fact may 
diverge from mediative work. To be sure, by this engagement, the laugh track formation is not 
just a media object. Alternatively, the knowledge we can actually have of the laugh track may 
hold the form of what cannot be known and is ultimately of no use. For all intents and purposes, 
what is at stake, then, is the nature of knowledge production. This opens onto a larger 
problematic that circumscribes the coming discussion in Part Three on the limitations of media 
archaeology. For if we are to engage the laugh track in some sense that remains true to 
Agamben’s gesture as pure means, we will have to push past the media archaeologist’s pre-
requisite of archival presence. This, as I argue, restricts the laugh track’s being engaged by it 
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ongoing quantificatory metrics. Effectively, at issue will be how generativity and uselessness 
may co-habit.  
At any rate, new approaches to materialism revive the traditionally rejected inanimate 
dumb/dead matter of experience. Objects of the world that were simply thought of as holding 
particular roles and places within the structural and spatial orderings (categories) of the cogito 
are held to be imbued with their own, inexplicable but relatable, being.  For thing theorists, 
applied media theorists, and those in the business of aestheticizing materiality and technology, 
objects appear to have a life or their own. Against a reduction to our everyday utilitarian interests 
thing theorists conceive and put into practice a non-human-centric methodology. In their 
estimation, objects and technology produce knowledge.  Alternatively, thing theorists embrace 
the non-mental inanimate for its not being reducible to any logic of form, measure and purpose. 
In this respect, the furnishings, fixtures and chattels of our physical world are “things” that 
possess their own integrity. Consistent with their counter to an anthropocentric use-based 
hypothesis these types of thing theorists also reject Cartesian representational realism, where 
objects of experience give rise to transparent “facts.”  This is the kind of realist that believes 
there is a 1:1 correspondence between mind and reality, and that the full veracity of an object 
comes to light, most objectively by human cognition, wherein the true presence of things and 
human cognition share the same plane of reality. Against this thinking, thing theorists tell us that 
our experience of the material world circumvents any premise of equivalency between subject 
and object. Though our interrogations of our mental capacities may arguably be solid, grounds 
for asserting a representationalist relationship are specious. Things are always changing and in 
turn are generative of other things, as well as, other possible changes. Thus, our experience of 
things can never entirely be clear nor can it be certain. Conversely, we need re-cognize in objects 
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and our relation to them an impenetrable opacity. In short, thing theorists believe our accounts 
and itemizations need to be attuned to the external-to-cognition flow of things. So rather than 
abstracting from the world, they thereby propose approaches that permit us to more directly 
experience things as dynamic, unpredictable and generative.  
Though not committed to the thing theorist’s generalized account of knowledge 
production, it is towards this kind of “autonomous” generativity that I am seeking to re-position 
the discussion of the laugh track. As stated, I wish to explore the laugh track as a formation that 
diverges from mediative work. On the face of things, broadcast laugh-producing systems are the 
opposite of dynamic and unpredictable. They are mechanical formations that reduce and distill 
recorded visceral (mostly human) effusions to quantifiably regulable mediations. However, by 
following the contemporary materialist’s thinking that things emerge and transform 
independently of our knowledge, we may resist subjugating the technological to being a means 
to an end. Instead of the laugh track being limited to a system for quantifying laughter we may 
alternatively explore how it transforms and extends its kind of media formation.  
 
In recent developments of thing theory certain researchers, working within media studies, 
have been exploring technology in ways that break from a communicative use-based ethos. They 
want to explore technology as if it were an under-defined “agent” provoking possibilities for 
aesthetic and philosophical change. Applied Media Theorist Marcel O’Gorman writes:  
 
The goal of Applied Media Theory is not, as in Harman's case, to demonstrate 
that anything – from a clod of clay to a child's toy – can bring the world into 
being. Still, AMT does promote speculative contemplation about the lifeworld of 
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physical objects. More importantly, this method serves as a methodology for 
tearing technological tools from their instrumental context, so that they may serve 
as objects of contemplation rather than distraction, even before they break down. 
Without wading too deeply into a Heideggerian morass, we might say that 
Applied Media Theory serves as a vehicle for provoking an experience of 
technological objects as present-at-hand to one in which they are ready-to-hand.” 
(Marcel O’Gorman, “Broken Tools and Misfit Toys: Adventures in Applied 
Media Theory,” 39-40)  
 
O’Gorman is proposing a perceptual shift. Things, or here, tools, emerge in an ambiguous field 
of relations. To reiterate the preceding overview, things are not contingent upon observation or 
being objects of consciousness. Rather, it is within this play of relations that our thinking about 
the material world gets activated. Alternatively, the world of which we are a part is then to be 
experienced as generative of the possibilities for our engagement and knowledge. Put another 
way, technology is not simply restricted to its seemingly designed purposes. Instead, its 
particular designs represent a potential opening onto unexpected engagements in the world (that 
diverge from the regulated and instrumentalist conception of machines, computers, etc). 
Accordingly, our tools have the unique privilege of creating non-human-centred knowledge 
formations. Proposing an interaction based approach O’Gorman theorizes, 
 
An “epistemology engine” is a technology or a set of technologies that through 
use frequently become explicit models for describing how knowledge is 
produced. The most dramatic examples of “epistemology engines” influence our 
notions of subjectivity, directly affecting how we understand what it means to be 
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human and to perceive things from a human perspective. They enable us to draw 
connections between the knowledge producing capacity of the human mind and 
technologies that putatively function according to similar mechanical processes. 
The philosophy of mind is replete with theorists modeling the brain, which even 
today is poorly understood, on technologies whose design is better understood. 
An epistemology engine is thus a special case of a more general 
phenomenological notion that entails the ways in which life-world practices form 
the basis for what often become scientific theories. But it is also a case in which 
the practices are engaged with technologies, which in turn, suggest what can be 
models for knowledge.” (MO, 362)  
 
The very coordinates for our appropriation of things are in and of things. The applied media 
theorist thus attempts to tap into the pre-conceptual feedback loop set within an inexhaustible 
and seemingly primary being in the world. That is, by a more classical formulation, “the in-
itself” represents the materials from which our ordering mechanisms are derived.  
 
Though I find questionable O’Gorman’s notion that things, media, tools, etc. engineer 
their epistemic order, I can, however, get behind the applied media theorist’s more general idea 
that things are generative of the processes for how they emerge. Accordingly, the laugh track – 
which I dare say produces knowledge or a like outcome governed by any such disciplinal 
orientation or regimen – generates more of itself. But, as I have outlined earlier, this is an aporia. 
The laugh track undermines its mediative productivity actually by maintaining its system as a 
media formation. That aside, for now, I take the point that O’Gorman’s main objective here is to 
resist abstract formulations that prioritize and make faculty of a system that produces knowledge. 
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Instead our knowledges may be thought as always coming into presence, a becoming as it were, 
that are generated by the indeterminate and always changing interplay of mechanisms. Where the 
transmission or even the ritual theorist stops, the applied media theorist begins. They investigate 
how the conditions for our representations permit other possibilities of engagement that support a 
thinking that is independent of our predictive and instrumentalist conceptual schemes.  
 
 
Matter exceeding the itself of Thingness  
 
Applied media and thing theorists prompt divergent engagements and critical reflection 
on the nature and formation of both human experience and knowledge of the physical world. I 
consider this helpful for engaging media, the laugh track in particular, outside the constraints of 
pre-ordained discursive methods underwritten by the means/end formula of traditional 
communication theory.  However, their account of “things,” though refocussing attention on an 
object’s being generative, may suffer from similar epistemological pitfalls as a rationalist and 
utility biased thesis. In other words, their formulation for discreteness may be too generic and 
collapses thingness into a readily knowable productive entity.  
In her book Stuff Theory, Maurizia Boscagli radicalizes the materialist premise by which 
thing theorists claim the potential for a productive relationship emanating from the discrete 
operations of matter, of machine, of bodies, of objects. Specifically, Boscagli challenges 
characterizing things as tidy identifiable knowably unknowable “discrete” entities. Moreover, 
she contests the discreteness (a specifying characterization of discreteness) of “things” over their 
being formulated as self-contained. By her thinking, we are in no position to assert a thing’s 
supposed limits or factical quantificatory qualities as either being arbitrary or having 
universalizable characteristics that then make it a discernible entity. I consider this problematic 
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concerning how the particular diverges from the universal to be critical for my analysis of the 
laugh track. Its discreteness cannot just be assumed. It is not simply in virtue of, for instance, 
“being its own media formation.” To explore the laugh track as a peculiar formation we not only 
need to identify how it is peculiar but, more importantly, to do so in a way that does not subsume 
it within a generic model of differentiation.  
Countering some of the thinking informing thing theory, Boscagli expands contemporary 
materialism by situating it within the capitalist system of daily mass production. It is a global 
system, as she argues, wherein objects of consumption – products – by design undergo constant 
transformation (i.e. of worth, relevant application to whatever system, a shelf-life determining 
usefulness). The discernibility of a thing’s qualities is thus tied to fluctuating everyday cultural 
notions.
61
 We do not experience things in the plenitude and certitude of their isolable thingness, 
we experience stuff.
62
 Boscagli writes,  
This is a materiality that refuses to behave according to the rules of the “order of 
things” of modernity. Uncontainable by the tabula through which, as Michel 
Foucault describes it in The Order of Things, matter is made into epistemological 
fields and taxonomies of knowledge, stuff designates those forms of hybrid 
materiality that defeat, with their plasticity and unceasing traffic with the human, 
the long western history of systemization of the object. Under the terms of the 
new materialism, such potential for uncontainability should be discernible in any 
material object. In the lived conditions of the real world, however, some objects 
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 Put more brutishly, our relation to things is awash in seemingly unbridled consumer 
capitalism. 
62
 The word “stuff” indicates a reference to a lesser discernible, ambiguous or unquantified 
specificity or indeterminacy as to a things use or being useless. In effect, what takes hold of our 
perception of a thing’s attributes and qualities is a fluid sentimental relation or feelings of such 
and such towards things entrenched in practice. 
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are more amenable to plasticity than others ... Stuff refers to those objects that 
have enjoyed their moment of consumer allure, but have now shed their 
commodity glamour – without being quite cast aside. ... Not particularly useful 
but not useless to cast off.” (Maurizia Boscagli, Stuff theory: everyday objects, 
radical materialism, 5-6) 
 
Having situated things or objects in the unruly transitory play of contemporary commerce, 
Boscagli asks: what is so definite and clear in the new materialist’s perception of things when a 
thing’s potential and gathering of distinguishing attributes is ambiguous? How could the thing 
theorist be so certain? What might be their alternative grounds for certainty? To her, as to what 
an object’s discreteness consists is, to be declared with a modicum of certainty, indeterminate. 
Within a consumerist world, objects are typically experienced with fading feelings of potency 
and a sense of vagueness that surrounds their relevance and purpose. Apart from 
decommissioning a use/useless metric, Boscagli emphasizes that stuff has an affective historical 
dimension. Our things entail personal attachments. We have varying emotional commitments 
with and towards (a system of) pre-ordained itemizable products. The things we purchase are not 
just inanimate lumps of product readied for bulk consumption. Ultimately her point, as in the 
passage above, is to expose the new materialist’s claim about things having a potential for 
uncontainablity as being ahistorical and devoid of context. It is really an entirely unempirical 
unfounded assertion. Conversely, for Boscagli the terms of a thing’s discreteness, or, its 
“potential for uncontainability” are never readily discernible. Thereby, we have no right to 
assume there to be independent, isolable qualities natural or core to a singular or individuated 
(from the presupposed dividual) unit. What is then considered as potentially productive, in 
contemporary theories of the thing, is not in or emergent from the thing. Instead, the notion of 
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uncontainability only reinforces a system for inferring transparent and pure qualities against or 
relative to an assumed backdrop of indiscrete amorphous conditions. I take the general point of 
Boscalgi’s critique to represent an important cautionary tale. We can neither presume things to 
have true properties nor characteristics of the supposed realm
63
 in which they emerge. By 
extension, when researching the laugh track, we need be mindful of generic relational 
formulations of how things are discrete. Formulations, we may suspect, that assume a productive 
relationship pre-ceded our exploration. Given that I have set out to explore uselessness as 
potentially non-binaric this concern is especially pertinent. The very method for identifying the 
laugh track system’s uselessness may impart a usefulness to the particulars that constitute the 
laugh track. The useful would then produce the useless. Of course, this is the functionalist 
parsing system I seek to elude. In this respect, we may never actually gain entry to the 
unadulterated realm of pure means to which Agamben’s notion of gesture gestures.  
Boscagli challenges the new materialist’s account of things at the heart of its theoretical 
productiveness.
64
  She points out that how things are described as discrete entities permit a 
                                                          
63
 Perhaps as a non-productive surround with an entirely nebulous opacity. 
64
 Apart from theoretically, she initiates an intimate style of research. Contrary to new 
materialist’s, Boscalgi’s approach is one of exploring the inherent and seemingly inescapable 
investments we have in things, with our things. She opts for exploration of a full sensorial 
bonding that, prior to the New Materialist’s theorized primary relation to things as things, 
invariably makes possessions of the “furniture of the world.” Opposing the cool detachment of 
the contemporary social scientist, Boscagli writes, 
 
“these science-oriented discourses [new materialism], considering matter as such, 
engage less and less with the fact that this volatile materiality takes shape and gets 
assembled and disassembled in the only possible cultural-economic context: that 
of modern capital. The techno-scientific ontology of the hybrid object, its 
ecology, is always already a part of a political economy. Culture asks us to look 
again at the messiness of matter. This matter is not simply technonature, but 
technoaesthetics. By technoaesthetics is meant, first, that aesthetics is an 
important technology of matter, a dispositif through which materiality comes into 
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theorist to erect the concept of things as unquantifiable. In effect, she attacks at the point where 
this new regime of thinker overthrows the old subject-object dualism and thereby re-sets our 
epistemological base as object-governed.  Instead, as Boscagli brings focus, the notion that a 
thing’s potential for uncontainment – its indeterminacy as to having a definable status within or 
by any categorization of objects – is a theoretically (prescriptively) determined construct of 
empiricism. Once again, as with the transmission theorist’s accounting for media, the spectre of 
pre-mediating terms appears.  Likewise, the thing theorist’s notion of a thing only gets traction 
when abstracted from the very play of forces that make things a transforming site of investments 
and negotiations. Following this approach only gives the laugh track a new identity or role 
according to a category of abstracted role-ness. Conversely, Boscagli, through tripping up the 
detached methodological stance of new materialism as one of attachments and trappings (in the 
always altering exchanges of our everyday), radicalizes the thing’s unquantifiability. It is not due 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
being; second, that the new forms of matter are also aesthetic, that is, that they 
have been shaped by artistic production; third, that materialities have been 
accessed primarily through the senses, apprehended synaesthetically, affectively 
and somatically through a perceptive apparatus that dismisses any hierarchical 
separation between soma and matter. The commodified and aesthetic version of 
materiality takes us into the middle of the everyday, and allows the critic to gauge 
with more clarity the effects of matter as a force operating through different 
network flows of power – economic, technological, scientific, libidinal, affective, 
collective, and individual. I call this everyday matter with style, accessible to the 
subject’s senses and produced also by aesthetic practice, stuff.”(MB, 4) 
 
From this passage, we gather that materialism for Boscagli is more complex than the purified 
matters of empiricist observation. “Things,” through seemingly incessant shaping, mouldings 
and re-configuring of our world, possess an irreducible density of affects. What materializes is a 
part of a larger makerly or aesthetic(izing) process (which is not the same as the fetishized 
object). For better or for worse, the machinery of consumer capitalism imbues our so-called 
things and everyday objects (Goods or products as opposed to the designated “collectible” that in 
so many instance have well exceeded their ...) with use value which generates inescapable links 




to a specifiable potential of un-containment. Rather, what may be identified as being a thing’s 
“potential” is both historically variable and, more poignantly, possibly impotent. This is a 
possibility I will, in Part Three, give considerable play to in examining the notion of dynamic 
that greatly informs Wolfgang Ernst’s media archaeology. It appears Ernst has no room for 
considering media that lack transformative thrust. Instead, I take up the dud, impotent and 
unquantifiable as a way to explore the very machine constitution of the laugh track. At any rate, 
for Boscagli, a thing when experienced as stuff, as thing within its context of practices and 
productions, eludes determination and thereby falters at the calculus of discreteness. Stuff is, if 
anything, then an expenditure of a system of expenditures. Its discreteness problematizes an 
accounting for “...” as a specifiable potency.65  
 
Success/Failure Metric Problematized (of what’s not simply stuff 
but lovely digital garbage) 
Boscagli is valuable for cleansing the thing theorist’s notions of restrictive and 
contradictory commitments. Things are never just pre-ordained as or limited to being things. If 
that were so, matter would be abstracted from the very dynamic flux of the world around which 
the new materialist’s situate their analysis. Boscagli’s point that a thing’s being discrete is never 
determinate in turn raises questions about things having predictive and quantificatory attributes.  
In this sense, Boscagli’s discipline-specific challenge greatly resonates with the general manner 
in which I will later explore the regulatory mechanisms of the laugh track. Accordingly, we will 
need to look past the defining features of machines as computational systems toward how they 
may break with being a quantificatory regime.  
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 Instead, we tend toward the clarification of the amorphous that gives little access to what 
might indeed be discrete. 
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In some respects the destination to which Boscagli’s theory of stuff leads is the realm of 
analysis that failure theorist Eldritch Priest and glitch practitioner Kim Cascone focus on. While 
she attends to the unquantifiable terms and limits of a thing’s discreteness they make game of the 
unprogrammed breaches inherent to a computer system’s quantificatory prowess and generativity 
within the context of the contemporary arts. Boscagli challenges where the limits are while Priest 
and Cascone engage un-controlled deviant elements within the perceived limits of a system. 
Along with Boscagli, their analysis has some affinity with the general way I have conceived of 
the laugh track as uselessness in reserve. In learning from their experimentation, I gain insight 
into examining the laugh track not only for its potency in generating more archival systems but 
for doing so as a result of an inherent impotency.  
Instead of uselessness, Priest and Cascone explore failure. They do so in a way that 
demonstrates so-called flaws and errors as unavoidable to the generative plan for successful 
outcomes. From the programmer’s trashcan of computer algorithms, they repurpose the aborted 
materials of a program’s incalculable and unpredictable failings, its “glitches.” As has become a 
commonplace term in our contemporary lexicon, “glitch” refers to a brief malfunctioning or 
irregular fault within a digital system. The appropriation of glitches has its beginnings in certain 
20
th
 century artistic practices that make product of “the mistake” or “the accident.” Here, Priest 
outlines the failure/success inversion or an aesthetic(S) of failure: 
The discrete event of the glitch as a break in an artefact's practicable relays 
becomes a continuous event when the evaluation of its occasion is caught up in its 
own duration, in its temporization. A point of fault becomes a fault-line when its 
evaluation is prolonged, for the process of assessment, in effect, suffers a hitch 
75 
 
serially and ongoingly such that it cannot help but accumulate expressive 
correspondences that intensify the abstract potential of the “error” by giving the  
derivative meanings that cling to its barb the chance to tell another story. (Eldritch 
Priest, Boring, Formless, Nonsense, 7-8) 
 
Making “the glitch” into a musical form, Priest’s co-conspirator Kim Cascone66 seeks to 
reposition composers and musical compositions with respect to the unconscious, non-predictive 
conceptualized workings of computational technologies. His kind of sonic experimentation 
pushes for an aesthetics comprised of, for example, broken time and broken measure that shows 
through irregularity and unplanned randomness.  In effect, experimentation that derails orthodox 
ideals organized by a sense/prejudice of symmetry and completeness. The idea is to break away 
from systems bound by conventional categorizations of music production and their attendant 
knowledge for, or in service of, further production. Instead, the hope is to re-conceive our 
thinking on the composition as holding the potential for always expanding the modalities of our 
musical practices. Still, it is within this time-honoured paradigm of control and mastery that his 
exploration of the unavoidable digital fissures, fractures and fragments – that the flawless 
performance and hyper-programmed music score masks – becomes potent. As overall, the 
aesthetics of failure represents an ongoing project of devising techniques that systematically 
undo artistic mastery. Here, on two fronts, the failure theorist’s experimentation runs parallel 
with how I explore the laugh track. We both examine the quantificatory mechanisms that secure 
a system’s goal in terms of what eludes quantifying. Further, we conceive of inventive processes 
as possibly leading nowhere or for somehow subverting a system ideal of having infallible logic. 
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 For some years Cascone has devoted his efforts towards this through the formation of an 
experimental community of digital labs. 
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However, while Priest and Cascone re-work corrupt/deviant quanta to fit within a functionalist 
program I will look to expand our notion of functioning to actually entail uselessness.   
Put into action, Cascone’s project involves developing new practices and strategies for 
divergent compositional techniques. He wants to supplant composer-driven legibility biased 
systems, effectively schools of composition, with databases filled with digital artefact(ing) chaos. 
The new source material will allow for unpredictable play with a technology’s un-programmed 
by-products, waste or unproductive expenditure. However, all good intentions aside, and as 
Priest makes clear, the very processes proposed by Cascone likely work to re-inscribe the system 
to which the proposed experimentations pose a challenge. 
Cascone's expressions of failure – “glitches, bugs, application errors, system 
crashes, clipping, aliasing, distortion, quantization noise, and even the noise floor 
of computer sound cards” – are judgements made according to the way they skew 
the assumed functionality of the digitally instrumentalized artefact, a functionality 
that in contemporary industrial cultures revolves around expressions of speed, 
connectivity (to other digital technologies), and simulation. Yet these “failures” 
are not naked failures. They are dressed in scare-quotes, which directs judgement 
towards something non-functional, something that creates an irresistible alliance 
with a network of significations that do not necessarily interfere with the 
“positivist and functionalist paradigm [of] our technological society.” (EP, 6) 
 
The marginal is made relevant through the thematizing of its unsystematic irrelevance. It has 
status as a disturbance of or interruption to the expected execution of a command governed by 
system rates and performance specification. The digital fault is thus made readable as generic 
character (as placeholder denoting disruption) and contrapuntal resource within the margins of 
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the programmed. Cascone thus capitulates. Just as laugh track theorists designate canned 
laughter as a function in service of a broadcast, he validates the glitch, giving it place and 
purpose within a coherent system for engaging music. A potential failed experiment instead 
makes rescue of the discrete digital oddity. In the later chapters for exploring the constitution of 
the laugh track we return to the glitch as a disruptive digital formation that underscores the 
foibles of invention. We also come to question if the computational actually lacks the certitude 
Priest and Cascone’s framework for failure must afford it. It is by these types of investigations 
that I look to push past the aforementioned media archaeologist’s pre-requisite of archival 
presence. At any rate, the inclusion of the “marginal” may be generative of new approaches 
predicated on materials once dismissed as scraps or digital detritus but this contemporary art 
ethos of experimentation effectively masks inversion as perversion. Ironically, Cascone fails. He 
maintains the very order a practice of failure was meant to undermine.  
 
Perhaps, given the implicit political ambitions of most avant garde movements, this 
integrative move is of no surprise. The “positivistic” and “functionalist paradigm”67 that frames 
Cascone’s collusion with standard processes of production is near impossible to resist. In effect, 
it is by functionalism that malfunctioning operations, dysfunctional elements, glitches etc., are 
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 Priest’s analysis of functionalism as characterizing our modern technological systems is 
greatly instructive. Though I examine the predilection for positing “function” as causal 
mechanism (etc.) with the idea of challenging its conceptual limits, Priest’s analysis helps to 
highlight the ethos of industrialized productivity that governs our notions and wants for factory 
specified idealized performance. It is no doubt that within the mechanized framing and mindset 
of “what works,” we operate by success/failure standards. As well, that we identify facts and 






 Of course, by the dictionary definition “glitch,” either as verb or noun, is 
conceived within the orbit of functionalism. Still, the trajectory of an aesthetics predicated on the 
glitch as un-programmable digital deviation holds promise for exploring the very borders of a 
“functionalist paradigm.” This is not to propose a Hegelian re-structuration – a negation or 
contradictory movement within a productive apparatus. Rather, as Priest suggests, it is to engage 
and experiment with the logics of exclusion that discretely govern the generative processes of 
our technological systems. This is a significant insight for how the failure theorist formulates a 
thesis of disorder. As well, exclusionist circuitry is a point from which I will also get some 
purchase for analysing the kind of techno-archival regime that the laugh track is. The laugh 
track, I argue, perversely maintains the rules of its medium by rendering the recorded material as 
a tool-version of itself. It is not the means for replication. It is the by-product of repetition and 
quantification designed to ensure, against its own exhaustion, replication. I will return to the 
peculiarities of this process in Part Three.  
 
As per the glitch, we grasp that built into the modern technological systems that give 
meaning, form and maintain intensity is the unplanned internal threat of an always encroaching 
unregulatable force. The erratic discrete moments within the circuitry of our productive 
machinery that break sequence, frame and order are not outside the system. However, a glitch’s 
nestedness, though within workings of a system, is an unpreventable disruption. Its location, its 
frequency of occurrence, even its electrical frequency, cannot be isolated, programmed against 
nor entirely buffered from. The glitch is materially but invisibly and indivisibly a system’s 
indeterminacy.  
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 This is much like how the locksmith industry advances. Any breach of a security system 
serves to improve the industry’s locking mechanisms. 
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Chapter Four: Objects, Storage Media and Archival 
Mechanisms  
 
In the last chapter, in a turn to recent studies in materialism, the focus was on how to 
approach “things” given their irreducible discreteness. The general orientation of the discussion 
represented a counter to the orthodoxy of rationalist and semantic based accounts of knowledge 
for supporting theories on communication and media. The status of “things,” in terms of 
consumer items or digital artifacts, is considered to be ambiguous. It was argued that things, in 
order for one to properly engage their kinds and degrees of indeterminacy, require other 
epistemic registries than fixed determinations for their being objects of knowledge. In this 
chapter, “things,” beyond their own discreteness as localized objects, are explored for what they 
generate as and within our modern systems that organize, produce and proliferate. In effect, 
focusing on the generative components of such systems serves to initiate thinking through how 
we may conceive of the contemporary archive. Of course, I am trying to stage how we may 
identify the laugh track as an archive. And beyond that, a kind of archive that defies being of use 
and purpose. First however, I explore how various industry manufactured objects institute 
archival techniques and mechanisms that circulate, preserve and perpetuate contemporary 
networks of exchange and consumption.   
 
Largely relying on Matthew Fuller’s ecological account of objects, much like Boscagli’s 
stuff and Priest’s glitch, I gain some purchase for thinking about contemporary archival systems 
as auto-generative formations. Fuller is keenly aware of the generative elements of the 
mechanism of standardization that organize and transform the contemporary landscape of 
80 
 
monolithic systems (ranging from the production of goods to an array of communications to 
transport and invariably applicable to systems of finance and of knowledge, just to identify a 
few). He provides us with a rather elastic account of the general forces at play regulating, by 
particular configurations of objects, the modern day experience. However, though unhinged from 
a central or authorizing discourse, if restricted to Fuller’s instructive analysis, ultimately we see 
the archive would amount to another mediating instrument. That is, it would be an organically 
derived function still governed, though obliquely, by a broader network of rules and principles. 
By contrast, in the next chapter, Michel Foucault will get us to consider the complexities of the 
archive as representative of a truly discrete historical formation. Closer to my objective for the 
laugh track, he prompts exploring the archive as an ongoing indeterminate formation of rules and 
as formative of rules that permit our doing history.  
 
 
The Collected Object 
 
This or any other procedure is merely a dam against the 
spring tide of memories which surges toward any collector 
as he contemplates his possessions. Every passion borders 
on the chaotic, but the collector's passion borders on the 
chaos of memories. More than that: the chance, the fate, 
that suffuse the past before my eyes are conspicuously 
present in the accustomed confusion of these books. For 
what else is this collection but a disorder to which habit has 
accommodated itself to such an extent that it can appear as 




Writing at a time of early 20
th
 century mass production of consumer goods, Walter Benjamin 
explores the collecting and preservation of things. He considers it to be an archival inclination 
that is both institutionally systematic while being highly idiosyncratic. Certainly, our connection 
to what comes to be called a collectible, or more anthropologically, an artefact, is locatable in a 
collective space and precedent temporal order (i.e., historical timeline or by some broad narrative 
coordinates). However, collectibles are also infused with personal investments in the fleeting 
passing of real and imagined events. The structure of an event, though always destined as time-
bound, is also subject to the magic and/or hidden rules of ellipsis. As Benjamin makes clear, the 
avid collector’s passion toward whatever object bestows a sense and meaning upon a cherished 
possession(s) that, from the non-collectors’ detached perspective, may otherwise be just another 
object. Thus things come to stand forth as having a pre-ordained but malleable – given the 
strength of one’s memory and sentiment – registry of value and rank. The collected item appears 
to, before the gaze of the enamored collector, automatically gather or collect itself into an 
appropriately designated grouping, classification or category. No doubt Benjamin’s observation 
anticipates Boscagli’s account of stuff. However, for the purposes of this chapter and for staging 
an encounter with the pre-authorizing archivo-technological formations for the laugh track, the 
collected object serves as entry onto examining the technological imprints that precede our 
intimacies with things. As we will explore in Chapter Nine, the laugh machine’s techniques of 
salvage and extraction, prior to any material assembly of laughter, is circumscribed by an 
archival authority contained within the recorded material to be assembled. For now, though, the 
general point is, within the “mechanical era” of mass production the mechanisms by which we 
gather and order, things are often regulated by pre-set dating protocols. The global features of 
objects (i.e. a book’s formatting) along with specific paratextual framings (regardless of an 
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object being designated as a collectible or “run of the mill” item) derive from industry specific 
manufacturing standards. These aspects of goods, commodities, artefacts (whether customized or 
of general consumption) obviously relate the properties of the medium of production. However, 
they also relate inherently generalizable cataloguing principles that facilitate a particular type of 
(potential) future mediation between collected material and historical or archaeological 
rendering. This raises a key problem for exploring the laugh track: how do a system’s 
standardized techno-mechanical traits reveal the laugh track as its own distinct transformative 
medium? If we are to explore the routine production of laugh track material in this way, we will 
then need to examine how its particular quantificatory metric deviates from established machine 
principle. That aside, for now we need grasp these circumscribed terms. The collected object, 
though it still may be experienced nostalgically (a phenomena of our era no doubt) or invested 
with personal (and often desultory) meanings, is ready for institutional processing within the 
technologically flexible formatting of the modern archive. The post-Benjaminian possession is 
thus pre-possessed of and by the very mechanisms of its production and productive apparatus. As 
mass produced object, it is “system-magically”69 imbued with the attributes of the broader 
structure for its circulation that invariably contribute to further expanded circulation.  
For media ecologist Matthew Fuller, who specifically analyzes the linkages of modern 
information networks, the very idea of an object’s circulatory potential leads to curious and 
productive forms of feedback. To him, the attributes of objects are active as an insidious 
contagion. Though not expressly focused on the archive, Fuller’s work, however, is instructive 
for bringing attention to the industrio-commercialized circulatory system of standardization 
governing modern day mass-produced objects. Like Benjamin, somewhat anticipating Boscagli’s 
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  My coinage. 
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challenge to the new materialist’s abstract formulation of things, Fuller advances an account of 
objects as processes. The products of consumer culture are not dormant. They contribute to the 
circulation of a system of production. In other words, objects are active carriers of a system’s 
potential expansion, contraction and, ultimately, its future. Accordingly, we gain some 
perspective on how micro-elements of a larger aggregate of interests may not only sustain but 
foster the interconnectedness and authority of that aggregate. This relates directly to my thinking 
regarding a general conception of the laugh track broadcast production. We need to approach it 
as a system that is formed through a process of pre-registry that inheres in the laugh track’s 
readymade materials. Again I will return to examine the specific nature of that process in chapter 
nine. For now though, I maintain the focus on Fuller’s description of the productive dynamics of 
modern objects.  Fuller writes,  
What is interesting about the freight container and the technology of 
digital packet-switching is that they work as a metaobject. A donkey cart 
can be used to carry turnips or bricks; a wooden barrel can carry tar or 
wine; these are objects made with other elements in mind. What can be 
said, though, is that the container and the packet exemplify in particularly 
pure but different ways a trajectory toward standardization, which then 
compels the adoption of their standard in a way that is not complex but 
direct. What become standardized therefore are not simply objects, but 
processes. (Matthew Fuller, Media Ecologies: Materialist Energies in Art 





 By Fuller’s example of freight containers and the technology of digital packet-switching, 
contemporary objects, or rather metaobjects, are productive and supportive of more, and 
potentially other, networks of production. For Fuller, the particular entrenchment and 
standardization of these networks is ensured by the system-specific predictive or regulatory 
metrics of: classification; temporal limits on lifespan as relates to a manufactured expiry date or 
bounded term of obsolescence; and, the generative capacity for a system, device or component’s 
logical extension and adaptability within a prevailing platform of operations. In effect, all these 
qualities that comprise objects are, by design, processes that mark off what is not part of a 
particular network. At the same time, these qualities underscore the terms of a particular 
systems’ functionality or productiveness. We thus are prompted to consider the individuated act 
of collecting within a highly stratified and systemized set of codes for delineation and 
quantification. When objects are thought this way, we may surmise that the archive does not 
impose the terms of registry on its materials. It is only the official final destination where objects 
come to be known or citable as particular collected materials. Accordingly, archival structural 
attributes – vis a vis classificatory metric, temporal registry, historical fact of propriety 
(manufacturer, Radio Frequency Identification, chain of title) – precede the confines of the 
repository and comprise the make-up of objects.
70
 In the next chapter we see that Foucault’s 
                                                          
70 We note that for Fuller, “standardization” is a fluid process. Not only is the destiny of an object 
prescribed with a specifiable potential for how it is indeterminate so is the system of which it is a 
part. Effectively, like the productive potential of a metaobject, a system’s form of standardization 
is itself a process, in one way or another, preparatory of subsequent standardization. Thinking 
out the life of modern technological systems much as if they were alive as ecological systems 
Fuller declares, 
Meanwhile, as particular systems become self-generating, perpetuat-  
ing themselves by virtue of the critical mass of interrelations they build up,  
other elements come into   composition   with   them,   send   them   on   detours, 
detach themselves, fall  into  disuse, vanish, arise  in  contradistinction, or emerge 
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account of the archive operates by a similar distinction. The physical repository may hold 
documents, records and materials. However, the system of archivation that regulates their 
coming to presence (in whatever knowledge configuration) is not, as if an identifiable and 
locatable epistemological order, itself contained. Nevertheless, even though there is a parallel 
with Fuller, Foucault resists Fuller’s would-be systemizing of the archive. Though he sees it as 
an authorizing and regulative formation, Foucault does not conceive of the archive as a 
productive network. He remains uncommitted to assigning the archive a purpose. Still, Foucault 
is very committed to accounting for the archive as a discrete formation. And, in due course, it is 
through Foucault’s open-ended account of the archive that I explore the laugh track archival 
formation as pure means.   
 
 
And thus, Disco as a Reserve 
 
 
The metaobject represents processes for entrenching the standards that retain and 
proliferate a system’s authorizing encodings as a reserve of practices and protocols. The object 
of circulation is always an object of its logico-mechanical past and present possibilities that 
executes its objectness by a system’s pre-quantified calculations. Fuller provides a broad account 
of the metaobject as mechanism of standardization within large-scale contemporary systems 
designed for storage and conveyance. To restate, he articulates how the metaobject acts as carrier 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




Modern systems operate within a greater order of standardizing generative schemes. A system’s 
variability, fluidity, indeterminacy, fragility, unpredictability, in effect unproductiveness, is 




of a systems structural attributes. In the same vein, Tan Lin accounts for disco as operating in a 
similar way to how Fuller describes metaobjects and systems. He provides us with a concrete 
instance of an archival system that falls in line with Fuller’s theorizing. Here, disco is not a 
musical system in the typical sense. For Lin, disco is fully circumscribed by its archival traits as 
a modern storage medium.  As a complement to Fuller’s analysis of objects and systems, Lin 
describes the self-generating potential of digital storage media. Audio fragments, essentially the 
components of a track of disco music, further parsed into smaller fragments, are not just 
expressions of a larger system of order and construction. They become the code that serves to 
multiply a system’s capacity to replicate itself. This, as we shall see, is particularly poignant for 
exploring the laugh track as a techno-mechanical archive. In going forward, it helps to grasp the 
significance of a key distinction. The isolable or individual laugh track is not only designed to 
circulate a system of archivation. It is a quantificatory mechanism designed to circulate as a 
system of archivation. Each laugh track is preceded by its being an archive. Its assemblage as a 
timed unit is permitted by a perverse archival regime of imitation.  Effectively, what the laugh 
track generates has already been generated. It is an archivated production of a re-production that 
we may suspect is already archivated. We will return to this tail-chasing conundrum in Part 
Three. 
 
Disco is unlike any other form of popular music, which is often evaluated according to 
particular conventions governing a song structure. Rather, for analyzing the popular dance music 
phenomenon of the 1970s, Lin conceives of disco purely as a function of 20
th
 century digital 
technology. So, by the dumbness of its automaticity, disco does no more than to perform its 
being a technological contrivance. The depth and potency of disco is thereby to be estimated in 
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its being a resource platform for dance music mixes. As Lin analyzes, this reserve that houses 
and accesses quantified musical tropes and beats contains little more than the structural and 
stupefying characteristics of “an empty storage medium of history.”71 Where Fuller prompts 
reflecting on how objects generate modern storage systems, Lin collapses the auto-generative 
seesaw between object and system into one mode of reproducibility.  In effect, disco is a 
computer “operating system.” It is much like a binary-code-bounded repository that has no 
purpose other than (re)manufacturing a databases’ housing of previously recorded musics. Lin 
writes, 
What does disco do? It programs a random-access search for "origins" and incites 
in the reader a search for sources, which turn out to be hallucinations or echoes of 
sources. Such a programming language was once called literature (we have 
chosen to call it art history), though disco, of course, is not a literature at all; it 
merely simulates the effects of literature (as empty brand) with the uncanny 
precision of our era's version of a lullaby: the remix. Disco is a programming 
language. It simulates the desire to remember when human remembering has 
become, from a technological standpoint, unnecessary or impossible. Disco thus 
proposes a solution to the vast volumes of distributed media (now databased on 
the Internet) that began in the nineteenth century and have snowballed of late – in 
the form of photographs, tape recordings, films, records, CDs, and hard drives ... 
Disco proposes a radical minimalization in the accessing of voices, regarded as 
discrete and modular data. For as we have seen, disco involved the systematic 
subtraction of extraneous information "tracks" and elevation of a percussion track 
                                                          
71
 See Tan Lin’s “Disco as Operating System, Part One,” Criticism, 2008 (p.95).  
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into a remix having minimal harmonic or melodic progression, and grounded in 
repetition. This subtraction would be exploited in the late seventies and early 
eighties with Eurodisco, Italodisco, minimal ambient house musics; contemporary 
artist writing/distribution projects; and a host of disco-oriented stylistics and 
sampling/appropriation-based poetries. (Tan Lin, “Disco as Operating System,” 
92-93)  
 
Seemingly, empty of content and adrift from validation by some “greater” or grounding thesis 
(i.e. an audiophile’s/collector’s idiosyncracies) disco appears to form a closed system as mimetic 
function of digital archivization processes. Transmitting a pulse from disco track-to-disc jockey- 
to-dancer-and-back, we gain access to moods or “data inaccessible to human memory.”72 In 
effect, disco, true to its French origins discothèque, is a library of phonograph recordings.  If you 
will, the night-clubber’s “archival system.” However, examined under the mood-kill lighting for 
Fuller’s techno-materialist gaze, by which we form an epistemological model for conceiving of 
objects, things appear more sinister and expansive. Disco is a pre-determining, highly 
systematized apparatus.
73
 Effectively, here Lin’s account extends Fuller’s auto-generative logic 
of mechanicity and reproductivity. We shift from objects being metaobjects within a broader 
system to objects being systems of metaobjects. Disco is a repository that is generative of more 
data that, as data, generates more repository. This appears consistent with idea that the laugh 
track is an ever-expanding generative loop of archivation. Certainly it would be tempting to 
conclude that the very form of its content determines both the recipe for more content and the 
                                                          
72
 Ibid.  p.93 
73 A material thing’s status as object refers primarily to its categorized instrumentality. Which 
effectively institutes a system’s preceding mechanicity. 
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regulative bounds by which it has been inscribed within the broadcast industry. However, as we 
shall explore, the laugh track also deviates from the strictures of its being a reserve and from the 
forming of one.  
 
In following Fuller’s thinking, we grasp how objects and their storage media may be fully 
circumscribed as serving the systems from which they emerge. Still, although we may account 
for the over-arching techno-instrumentality governing the systems that classify, collect, store, 
assemble and produce objects need our conception of the modern archive be entirely 
circumscribed by this modern day scheme of functionality? In other words, is the archive merely 



















Chapter Five: Foucault, Function and the Archive 
 
To take steps towards engaging the laugh track as an electro-mechanical archival system, 
I have been attempting to engage a materialist-based thinking about technology and 
contemporary memory storage media. By this thinking, we may experience material production 
and media formations as dynamic and self-generative processes. From Fuller’s metaobjects and 
storage container to Lin’s account of disco contemporary systems of objects are, though arguably 
making for a highly controlled and predictable world, always transforming, proliferating, 
faltering and reconfiguring, as it may appear, without some overarching and totalizing directive 
or order. However, though we may grasp that these self-turning contemporary storage systems 
are at once generative of more objects/data and for more storage capacity, the analysis has 
remained within the circuitry of serviceability.
74
  In all, we have been focused on data/memory 
storage mediums as being, in a very general sense, instruments of technology. Still, although 
contemporary archival systems may be accessible as functions of technology we are no closer to 
understanding what informs our engagement with what may be principally thought as the 
archive. Thus, apart from explanations of the technological mechanisms by which the activity of 
archiving or even the system-making of archiving gets executed and maintained, there are 
questions with respect to the principles/rules and forces by which the archive may be governed.
75
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  It is the computer software that expands, transforms, archivates and de-archivates to facilitate 
the data designated as “records,” “documents” or “materials.” Further, it is the hard-drives or 
electronic engines which run the software that are the main fixed means for guaranteeing the vast 
variability of needed quantification for a reserve that makes and maintains space and time for 
future amassing and (re)configuring. 
75
 In other words, what is it that precedes but certainly persists via its various instrumentalized 
mediatic orderings and has permitted its particular formations within history as a formation that 
gives order to things? 
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Towards addressing the archive as its own formation, in this chapter, I turn to Foucault’s 
non-instrumental account of the archive in The Archaeology of Knowledge. By Foucault’s 
account, the archive is a formation that has its own rules prior to and independent of the very 
history of the documents and artefacts of which it is comprised. The archive precedes the 
discursive and mediatic mechanisms that make of the past a past or thing of knowledge. 
Accordingly, the archive is not a site of mediation, it is not a conduit nor a function of 
knowledge-making. The archive, as Foucault tells us, is active all on its own for forming rules 
for, either in discursive or non-discursive formations, what may come to presence.  
With the discussion now re-directed towards Foucault’s conception of the archive, the 
question arises: How may one approach a system that is prior to our description of things? That 
is, if we are to explore the laugh track as its own archival formation, how might we avoid re-
inscribing instrumentalist terms into the analysis? To wit, the archive is what permits Foucault’s 
archaeological approach to discursive formations. Archaeology allows for a studied description 
of the precedent formations for how a knowledge of things may come into being. Accordingly, it 
permits approaching the archive as its own evolving complex of processes. As we shall see, 
Foucault demonstrates the functioning of the archive in terms that are not bound by conceptual 
order and/or productive causal mechanisms. Here, learning from Foucault’s account of the 
archive and archaeological approach, we may revisit the earlier discussion concerning function. 
Instead, by conceiving of function prior to its implementation as a mediating term, Foucault 
recasts function within a system of making that is in the making. Further, the turn towards an 
archaeological approach thus anticipates the coming pivotal point at which we may encounter the 
laugh track formation, rather than a “means to an end,” as a gesture or “pure means.” We thus 
get closer to examining the laugh track’s form of paradox. For all intents and purposes, I am 
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aligning Agamben’s idea of the gesture as “pure means” with Foucault’s putting into question 
there being an authorizing or commanding mechanism that governs the formation of the archive. 
Accordingly, we arrive at the radical formulation that the archive as “pure means” is an unlawful 
law.  
 
Of What the (Classical) Archives May Permit  
 
The archive is first the law of what can be said, the 
system that governs the appearance of statements as 
unique events. But the archive is also that which 
determines that all these things said do not accumulate 
endlessly in an amorphous mass, nor are they inscribed in 
an unbroken linearity, nor do they disappear at the mercy 
of chance external accidents; but they are grouped 
together in distinct figures, composed together in 
accordance with multiple relations, maintained or blurred 
in accordance with specific regularities; that which 
determines that they do not withdraw at the same pace in 
time, but shine, as it were, like stars, some that seem close 
to us shining brightly from afar off, while others that are 
in fact close to us are already growing pale. (Michel 




With Foucault’s help, we shift from accounting for a generalized notion of memory systems, 
even objects in their own right, as designed to save and manage content or operate as servant to 
the preservation and representation of the past, to an unbounded and somehow always-altering 
system. It is a system that permits of things the formation of particular details, their orderings 
and kinds of articulations. Foucault, as if responding to Matthew Fuller’s somewhat social 
integrationist network (even applied media’s epistemological engine), challenges the 
functionalist inclination to grasp the archive as circumscribed by our contemporary industrio-
political system. No doubt for Foucault, the archive, be it as public records holder, is a site for 
ongoing squabbles or power plays over claiming authority in whatever civic matter. However 
beyond such provincial interest, he conceives of the archive as, in some fashion or another, 
generative of the very terms for which such kinds of exchanges may arise. Effectively, Foucault 
directs us toward thinking of the archive non-container-wise. If anything, the archive is that 
which “permits” the uncontained. For Foucault, looking past the purposivity of modern techne, 
the archive is not a particular discourse or instrument of discourse, nor a platform or medium.  
The main point is that, the archive is not an isolable and potential sequence of intersecting events 
on a timeline. Rather, by Foucault’s analytic, we encounter the archive as historical process at 
the moments that, within the always-contingent flux and dispersivity of history,
76
 permits 
whatever statements arising as history. Generally considered, Foucault has restricted his focus to 
what may be considered as the classical text-based archive. In keeping with the analytic on 
discourse formation central to The Archaeology of Knowledge, he declares it as the system that 
governs the appearance of “statements as unique events.” Effectively, he has linked the archive 
to a system that regulates history in terms of discursive formations. But, as we will explore in the 
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 As an always preceding formation or historical a priori of what gets called history. 
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coming chapters, especially as relates to media archaeology and approaches to exploring the 
laugh track beyond being culturally purposive, Foucault’s statement on the governance of the 
archive extends to accounting for media formations as regulated by processes other than 
discursive, vis a vis quantificatory and machinic.  Though focused on the history of technological 
formations, the media archaeologist grasps the material artefact very much as Foucault engages 
discursive formations.  Always the guiding question for Foucault and media archaeologists is: 
how are the organizing elements of a system permitted, regulated and authorized? In accordance 
with Foucault, the media archaeologist conceives the workings of the archive as being generative 
of the facts by which we interpret both media and its attendant discursive formations.  
 
With that said, by Foucault we grasp that the archive is not active as memory aid or as a 
device that has as its fixed design cognitive-like subject specifying attributes. It is not simply, as 
is commonly thought, a container for holding information (data, material) that is to be at some 
point in the future deciphered as knowledge. For Foucault, simply put, the archive precedes that 
productive apparatus. The archive is generative of the very rules by which the past comes to be 
formed. Its positivity, in effect, proceeds by negation. That is, what gets permitted, selected, 
ordered, spoken of etc. must occur with respect to what the archive does and does not permit to 
be devised in an accounting for things.
77
   
                                                          
77 We note from the above quote that Foucault gives a sense of how appearances of statements 
are governed. There is no predictive schema or commonsensical cause-effect mechanism by 
which we can chart or account for the operations of the archive. The idea of being observers of 
the archive as if it were a knowable and bounded apparatus is mere abstraction, historically 
determined by pre-ceding and perhaps receding historical processes. Even temporal proximity to 
things is without a ready-to-hand logic or roadmap for navigating what’s probable. Foucault, in 
likening statements to celestial bodies, poeticizes “some that seem close to us shining brightly 
from afar off, while others that are in fact close to us are already growing pale.” And yet, for 
Foucault the archive as system regulates the linguistic processes by which we appropriate things 
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Archaeology of Knowledge and the “Seen” and “Said” 
Foucault challenges the “implicit causal discourse” that at once gives force to the 
classical historian’s ordered accounts. Though seemingly just targeting the historian, as just 
outlined, Foucault’s thinking represents a broadly applicable approach to examining the 
generative mechanisms for ordering, structuring and constituting the logic upon which 
propositions of order and causality seemingly naturally occur. Foucault resists thinking and 
characterizing knowledge as a reasoned and an ahistorical enterprise.  He avoids treating (the 
history of) knowledge as a soluble puzzle that, if solved, will provide clarity to an 
epistemological base for then doing a history. Rather, Foucault explores reasoning as a form of 
control or bringing order to what does not speak and that lacks intelligibility. Accordingly, he 
invents his own method, as will be discussed below, to attend to the silenced and dismissed 
deviant elements that inhabit the exclusionary mechanisms of any knowledge formation. Against 
western philosophical authorization, he thwarts making appeals to a universal principia. There is 
no positing of a metaphysical realm for grounding inductions and deductions in an apophantic 
mechanism that authorizes kind and certainty. Instead, knowledge and its logical moorings, 
though highly productive, are to be reckoned with as reactive formations generated within power 
relations. We hereby come by our knowledge(s), past and present, through force. Knowledge, it 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in time. As operation that is certainly within language - as if language were the materials for its 
operations as our pre-hensive engagements - the archive through its formations permits 
statements on what’s seen and said. It shapes what comes to be perceived as the rules 
determining the very gamut of possibility for which and of how things may be connected, 




appears, is made through systematic, normalized and routine state-sanctioned violence that 
imposes good sense on sense and sensations.
78
 
With ironic authorial-undermining of the possible universalizing of his own claims 
concerning knowledge, Foucault institutes an archaeological approach to the rules that permit an 
institution's authority for formalizing a discursive practice.  Inscriptions and dictums are never 
just made, they are permitted to be and to be articulations by the terms of an authorizing registry, 
that is, by a sanctioned legible propositional standard. Again, the form and force of that making, 
though imposing an order, need not be rational. For Foucault, regulatory forces are akin the 
lasting impacting presence of police. They serve to impose upon subsequent conceptual 
gatherings a parametric and/or spatial design for a particular formation of discursivity. Or rather, 
for how a discipline-specific logic is developed and executed. From this perspective the archive, 
the very system under which Foucault’s form of archaeology comes into operation is 
extraordinary. The archive’s generative powers are near unfathomable. This is because the laws 
of its system are both generative of discourse and can transform the very system that permits a 
discursive practice’s formation. So then, how does archaeology permit exploring the archive? 
Further, how does archaeology permit examining media formations like the laugh track? 
In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault wrestles history from the rationalist and 
interpretative schemas of historians that have been deployed to link together a series of events to 
form cohesive narratives.
79
 Targeting the historian, Foucault puts into question the actual role or 
the privilege and authority granted to the historian as the one with access to a “behind the 
                                                          
78
  In effect, the things and experiences that very likely precede and determine the reasoning that 
gets deployed in governing what is routinely categorized as body and materiality.  
79
 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, p. 137. 
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scenes” progression. Actually, Foucault conceives of the traditional historian very much as he 
accounts for the formation of subject
80
 and authorship. These two terms that play prominent 
roles in organizing western thinking are inventions constituted by institutions, discourses and 
power relations. In effect, the historian is her/his own historical formation generated within the 
schemes and strategies of a particular discursive practice.
81
 In another sense, Foucault rejects the 
belief that historical events and documents harbour a secret, a hidden illusory truth or something 
essential about our human activities. Counter to providing grandiose explanations for history, 
Foucault limits his focus to the procedures and rules that give order and formation to our 





 general grammar) Foucault takes inventory of the particular field of relations that 
permit the formation of that discourse. This approach to history, as will be evident in the next 
Part, is highly instructive for media archaeology and the methods by which I explore the laugh 
track as a media formation. Still, just as important as an approach will be, we need register that 
an inventory of a field of relations holds no potential as explanatory schemes. In fact, these 
relations, so Foucault contends, are prior to any manufacturing of a thought-out program for 
rationalizing particular elements of a system. 
 
… it is no longer necessary to appeal to the themes of an endlessly withdrawing 
origin and an inexhaustible horizon: the organization of a group of rules in the 
practice of discourse, even if it does not constitute an event so easy to situate as a 
formulation or a discovery, may be determined, however, in the element of 
history; and if it is inexhaustible, it is by that very fact that the perfectly 
                                                          
80 Regarding the constitution of the subject Ibid. pp.51-55 
81
 Ibid. p.136 
98 
 
describable system that it constitutes takes account of a very considerable set of 
concepts and a very large number of transformations that affect both these 
concepts and their relations. Instead of outlining a horizon that rises from the 
depths of history and maintains itself through history, the “preconceptual” thus 
described is, on the contrary, at the most “superficial level” (at the level of 
discourse), the group of rules that in fact operate within it. (Michel Foucault, The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, 62)  
 
We note that the “preconceptual” does not preclude concepts from being a part of discursive 
formations. Concepts are but elements in a set of relations that includes other things such as 
“forms of deduction,” “derivation,” “coherence,” “intersection,” “substitution,” “exclusion,” 
“mutual alteration,” “displacement.”82 Specifically, the “preconceptual” represents the realm in 
which a series of formations take place.
83
 Accordingly, Foucault sees archaeology as the task of   
making a spreadsheet like account of relations. For Foucault, there is no room for traditional 
historical presuppositions of there being a pre-set backdrop of machinations by which the 
functions of a society, a system, or an historical event may be founded and understood. As Gilles 
Deleuze states, Foucault’s archaeological analysis is confined to what is permitted to be “seen” 
and “said.”  
 
But in fact there is nothing prior to knowledge, because knowledge, in Foucault’s 
new concept of it, is defined by the combinations of visible and articulable that 
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 Ibid. p.60 
83
 Ibid. p.59  
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are unique to each stratum or historical formation. Knowledge is practical 
assemblage, a “mechanism” of statements and visibilities. There is therefore 
nothing behind knowledge (although, as we shall see, there are things outside 
knowledge). (Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, 51) 
 
Foucault conceives of archaeology as a practice for defining and as being defined by the surface 
interplay of historical processes.
84
 His is an analysis by which the constituting of knowledge, the 
objects or the component parts of a discourse, reads as an intricate production-line process.
85
 
Archaeology has no explanatory powers. Instead, it is the “systematic description of a discourse-
object.”86   
Function? Or rather, a System of its Functioning? 
  In Part Two, I examine how Foucault’s approach to discourse translates to the media 
archaeologist’s approach towards media. In effect, archaeology becomes central to exploring the 
laugh track in less instrumentalist terms and as its own archival formation. However, apart from 
the potential for doing archaeology instead of a standard history of the laugh track, Foucault 
describes the archive in a way that addresses issues raised earlier concerning the notion of 
function. We recall function was examined as a particular figure of knowledge that lends 
authority to certain presuppositions about the workings of media. By the transmission model of 
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 In contrast, the historian (of ideas) who in accounting for historical transformations outlines “a 
horizon that arises from the depths of history and maintains itself through history” Foucault 
conducts his analysis “at the most ‘superficial’ level (at the level of discourse).” Ibid. p.62  
85
 We recall, Foucault regards writing the history of discursive objects as its own form of 
assemblage that requires the deployment of “the nexus of regularities” that come to constitute 
their manifold formations. Ibid. pp. 47-48 
86
 Ibid. p.140 
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communication, function gives explanatory force to reductively theorizing “the communicable,” 
communication and mediums for conveyance according to isolable goals (i.e., sending messages 
between source and receiver). And by the ritual theory, the term gets deployed to enable 
interpreting the effects of media according to a socially integrative model that always already 
gives place and purpose to communication/media. Foucault’s description of the archive as a 
system of its functioning provides us with an alternative expression to what covertly serves the 
cogency of a theory, specifically, of what gives theoretical impetus to the cultural historian’s 
analysis of media. In effect, Foucault’s version of function circumvents the programmatic to 
describe media in purposive and instrumentalist terms. Thus, for the coming exploration of the 
laugh track, the notion of functioning re-orients our descriptions of organizing elements and 
seeming catalysts as emerging from within the makings of media formations.  
Throughout much of The Archaeology of Knowledge, “function,” within the generative 
operations of a system, registers a system’s devised juncture for executing a discursive procedure 
(i.e. the policeman as street-warden actively maintaining the laws of public order). In the 
broadest etiological sense, function may thus have the appearance of a trigger-type mechanism 
with a causal character. However, for Foucault, more in terms of what they actually do, functions 
are circumscribed by a discipline’s formative process. Functions are given play as instrument for 
re-inscribing and re-asserting the power or authority of a discursive practice. By this application, 
functions are conceived counter to the transmission and ritual theorist’s idea of things. They are 
not causal nodes set within a generalized observational schema that provide a theory its 
explanatory force. Rather, for Foucault, functions are a system’s “officially sanctioned” methods 
for enforcement, verification and authorization. However, in the chapter “The Historical a priori 
and the Archive,” Foucault presents a variation on function vis a vis “functioning” that is, as 
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opposed to an expression of rules, a formative activity. We instead encounter function as a pre-
conceptual operation. Outlining the archive as authorizing system for discourse, Foucault writes:  
The archive is not that which, despite its immediate escape, safeguards the event 
of the statement, and preserves, for future memories, its status as an escapee; it is 
that which, at the very root of the statement-event, and in that which embodies it, 
defines at the outset the system of its enunciability. Nor is the archive that which 
collects the dust of statements that have become inert once more, and which may 
make possible the miracle of their resurrection; it is that which defines the mode  
of occurrence of the statement-thing; it is the system of its functioning. Far  
from being that which unifies everything that has been said in the great  
confused murmur of a discourse, far from being only that which ensures  
that we exist in the midst of preserved discourse, it is that which differ- 
entiates discourses in their multiple existence and specifies them in their  
own duration. (Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 128-129) 
 
Though the archive may be thought as a mere holding chamber where statements are forever 
preserved (in document or print material form), Foucault declares it to be an active dynamic 
force in how we actually form statements. The archive, by default, has governance in the 
formation and transformation of knowledge. By the system of its functioning, the archive 
differentiates discursive formations while delimiting the duration of their appearance. In other 
words, its formation sets the terms and specifics, in the most discrete and specifying sense, for 
the material registry of whatever discursive offering. However, by describing the archive as 
the system of its functioning, Foucault is not identifying mechanisms that are in service of a 
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system’s productive outcomes. That would be to re-instate a source to results regimen. But, by 
what we grasp, for Foucault, the archive lacks the authorial, cohesive or coherent presence of 
arbiter of fact. Rather, Foucault gets us to focus on the force and formation of a system. His 
notion of functioning and/or function precedes epistemological import and our accounting for 
productive gain. Functioning refers back to the system it forms, indicating that and how things 
are being operationalized. It is bereft of causal efficacy or having the role of triggering an 
effect for a system. In this sense, we engage function as the ongoing re-instituting of particular 
determinations that maintain a system as formation or process.  
 
Further, apart from recasting function as a system-reflexive action, Foucault’s account 
of the archive as a goal-less and indeterminate formation will provide the critical point at 
which my examination of the laugh track diverges from the main of media archaeology. Media 
anarchaeologist Siegfried Zielinski extends this radical insight for upending the media 
archaeologist’s belief that the archive reveals a medium’s generativity. For Zielinski, the 
archive is hereby impotent if it only permits accounts of knowable and potential media 
formations. By the media archaeologist’s limited interpretation of Foucault, the archive in 
effect blocks access to what is not knowable and to that which is without potential. In practice, 
Zielinski is at odds with media archaeologists over the narrow application of a “seen” and 
“said” governed approach. For him, what may be seen and said is quite possibly entirely 
inaccessible to any program of investigation predicated on positive display. Rather, in 
following Zielinski, we may describe the form and force of the laugh track as a system that is 
outside a metrics restricted to the registerable features of a medium’s quantificatory prowess. 
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This is significant because it permits engaging the laugh track in terms of what it does not 




























Introduction (for Part Two) 
I have placed Part Two within the graphic signification that typically indicates a 
broadcast studio cue. It is just like a TV script prompt for signalling the appropriate moment to 
insert audience laughter. However, more metaphorically considered, the parentheses signify a 
break from narrative constructions engendered by Foucault’s archaeology. Effectively, his 
approach cues my exploration of the laugh track as its own archival formation.  I explore the 
laugh track as a system of its functioning disconnected from human-centred mechanisms for 
explaining or describing a medium’s role and transformations. As we have seen, an 
archaeological approach rejects the cultural and classical historian’s linear or category 
delineating strategies that would ultimately reduce the laugh track to a tool within a broader 
scheme of production. Rather, we may approach the laugh track as it comes to interact with and 
quite possibly transform other schemes of production. In other words, I explore the laugh track 
as it shows and performs otherwise to its being a means to an end. It is from this vantage point 
that we may, in Part three, then explore the laugh track as an instance of uselessness. And, 
consequently, to explore how uselessness may be an integral part of media formations.  
Over the next four chapters I bring to focus how the laugh track is an archivo-material 
media formation. In step with Foucault’s descriptive methodology, I deploy a media 
archaeological approach to account for the laugh track. Specifically, I engage the laugh track by 
“seen” and “said” precepts developed by media archaeologist Wolfgang Ernst and media theorist 
Friedrich Kittler. Ernst and Kittler enable us to work through the dispersive nature of stored 
information and how it dictates the manner in which we actually account for media. Ultimately, 
through their approach we may calibrate our discourse by the interruption, displacement and 
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discontinuity engendered by our media systems. However, though my research of the laugh track 
is governed by a certain archaeological impulse, in order to directly explore the laugh track as its 
own form of archival system, I take from key insights by cultural historians regarding the laugh 
track. The work of sound performance theorist Jacob Smith along with the deconstructionist 
account of digital humanist Jeff Scheible, though extending the orthodox discursive approach I 
reject in Part One, is worthwhile. They help to open onto an articulation of the laugh track that 











Chapter Six: A History of Recorded Laughter 
Attention thus far has been on developing an approach that permits exploring the laugh 
track as its own media formation. This has meant countering the prevailing analysis and its 
theoretical framework for positing the laugh track as a function relative to the main content of 
broadcast production. To examine the laugh track as its own formation, I now place the 
discussion within the domain considered proper to its being a sound effect. Set within the history 
of sound reproduction technology, we gain traction concerning relevant inventive processes. 
Further, we examine material instances of the laugh track as a transforming routine mechanical 
operation both within and apart from the industrialized operations of North American radio and 
television broadcasting. This will set the scene for later examining, in chapter nine, the laugh 
track as materio-archival formation in relation to the broadcast regime of the late 1940s and 
onward. There, I explore the regulatory mechanisms that necessitate the material presence of 
laugh tracks. How, within the broadcast industry frame of scheduling, audience rating 
techniques, the division of labor running the spectrum from “creator” to “technician,” as well as 
the system of inventing and patenting, this archival regime became its own commercial entity 
and standard in the form of the Laff Box machine. Again, Kittler and Ernst will be helpful for 
navigating a media system’s possible divergences for how it shows. However, before such 
consolidation in the form of a laugh machine, the inventive forces for the contemporary laugh 
track may be assessed in parallel to preceding experiments in automata and other mechanical 
instruments made for either simulating or emitting the human voice. In this respect, there is 
much to draw on for grasping the archivative constitution of the laugh track. Consistent with the 
theme of being open to the laugh track, and media in general, as pure means we get a handle on 
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generative processes that, rather than being driven by inventors, drive invention. Leading up to 
the electric age of machines, inventions in sound reproduction technologies establish a particular 
realm for encountering the human through non-human systems that approximate, proliferate and 
transmit relatable sounds. The sound theorists Jacob Smith and Jonathan Sterne help to 
understand these historical processes in divergent ways. Smith directly examines the history of 
recorded laughter. He ties its various developments to human performance and physiology. 
Conversely, Sterne provides insight into how sound technologies in general are distinct processes 
analyzable independently of mind and body. Ultimately, though I will take issue with Smith’s 
dualist account, what we get from both their analyses is an understanding of how vocal 
emissions, generated from hand-operated machines, create the space for analyzing the material 
registry and replication systems that comprise the contemporary laugh track.  
 
Machine-Produced Visceral  
 
 
To understand the laugh track within the history of voice recording, sound and 
performance studies scholar Jacob Smith examines the relation between the listener and the 
actual materials or mechanical sound recordings. Smith tells us that the earliest recordings of 
laughter had a role other than that of demonstrating the technical prowess of a machine. It did not 
only display a gramophone or “speaking machine’s” capacity for reproducing sounds. Laughter 
conveyed a viscerality that was meant to engage listeners through a bodily affinity with a 
machine’s effusion. Smith writes, 
 
Notably, the use of the laugh to demonstrate the virtuosity of talking machines has 
an even earlier origin in the eighteenth and nineteenth-century talking machines 
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of Wolfgang von Kempelen and Joseph Faber. Kempelen, most famous for his 
automaton chess-player, also designed a keyboard-operated machine that could 
imitate the vocal organs (Patrick Feaster). Later, Faber designed a similar 
speaking machine that featured the torso of a “Turk” and a more convenient 
keyboard. The Illustrated London News noted in 1846 that the machine was 
capable not only of speech but also “even whispering, laughing and singing: all 
this depending on the agility of the director in manipulating the keys” (Feaster 
2000). As with early phonographic demonstrations, the laugh was presented as the 
spontaneous creaturely expression of authentic embodiment, capable of 
transcending the limits of mechanical reproduction. (Jacob Smith, “Frenzy of the 
Audible,” 24-25) 
 
Generally considered, early mechanically produced and later gramophone cylinder 
reproductions of the human voice, though at first appearing as sources of fascination and marvel 
(given their capability for replication and storage), were also designed to impact the senses.  The 
auditory experience could trigger empathy within the listener with certain sounds (known as 
empathaphonia). Somewhat spontaneously, through association with a recorded sound, one 
might have appropriately accompanying muscular sensations, often some kind of localized 
spasm. In a word, the listener felt, to some degree, physically impacted. Ultimately, Smith’s 
point is that extra-discursive sounds like laughter helped the listener to overcome the alienated 
feelings they had towards a non-human mechanical sound-emitting object.
87
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 The idea here is that with the novelty of machine-generated speech, music or worldly sounds 
having somewhat dissipated listening was transformed from attentiveness to spoken word 





For Smith, the catalyst for transformation of machine-generated speech being a novelty to 
participatory was early 20
th
 century capitalism. He surmises that making audio technology more 
relatable was born of a strategy for more widely marketing gramophone recordings. Given this 
industry objective, the target audience was not North America’s social elite. Rather, the 
burgeoning gramophone industry took aim at the disposable income of the large and rapidly 
expanding working class. Smith points out that often recordings of “hi-brow” performances, be 
they orchestral presentations, were replete with a slowly increasing crescendo of “lo-brow” 
associated involuntary bodily emissions (sneezes, hiccups, giggles).
88
 By exploiting class 
attributes (i.e. vulgarity), to somewhat reiterate, the gramophone became less apparent as an 
invention. Its mechanico-pragmatic possibilities as sound – even message – storing device were 
obscured. Instead, it was highly active as purveyor of sentiment. Accordingly, whatever anxiety 
and reluctance was felt over the “disembodied” sound-generating device was “sutured” by a 
machine’s capacity for triggering (a sense of) bodily response.  
Unlike Kalviknes Bore and other laugh track theorists, Smith does not assume 
reproduced laughter and the laugh track are a means for simulating a sense of “liveness.” For 
Kalviknes Bore, the laugh track is ahistorical. It is distilled as a concentrate of a generalized 
notion of technology. Thereby, the laugh track exists as device in service of a system of 
exchange. Instead, Smith pursues the material investments of vocal reproductions as part of a 
history wherein there is a fundamental need for a visceral connection between human and 
machine. In some respects, for which I explore the philosophical underpinnings in the next 
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 Such sounds often emanated from a recording’s audience-members, sometimes even from one 
of the performers themselves. Ultimately, the effusions escalated and staged a recorded 
presentation’s degeneration into a cathartic free-for-all of laughter (for example, the “Okeh 
Laughing Record,” released in 1922). 
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chapter, Smith actually examines the workings of sound technology as if another viscera. Here, 
the point being, machines of the voice are conceived as a humanized registry. They invoke 
because they are connected to human being. With the idea that laughter is so integral to human 
behaviour he asks: How might that need for connecting arise? For my exploration of the laugh 
track, Smith’s theoretical commitments diverge from exploring the laugh track as its own media 
formation. However, the orientation of Smith’s research gets us closer to the laugh track as a 
material transformative process. In my estimation, examining sound technologies as regimes of 
objectivation ultimately clear a path for exploring the laugh track as media archival formation. 
 
Psychic Apparatus  
In a section of Vocal Tracks playfully titled “The Canned Uncanny: Laughing 
Machines,” Jacob Smith speculates on a way to merge the categories of the human and the 
mechanical. Beyond articulating the connection of laughter-reproducing technologies to social 
and economic formations, Smith is held captive by the profundity of the connection. He probes 
how particular responses to laugh recordings may be authorized by a structural predisposition. In 
effect, he wants to locate overt physiological impulses in the workings of the human 
unconscious.   
Analyzing recorded laughter as a source of anxiety, Smith questions: “Why was the 
recorded laugh felt to be so powerfully disturbing?”89 Pushing past Henri Bergson’s powerful 
insight into how laughter as social sanction against mechanical behaviour represents a potent 
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 See Jacob Smith’s Vocal Tracks, p.45. 
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index for the human (so knitted into our social engagements), Smith turns to Sigmund Freud to 
articulate the psychic apparatus that permits the elision.
1
 He taps the logic of Freud’s theory of 
the uncanny. Finding a parallel with Freud’s famous account of witnessing an epileptic 
undergoing spasms, Smith offers that our “being disturbed” by canned laughter may have been 
the result of a category uncertainty vested in (a generalized experience of) mechanicality itself.  
When observed, the break in another’s “normal behaviour” is often thought to be directed by 
external automatic, machine-driven operations. Here, the observer of the epileptic bout loses grip 
on the standard human/automata divide. The so-called inanimate appears to come alive. In the 
presence of inexplicable forces, the observing consciousness becomes the subject of its own pre-
structuration. The observer is shaken. They are not the ground of being, the source or authority 
for determining what and how things are witnessed. With this “hard line” between human 
organism and machine momentarily put under erasure, the machine comes to presence as organic 
life. Likewise, “life” appears to move like the typical machine. As with Freud’s account of 
observing an epileptic fit, for Smith laughter itself, as demonstrated through involuntary body 
spasms and erratic vocal effusions, blurs the line between mechanical and human. The human 
animated by an uncontrolled force is here the sign of its humanness as a fluidly instinctive social 
organism. Put in another way, we have become predisposed towards our being abstracted as an 
abstract being.
90
 In essence, this lurking psychological mechanism that stages an uncanny 
impression is how for Smith canned laughter “was so powerfully disturbing.”  It reveals one’s 
inexplicable readiness to be drawn in by an inhabited sense perpetrated by a recording. 
Effectively, by this thinking recorded laughter carries human presence through mechanical 
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means. It is a performative of what is recorded. Recorded laughter is then the means for there 
being human presence.   
For Smith, the history of the vocal/laughter-emitting producing and reproducing 
machines proceeds by an opposition between machine and body. Regardless of proximity to 
humanness, laugh recordings are thought to traverse a chasm. In the next chapter, I will focus on 
the nature and consequences of this opposition for Smith. This dualism, as it appears, simply 
further entrenches the analysis of sound technologies within the divide between speaking and 
writing. Nevertheless, as we shall see, this is a philosophistic strategy. Smith deploys the dualism 
more to produce a narrative of sound technologies than to subsume sound studies to linguistics. 
Regardless, in both ways, we are diverted from understanding the laugh track as a media 
formation. At each turn for potentially exploring the laugh track or recorded laughter as its own 
technological formation, Smith halts analysis. He stops short of engaging the inventive processes 
of laugh recordings in a way that may, perhaps without reason, open onto other regimes of 
mediation and production. Instead, systematically, instances of mechanicalized laughter are 
always rationalized. They are plotted on an anthropocentric time-line for fitting part to whole – 
obviously covering psychic authoring, economic realities, social and behavioural mechanics. The 
media in question is always treated as a system of a broader discursive functioning.  I, of course, 
propose going in the opposite direction with my exploration. By engaging with the laugh track as 
a system of its functioning, I abandon engaging things by a linking mechanism. In effect, I do not 






Though focused on reconciling the relation of machine to body, Smith, whether intended 
or not, actually leads us to valuable observations about the mechanization of laughter 
independent of 20
th
 century broadcasting. In addition to having a role in the advancement of 
vocal producing technologies, laughter was (as with the von Kempelen talking machine) 
mechanically rendered for its own sake,
91
 perhaps more accurately, as a proto-laugh track. The 
speech-machine did not only emit laughs. By the regulated operations of simulated vocal 
mechanisms, it made a repeatable routine of vocalizing, of (re)-producing laughter. The main 
point being, the contemporary broadcast industry’s archival regime of producing laugh tracks, 
though reliant on 20
th
 century automated technologies predicated on electromagnetic principles, 
may have received its mechanicalized formula/cue well in advance of its particular mode of 
mediation. In a conceptual sense, the machine’s routine operation (of laughter) for storing and 
manufacturing well precedes its cultural use. And, in an applied sense, the human voice becomes 
instrumentalized as a hand and/or touch-controlled technology. Not unlike musical wind 
instruments (horns, clarinets), speech-machines operationalized “the voice.”92 Early voice (re)-
production technologies (inscription-based or tympanic membrane-based) helped to inaugurate 
automaticity. Narrowly considered, inventors acquired the means for making a material or 
engineered object speak. More broadly considered, however, the very program of a systematized 
material grafting of audio registration and methods of encoding, though derived from human 
physiology, meant that operations of a sound-emitting apparatus were constructed as independent 
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 We note the term soundtrack was first coined in 1929 – within the context of cinematic 
production presumably the first time audio was materially isolable as recording. “Track” itself is 
an audio recording term associated with magnetic tape recording technology. Of course, well 
prior to this there were dog tracks, race tracks, horse tracks etc ... 
92
 This featured a system of levers regulating air passage within tubes. 
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of the human arbiter.
93
 This insight is crucial for my analysis. It provides the springboard from 
which I launch my exploration into the archivo-mediatic character of the laugh track. The sound 
effect may not only be grasped in terms of a machine’s responsiveness or mediation (within a 
cultural sphere of a broadcast/audience discursive) but also by the particular logical and illogical 
orderings of a technology.  
 
In this regard, Jonathan Sterne’s work is very helpful. In his book The Audible Past – a 
history focused largely on formative moments
94
 of the earliest of sound reproduction 
technologies/machine (i.e. the phonograph with cylinder or the telephone with code-plate)
95
 – 
Sterne emphasizes how inventors of sound reproduction machines were most captivated by 
recording instruments as sovereign operations. These various inventions provided one with new 
and ideal methods for preserving and encountering the past that was not restricted to human 
mental capabilities. Developments in audio technologies of the early 1800s inspired the dream of 
an infinitely repeatable and permanent 1:1 representation of and engagement with (persons of) 
“the past” (that could be simply played back on a machine set to decipher machine-encoded 
recordings of speech, music, etc). The gramophone, for instance, went beyond memory prompt 
or glimpse at the past. Rather, it held the potential for constructing an archive, with the greatly 
increased capacity for storage of fully recallable memories, that forever sounded voices of the 
past in the present (and beyond).
96
   
                                                          
93  See James Lastra, Sound Technology and the American Cinema: Perception, Representation 
Modernity (Film and Culture Series). New York: Columbia University Press, 2000 (pp.31-35). 
94 See Jonathan Sterne, The Audible Past, p.28.  
95
  As mechanism for transferring so-called source sound to an automated medium. 
96 Of course, the dream met its practical limits fairly soon into the life of wax cylinder 
recordings. Sterne points out that these early inventions of mechanical entombment were and 
“are notoriously fragile and difficult to hear. They require careful and attentive storage and 
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In moving further into the existing research on auditory engineering, alongside Sterne, we 
are prompted thus to explore both the general problematic if and how the form of mechanicality 
indicates historical continuity within media. Most germane to my analysis the methodological 
question arises: how do we examine technological inventions either in terms of discontinuity or 


















                                                                                                                                                                                           
ginger use. Listening to those early cylinders often brings confusion and clarity in equal doses to 




 Much more narrowly, without a universal compass, how may we then explore the proto-laugh 
track as pre-cedent to current archival formations? 
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Chapter Seven: Contending with a Conditioned 
Absence 
When the woman in the laughing record floods 
out,
98
 the one-to-one situation between listener and 
performer is altered, because there are now at least 
two audience members. The listener’s role is 
suddenly made uncertain, free-floating. Is the 
listener part of an audience or over-hearing this 
performance? The woman’s flooding out 
precipitates the listener’s frame reorganization: The 
listener has lost a certain formal connection with the 
performer but has gained a relationship to the 
laughing audience member, who has broached the 
ritual constraints of the situation. (Jacob Smith, 
“Frenzy of the Audible,” 28) 
 
As outlined in the last chapter, Jacob Smith gets us to research the laugh track’s origins 
beyond the historical development of radio and television.
99
 Recorded laughter, as with other 
kinds of vocal recordings, developed within trajectories of invention that precede and diverge 
from the 20
th
 century industrialization of sound technologies. Again, as with the above account 
                                                          
98 “Floods out” here means: involuntarily breaking into or being overcome with laughter. 
99 Smith very nimbly navigates an analysis of recorded laughter within and in relation to the 
“ideology of liveness” along with the historical transformations of the TV and radio broadcast 
industry. As stated, his work is a vital prompt for investigating the phenomenon with respects to 
its particular acoustic and mechanical properties. 
118 
 
of the presence of laughter on early commercial phonograph recordings, Smith's goal is, in part, 
to make understandable the connective tissue between human vocal performance and machines. 
Here he makes a visceral link between a pressing’s evocative content and an audience’s “live” 
sensory receptors. Through unconscious psychological mechanisms, the gulf between so-called 
immediate or live experience and the recorded sound disconnected from the listener’s present is 
traversed. However, apart from accounting for the “connection” between listener and a 
recording, Smith certainly appears to go much further. For his analysis, he inscribes the human 
into the technological. He absorbs a machine’s history within the unfurling of a social or 
humanist trajectory. Though his analysis, at times, appears to entertain being circumscribed by the 
horizon of mechanically produced sound, in the end, he inculcates the significance of the non-
mechanical-live experience of sound in the development of the recorded technologies.  
 
In following Jonathan Sterne’s insightful analysis of the structural coordinates often 
circumscribing the discipline of sound studies, we understand how Smith situates the laugh track 
within a broader narrative of media transformations which features the human and the techne. 
Ultimately, this dualism impedes engaging the laugh track as its own formation. The human, not 
just conceived as aggregate of bodily processes but as always-present temporal gauge, restricts 
media to being a social trajectory. In direct contrast to Smith’s rather formidable research, digital 
humanities theorist Jeff Scheible prompts analysis of the laugh track as graphic formation or, 
more specifically, textual inscription. Scheible, countering oral-biased usages of laughter, “sees” 
the laugh track as suggestive of an anxiety divergent from Smith’s suture theory. It is an anxiety 
over conveying meaning. Scheible notes that the laugh track often, within the written registry of 
industry script form, appears in brackets. The laugh track takes form inaudibly, concealing 
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textual inadequacies. It represents an author’s covering for meanings that are not and cannot be 
heard.  
In what follows, I examine how both these stories of media proceed by the strategic 
positioning of their analyses of the laugh track. Their contributions play off of and indirectly 
reinforce the discipline of sound studies’ theoretical “mainframe.” This, traditionally, has been 
organized by the two opposing philo-historical camps, oral and graphic/written. However, all 
will not be lost in an entanglement of age-old quarrels. Their analyses provide my exploring the 
laugh track as a discrete media formation with a decisive opening. Upon clarifying Smith’s 
position we may circumvent the authority of a ubiquitous human-centric chronos. And, by 
following the logic of Scheible’s deconstruction of screenplays – with the main of the text set 
beside a routine industry procedure for signifying an extra-discursive – we fortuitously bump 
into the mechanics of the laugh track as system of archivation.    
 
 
An Oralizing of the Laugh Track 
As I plan to show, the laugh track is part of a larger 
story of the recorded laugh in the history of media, 
and telling that story can provide insights 
concerning the ways in 
which people have interacted with media 
technologies and in which bodies and voices have 
been represented through them. I argue below that 
the recorded laugh was a potent index of authentic 
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presence used to bridge the gap between recorded 
sound and listener. (Jacob Smith, “Frenzy of the 
Audible,” 24) 
 
In Vocal Tracks, beyond analysis specific to the recorded voice, Smith argues that the 
recording process, including recorded laughter, is a historical construct that can be explained by 
broader mechanisms for social order (that somewhat invisible but incontrovertible always 
present mediating frame). Throughout much of the book’s opening chapter, which is solely 
devoted to recorded laughter, Smith establishes laughter in relation to the sociologist Erving 
Goffman’s notion of the “frame.” Goffman’s idea is that we as social creatures are always 
conducting ourselves within set boundaries that involve, to some extent, our awareness of the 
regulatory terms of a given context for what is permissible in participating in a given social 
engagement. Smith writes,   
In Goffman’s terms, Bergson’s definition of laughter has to do with the social 
control of frame maintenance. When people are not flexible or fluid in their 
ability to adapt to the appropriate social frame, they are sanctioned by laughter. 
Laughter, then, is a kind of suture between the rigid and the flexible, the social 
and the individual, the mechanical and the human. The ability of a mechanical 
recording to break frames helps it to emanate a sense of authentic presence and 
humanity. (Jacob Smith, Vocal Tracks, 31).  
 
Accordingly, laughter must be treated with much seriousness and purpose. As stated in the last 
chapter, Smith reckons the contemporary formation of recorded laughter to be a part of a 
121 
 
historical continuum that stems from helping early audiences relate to mechanical reproduction 
technology. The laugh track’s general purpose is considered to be born of a need for comforting 
an audience. What is inspiring about Smith’s work is that it opens up the research beyond the 
narrow estimations of a laugh track’s impact or value for a broadcast production. It re-focuses 
accounts of the laugh track in terms of its material properties or qualities. We thereby glimpse 
the possibility of exploring the laugh track as other than a tool in a means/end calculus. Still, 
although being a technological invention is addressed, clearly, how the laugh track is its own 
kind of formation again is ignored. Rather than directing our research and analytical investments 
toward the laugh track’s media specificity, Smith offers a greater narrative. It appears at least 
that, as with other accounts of the laugh track, we again subsume the recording as mediation and 
its technological and archival attributes as productive within a media studies episteme. However, 
the philosophical base that authorizes Smith’s account of the laugh track extends the 
conversation beyond probing the implicit epistemological commitments of the previously 
referenced laugh track studies. It appears far more primordial and of existential import. If 
anything, Smith thrusts the discussion towards grander issues.  Although the content production 
mechanisms within cultural history, discussed in Part One, may not authorize the laugh track as a 
media formation, it appears that the western logo-centric tradition does.  
Drawing from the last quote, the laugh track does not just have a role in suturing one’s 
encounter with a machine’s outputting of a performance. Laughter also registers human bodily 
traits and “involuntary response mechanisms.” These responses make acceptable, well 
independent of any technological media formation, certain social behaviours that lessen and 
loosen the affects of rule-governed along with formalized modes of presentation and social 
practice. Though Smith may not be entirely committed to Bergson’s rather humourless 
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philosophical account of laughter as the elixir for inelastic behaviour, he largely conceives of 
laughter as an outlet for expressing what is suppressed by social regulations and what cannot be 
expressed by scripts that pre-scribe a player’s given performance. Coming to presence through 
this plastic/inelastic binary, laughter is measured according to a metric of social order or, more 
accurately, for a social order being maintained. Beyond the narrow machinations of the early 20
th
 
century gramophone industry, laughter thus serves as a “true to life” and socially unregulated 
“gut-felt” response. For Smith’s purposes, it reaffirms the presence of the sovereign-to-machine-
essential-human. Considered within the greater workings of things, laughter thereby relieves the 
human-all-too-human anxiety that threatens the certitude of unification and authority necessary 
for the functioning of a society.  
Though there is a consistent provisional tone to Smith’s analysis, given that he recognizes 
our vocal performances are mediated by machines, he firmly attributes to the voice a power that 
registers independently of the mechanisms by which the voice is conveyed. In this sense, he 
offers an account of the human voice that, in general, resonates with language theorist Walter 
Ong’s theory of orality which is predicated on a theoretical divide between oral culture and 
literate culture.  Ong writes, 
Sound is more real or existential than other sense objects despite the fact 
that it is also more evanescent. Sound itself is related to present actuality 
rather than to past or future. It must emanate from a source here and now 
discernibly active, with the result that involvement with sound is 
involvement with the present, with here-and-now existence and activity. 




Spoken words are always modifications of a total, existential situation, 
which always engages the body’. (Walter Ong, Orality and Literacy, 67) 
 
The human voice does not just parlay information or the contents of one’s so-called “inner 
experience.” The voice emits sounds that are independent of a symbolic or reasoned formulation. 
And just as Ong would have us believe, for Smith these sonic materials are nested within the 
complex fibres of, as experienced individually or collectively within a social order, human being.  
Smith’s premise for recorded laughter actually shares a structural parallel with Ong’s 
notion of “secondary orality.” For Ong, primary orality refers to verbal expression uncorrupted 
or prior to the graphic representation of language. Accordingly, secondary orality is: “essentially 
a more deliberate and self-conscious orality, based permanently on the use of writing and 
print.”100 Likewise, Smith reads the laughter of recorded laughter as an oral expression of the 
Ongian first order. Laughter here is still a primary or even primitive-type of oral engagement. 
Though it is a contrivance of literate-derived technology, laughter’s unscripted viscerality 
permeates the machine-mediated experience of the audience. Still, as I have indicated, Smith is 
less committed to foundational thinking or metaphysics than he is to the deployment of such. 
Two crucial things distinguish Smith’s account of the human voice from Ong’s transcendent 
theory. In one sense, though Smith does preserve a core distinction between the human voice and 
the media for transmitting it he does not extend Ong’s mission to give primacy to the oral as 
real, transcendent and transhistorical.  Conversely, disparaging the written and its various 
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 See Walter Ong’s Orality and Literacy, 1982, p. 136. 
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associated technological manifestations, as representative of the transitory, threatening or 
corrupting realm of the artificial. In another sense, Smith diminishes the perceived opposition 
between the oral and the written. He treats the two as being in a historically mutual and 
contingent relationship. They are intertwined as differing modes of human experience. For 
Smith, perhaps contrived, scripted, faked, mechanically generated etc., the laugh track survives 




 century racial 
typecasting and economic class division) a base communicative function. In short, he 
instrumentalizes the classical division of the oral and written in order to articulate the 
“expressive” role of a recorded performance for a social context. Audio recordings of extra-
discursive vocalizing not only generate immersive approaches to sound reproduction research. 
They provide Smith with the pretense to exploit and even reconfigure general theories of 
language, technology, society and history to a humanist-oriented account of a medium’s 
particular coming to presence.  
 
A Sterne Warning to Mr. Smith 
If Smith’s analytic is just the strategic deployment of establishment philosophy’s terms, 
then maybe his account of the laugh track as “part of a larger story of the recorded laugh in the 
history of media” does get us closer to the discrete workings of sound recording media than it 
may appear. Though not directly commenting on the concealment of audio production values, 
Smith describes recorded laughter, so that a performance does not appear divorced from the 
“here and now,” as a procedure deployed to distract the audience from the main of the 
production. Laughter thus functions to cancel out whatever perceived foreign attributes a 
recording may have, including its deficiencies. It aids by immersing the listener/audience 
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uninterruptedly in their experience. Just as if it were a “live” happening or real and present 
performance. In this regard, we may consider Smith’s work on the laugh track and other 
“wordless” vocalizing101 as exposing the ideological and practical pursuit to achieve “true 
fidelity.” As Jonathan Sterne tells us, from one generation of technician to another, within the 
history of sound recording, the pursuit of true fidelity appears to be a major driving force. For 
whatever commercial and industry use (i.e., film, TV, radio, music), a primary goal has been to 
devise recording methods that “close the gap” perceived between original and copy, or, more to 
the point, a produced/source sound and its recorded/reproduced version. Likewise Smith’s 
analysis may be re-cast within one of Sterne’s more potent observations. In The Audible Past, 
Sterne writes: “a set of procedures and aesthetics had to be developed to stand in for reality 
within the system of reproduced sound.”102 However, though it would appear that Smith’s thesis 
on recorded laughter is retrievable within the recording ethos of “true fidelity,” the seemingly 
provisional philosophical commitments guiding Smith’s analytic are at odds with Sterne on this 
ethos. Sterne thinks the ideal to be entirely historically contingent, even fickle. And he certainly 
does not think it is the only ideal that has been pursued. More significantly, Sterne puts in 
question the basis for producing an account of history that foregrounds, even strategically, a 
sense of a continuum. Smith’s work, to the contrary, requires a founding structural premise for 
interpreting the mechanicalizing of laughter or whatever wordless vocalizing. So, even though 
our activities and concepts are made-up, as social constructs they are a veiled referent to an 
authentic human interiority. Greatly influenced by Foucault, Sterne attempts to steer sound 
studies, at least those studies focused on the history of reproduced sound, away from the 
                                                          
101 For example, breathy deliveries, exclamations of anger are also what may be referred to as 
secondary sounds relative to speech and music. 
102  See Jonathan Sterne’s The Audible Past, p.285. 
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metaphysical ideal of authenticity, fixed truths governing audition, or a disguised logo-centrism. 
In his analytic, notions of authenticity are contingent. They are predicated on the always in flux 
transformativity of recording machines. Thus, the so-called real of our cultural experience and 
practice is conditioned by machines as being amongst more machines. Sterne writes, 
 
This history of sound begins by positing sound, hearing, and listening as 
historical problems rather than as constants on which to build a history. 
So let us take a ride on Ockham’s razor and work from a simpler 
definition of sound-reproduction, one that does not require us to posit a 
transcendental subject of hearing: modern technologies of sound-
reproduction use devices called transducers, which turn sound into 
something else and that something else back into sound. My definition 
[presumably of sound-reproduction technology] is certainly reductive and 
incomplete, but it is a very instructive reduction. It offers us a useful 
starting point for a history of sound reproduction, especially for a history 
that will proceed analytically rather than chronologically. Even though 
transducers operate on a very simple set of physical principles, they are 
also cultural artifacts. This is where The Audible Past begins its history of 





Focused on the history of sound reproduction apparatuses, Sterne approaches sounds studies 
independently of an opposition between the listening subject and sound technology.
103
 He 
engages sound reproduction technologies by the measure of their own terms or, rather, what they 
do practically. Within sound studies, Sterne’s medium-centred research represents a significant 
departure from commitments to sound as subject-centred historical phenomena. He circumvents 
the chronos-based thesis that projects an inherent human registry mechanism onto the operation 
and transformation of machines. Our focus shifts from sound technologies (inclusive of non-
electronic or electrical instruments) producing or reproducing content to sound reproduction 
being a transductive process. Thus, proceeding analytically rather than chronologically, we 
attend to the conditions supporting the material transformation of sounds into other forms of 
sound. As we go forward in the next few chapters, taking a cue from Sterne, I extend the terms 
for analyzing and researching the specific re-productiveness of the laugh track. Sterne’s 
conception of the sound technologies re-paves the bridge between Foucault’s non-narrative 
archaeological process and the media archaeologist’s technologically centred approach to media. 
In accord with the latter, I thus explore the particulars of the laugh track as a system of its 
functioning, as its own transformative process. 
 
 
A Text-Based Analysis of Laugh Tracks 
Whether engaged as a grand philosophical commitment or just a narrative strategy, 
within the trajectory of the western philosophical source-supplement quarrel, Smith, as pertains 
to accounts of the laugh track, is not alone. Jeff Scheible, in his article “Within, Aside, and Too 
Much: On Parentheticality Across Media,” analyzes the laugh track in terms of how, within a 
                                                          
103 We note that The Audible Past (2003) was published prior to Vocal Tracks (2008).   
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script for a sitcom, it is transcribed as a parenthetical or bracketed element. Focusing on the 
laugh track by its particular arrangement or placement in a TV program’s script, the laugh track 
is not only to be explored in terms of what is heard or performed, but by how it operates in the 
scripted arrangement of scene and dialogue. He deconstructs how typographic brackets and/or 
parentheses serve to underscore the divide between the dialogue being acted out by actors – the 
main of the action – and the superimposed pre-recorded audience laughter. In contrast to Jacob 
Smith’s account of the laugh track as means for surmounting our anxiety over relating to 
machines, Scheible claims the bracketed laugh track indicates an uneasiness and anxiety around 
the need for aiding a script’s meaning by use of external framing devices.104  By this logic, in 
order to help transitioning within and between comedic scenes or routines, the laugh track 
supplements what is indeterminate or deficient about “the said” of a performance with a pre-
recorded “unsaid.”105 For my purposes, Scheible is quite important for bringing attention to the 
inscriptive mechanical procedures that announce the presence of the laugh track as another 
formation, independent of the text (and of a particular model of cultural mediation). As with 
Smith, Scheible’s work cues us to how the laugh track may be at play as a pure means. That is, 
the “bracketed” is not only, as Scheible reads it, a suspicious intervention. The bracketed-off 
instruction serves as index for the industry’s system of labour. It is here that we may parse, and 
in turn potentially explore, the systems of effects (here the directed and/or mechanically 
generated laughter) from what they are supposed to effect. Alternatively, deploying an isolation 
metaphor, I have bracketed Part Two to indicate the laugh track’s “structured absence” as a break 
from narrativo-philosophical mediation. Beyond how we may read into things by such 
investments the laugh track’s structured absence materially looms, as a uselessness in reserve. 
                                                          
104
 It appears Scheibel is making play of the Goffmanian frame. 
105
 Or rather, might it be put, an “indeterminately said.” 
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Scheible attends to the graphic textual representation and placement of the laugh track as 
written stage direction placed in brackets alongside the character dialogue for TV and radio 
scripts. Using Rose Kohn Goldsen’s script breakdown of various TV programs ranging from 
stand-up comedy routines to variety shows to cartoons in her book The Show and Tell Machine, 
he draws out the laugh track’s implicit separateness.106  
In other words, she [Goldsen] never writes, “(Guffaws.)” or “(Explosion 
of whoopers.),” only “(Laugh track.).” This writing of the laugh track 
seems to reflect how we imagine the track parenthetically – invariably, 
grammatically separate, an aside. (Jeff Scheible, “Within, Aside, and Too 
Much: On Parentheticality Across Media,” 16) 
 
Laughs for Goldsen are not partitioned off in terms of their variability and style of chortle (i.e. 
guffaws, explosions of whoopers). Instead she, with some variation, groups laughter that trails 
dialogue or action within parentheses. And, with unvarying repetition, she writes out the break or 
isolable element that gets interjected between actions and lines of dialogue as “(laugh track).”  
By another example of Goldsen’s account we see: 
... an animated creature is flattened by a steam roller (laugh track) or 
comes apart in a flurry or dismembered limbs (laugh track) which 
                                                          
106
 Here, to state the obvious defence of Goldsen’s (typo)graphic framing, I abruptly register that 
her “bracketing off” may also be considered as a pragmatic entry to prevent that “laugh track,” 
read amidst lines of character dialogue, is not interpreted as yet another couple of words to be 
uttered along with the scripted dialogue. After all, the point of her analysis and description of the 
laugh track is to bring attention to the function the laugh track is assigned by TV producers 
attempting to determine how a program will likely be received. However, with that said, I think 
Scheibel’s analysis could very well be on the “right track.” 
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miraculously reassemble themselves into an intact body (laugh track). 
(Rose Kohn Goldsen, The Show and Tell Machine, 67) 
 
The laughter indicated by the entry “(laugh track),” be it in terms of the kind, volume or extent of 
laughter, lacks any individuation in quality. Rather, as Scheible points out, the simulated 
audience response of mixed-in laughter is graphically registered most systematically and 
economically as an element. Or, to use the functional language of Goldsen it is a “cue.” “(Laugh 
track)” historically operates from outside what is of and proper to the “authentic” or intended 
engagement with the text. In other words, Goldsen simply refers to pre-recorded laughter as a 
generalized space or moment of sound that marks the beginnings and ends of gags. Her textual 
representation counter-poises the specificity of dialogue and action with a signifier for quantified 
presence of audience expression so-denoting a form-giving or framing device. Accordingly, 
Scheible reads these brackets (provocatively) as provocative:  
Goldsen’s literal parentheses bring to mind a more figurative 
parentheticality that helps make sense both of the laugh track’s sonic 
suturing into the rhythm of the sitcom and of its place in cultural 
consciousness more generally. The very sound of prerecorded laughter, 
coming from the position of the audience – structured into the soundtrack 
of the television program – interrupts, pauses, or displaces the principal 
flow of the program. But at the same time, its very interruption becomes 
integral to a show’s flow, in a manner similar to the function of a 
parenthetical in a written sentence.  (Jeff Scheible, “Within, Aside, and 




Here, the laugh track has a troubled and troubling relationship with the scripted material. In 
certain respects it inhabits the main of the text as an unwanted but needed supplement (for 
maintaining “flow”). The laugh track reinforces the sense that the stand-alone studio-recorded 
performance lacks vitality and, without appropriately timed responses, may, tending towards the 
desultory, lose its cohesion. Thus the laugh track, while serving as the spontaneous and 
expressive dynamic stand-in for the non-present live audience, aids in contextualizing and giving 
a sense of completion to an action that is absent both in the script and in its being acted out. In 
effect, the laugh track is what Scheible, hinging his analysis off Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction 
of the role of parentheses in writing, refers to as a “structured absence.” The laugh track is “the 
other” to the principal or featured work. Within this binary, the laugh track is not on equal 
footing with the “text proper.”  It is not only considered an add-on that is in service of the 
scripted production, over the history of radio and TV comedy, its necessity for the industry is 
plagued with the sense that it is an unfortunate supplement for what would otherwise ideally be 
present and ‘real.’   
 
Questioning Scheible’s Analysis of Laugh Tracks 
 
By Scheible’s deconstruction of Goldsen’s representation of the laugh track, we may read 
the very parenthetical framing of the laugh track as an indictment of the cultural and political 
authority in, for, and through a text’s construction. Simply put, the laugh track is a peripheral 
device, a necessary evil that serves to maintain narrative coherence and presence. Again just like 
Smith, Scheible restricts our engagement to the laugh track as being an impure formation, 
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corrupted by whatever purpose or interest. He rationalizes the laugh track as a means to an end. 
Still, given the use and role of laugh tracks as a “structured absence” (that is implicitly assigned 
in relation to a live performed script) the following important questions may be raised: What are 
the mechanisms by which we make a quantitative product of the seemingly qualitative emissions 
of the body? Further, if these mechanisms are not discursively circumscribed are we to reject 
Scheible’s discursive presupposition or at least depart from it with a, shall we say, lesser-
committed discursive theorizing?  To work towards addressing these questions, again Goldsen’s 
text may itself be of use.  
By the very parenthetical gesture by which Goldsen and many others mark the laugh 
track’s appearance/absence, it may be argued, parentheses indicate the laugh track as a particular 
institutional structuration.
107
 The laugh track may be considered entirely distinct and independent 
from the functioning of a broadcast studio production. No doubt, Goldsen’s use of parentheses 
assumes a kind of purposivity that binds the pre-recorded laughter to “the live” program it 
accompanies. However, her bracketing may also simply indicate the nature of the type of 
mechanisms that hold, house and contain the component parts. In other words, Goldsen may be 
cuing the reader to the laugh track being a lesser-defined media formation, an other medium. It is 
lesser-defined in that, by its very assemblage, proliferation, and murky status as an authenticating 
effect, the laugh track is not only another piece of a studio’s narrative. Apposite to Scheible’s 
read, I propose we take Goldsen’s bracketing of the laugh track no differently than any other 
supposed non-diegetic accompaniment. Here, the brackets indicate the politic of a division 
between the creative-content producer and the technician. Or more broadly thought, between the 
                                                          
107
 Of course this Part Laughing (“Outside” the Box ...) may be read very much as a particular 
form of institutional structuration.  
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stage/studio designated “work of interest” and the facilitating technological apparatus and 
appurtenances. In taking cues from Goldsen, as opposed to being circumscribed by a cultural 
rationale, we may then directly explore how the laugh track is constituted. Though a part of 
relaying the media of interest vis a vis a comedy routine, the laugh track may also be justifiably 













                                                          
108
 I note that with a certain consistency appropriate to the theme of her book The Show and Tell 
Machine - as with a director’s script-notes for stage/studio instructions, shot list, cinematography 
and lighting, camera directions, acting, etc. - Goldsen presents a TV program’s elements as 
“cues.” Accordingly, by her thematizing or more aptly re-(in)scribing, in the very language 
designated as technical shorthand for the TV industry, sequence of stage/studio commands into 
the analysis, alternative to Scheibel, we may read the main/creation of production so-marked by 
its relation to “mediated” laughter as our (the writers, the actors, the crew, the audience) always 
already being in a particular relation to and of “technology.” 
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Chapter Eight: Digging into things with Media 
Archaeology 
 
Bodily experience is a product of the particular 
conditions of social life, not something that is given 
prior to it. Michel Foucault has shown that, in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the body 
became “an object and target of power.” The 
modern body is the body that “is manipulated, 
shaped, trained,” that “obeys, responds, becomes 
skillful and increases its forces.” Like a machine, it 
is built and rebuilt, operationalized and modified.” 
(Jonathan Sterne, The Audible Past, 12)  
 
In the previous chapter, Jonathan Sterne’s notion of transduction was introduced as an 
alternative approach to studying sound reproduction technologies. In order to avoid 
“predetermin[ing] the history of sound reproduction” by the “positing of a transcendental subject 
of hearing”109 Sterne attends to each sound technology as being unique transformative 
processes.
110
 Whether it is for television, radio, the changes in the phonograph or certain digital 
sound technologies, he considers each invention to operate by historically specific “logics” and 
particular material realities that have come to constitute the specifics of each format of sound 
                                                          
109See Jonathan Sterne’s The Audible Past, p.21. 
110





 What I take to be instructive is his conception of history. That is, that history 
“will proceed analytically rather than chronologically.” Accordingly, we resist an inclination 
towards a generalized vision of history governed by logics of progress and succession. Instead of 
rationalizing the laugh track as being historical or part of a larger ongoing project, I then attend 
to the transformative mechanisms of its system. In no way will this be to abstract a sound 
reproduction technology from the “flow of the world.” Rather, it is to contend with how a 
cultural artifact may be integral to the material realities and detailed operations of a cultural 
practice(s). As Sterne states, “the history of sound implies a history of the body.” A history of the 
body, as outlined in the quote above, lands us in a complex play of culturo-material processes. 
These processes are in varying, often non-linear ways, along with our relation to and notions of 
them as theorists, always in formation. Constructing a historical account by an ordered sequence 
or progression from one event to the apparent next and onward after that really only reinforces a 
way history is told. For Sterne, a history of sound reproduction technologies needs to be told by 
identifying how the institutional forces, practices, discourses or disciplines, correlative 
technologies are at work (or made past) in the creation of a particular technological invention.  
In this chapter, I turn to media archaeology as method for proceeding analytically. I 
attempt to explicate how it permits exploring media. Through media archaeology, we may 
explore how media formations are artifacts emerging from distinct material and cultural 
conditions. The laugh track is obviously a sound reproduction technology; however, as I have 
contended, its transformation as a so-called effect is not only dictated by inventions in sound 
technology particular to radio or television. Rather the laugh track is circumscribed by other 
                                                          
111The “exteriority” of sound is this book’s primary object of study. If sound in itself is variable 
rather than constant, then the history of sound is of necessity a contextual endeavor. Sound is 
thus an artifact, not a fact, of the messy and political human sphere.( Jonathan Sterne, The 
Audible Past, p.13) 
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seemingly non-sound based processes that make it into its own material registry, or, archive. 
Appropriate to a contemporary analytic concerning the archive, I draw from the media 
archaeology of Wolfgang Ernst, and, to some extent Friedrich Kittler. By their approach, we may 
activate a micro-historical account of the transformative productive apparatus of recorded 
laughter that, while proceeding analytically, disrupts the plane(s) of narrativization for inherently 
making function and purpose of the laugh track. Alternatively, by pursuing the laugh track as an 
archive we stage reckoning with the laugh track as a particular mediatic instance of what 
Foucault refers to as a “system of its functioning.”  
 
Non-discursive Material Registries 
 
 
“Our writing materials contribute their part to our 
thinking.” (Friedrich Kittler, Discourse Networks, 
196 quoting Friedrich Nietzsche’s letter of 
February, 1882, in Briefe, IV: 97)
112 
 
 Analyzing the laugh track by the regime of media archaeology represents both a 
methodological and philosophical enterprise centred on the none-too-apparent technological 
under-girding of contemporary mediatic formations.
 113
 On the one hand, the task is to, by 
applicable tenets of archaeology, describe the schemas and formats of media that impose a 
certain order on our world. And, on the other hand, to attempt to understand how media 
                                                          
112
I will refer to this quote in more detail in the Appendix with respect to laughter. 
113
It is arguable that the laugh track is always already cued and that this particular cueing is 
merely a quasi intervention or methodical illusion – a dreamt up rigorous mapping onto things. 
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formations make possible what we think and how we operate. Media is then not approached as if 
it were only a means to an end. Rather, media, through its varied operations, is what permits how 
we approach and perceive ends. With respect to the specific developments in 19
th
 century 
approaches to historical documentation, Wolfgang Ernst prompts us to consider, “It is here that 
the crucial media-archaeological question arises again: does a discourse favor the development 
of new technologies, or is this new discourse itself an effect of such a shift in technology?” 114 
As much as our discourses may be about things or the objects that comprise a particular topic 
they also tell of themselves as discourses, or the rules and terms of their formation. Further, 
discourses on media or how we talk about our technologically ordered world (past or present) are 
very much mediated by non-discursive formations. To further emphasize, media actually set the 
terms for what is permitted by the orderings of a discourse, by what may be innocently said 
and/or described. In the next chapter, for instance, when examining the laugh track during the 
years just prior to television, we see that it influenced how radio shows could be more efficiently 
and effectively formatted. The laugh track did not simply add tone and color to the content of a 
performance. It was a system of recording that shaped practices permitting new approaches to 
both address scheduling demands along with concealing program flaws. In other words, rather 
than as a discursive component of a script or show, its presence, in rather rudimentary ways, was 
impacting as a media formation. 
 
  In the quote heading this section, Friedrich Nietzsche declares that our thoughts are 
influenced and perhaps ordered by the technological limitations of our writing tools. This general 
observation greatly lends support for the media archaeologist’s formulation – set in 
                                                          
114
 See Wolfgang Ernst, Digital Memory, 46. 
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contradistinction to Marshall McLuhan’s115 influential postulate that media are an extension of 
man – man is an expression of media. For the media archaeologist, by this perhaps facile 
inversion of McLuhan’s famous dictum “man’s” actions appear to be a mode of a technological 
engagement. The consequence of this is that since media are so integral to experience, one can 
never gain sufficient distance from which to study media as an independent observer. This really 
underscores the force of Foucault’s descriptive methodology for the media archaeologist’s 
exploring media. For instance, we have no grounds for asserting that the laugh track is a mere 
tool of a broader system. Certainly, it is a part of one. However, subsuming it within a 
cause/effect analysis ignores how the laugh track may be generative, not only of more laugh 
track but, of the very system it operates within. Along these lines for thwarting abstract 
formulations, media archaeologist Jussi Parikka asserts: “we do not so much have media as we 
are media and of media.”116 Media, by various processes of so-called inquiry and knowledge 
production, are then only further activated as methods of description and formulation that, in 
effect, generate more apparatus. Thereby, any system of knowledge is determined by discourses 
that are actually a by-product of the workings of technology. Even how we conceive of 
temporality, spatial relations, communication, culture, etc. are framed by technology’s turnings. 
With respect to our relations with the past, Friedrich Kittler, considered a founder of media 
archaeology, here makes this point rather acutely: 
Once technological media guarantee the similarity of the dead to stored 
data by turning them into the latter’s mechanical product, the boundaries 
                                                          
115See Marshall McLuhan’s Understanding Media. 
116
 See Jussi Parikka’s Insect Media: An Archaeology of Animals and Technology Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2010. (xxvii) 
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of the body, death and lust, leave the most indelible traces. (Friedrich 
Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, 55) 
 
This excerpt follows from Kittler marking the divide between olden day recording methods 
organized by abstracted idiosyncratic written reporting
117
 and more modern-day media capable 
of faithful standardized reproduction and storage (either acoustically or optically). Again, very 
much like Foucault’s challenge to the notion of the author, Kittler challenges any authority we 
believe to have over our thoughts, creations, memories and even accounts of history. It is the 
machinery that authorizes and “guarantees” how the past will survive. More specifically,118 we 
are confronted by material registries determining how and what we relate to as the past and 




 century, recording technologies of 
(analogue and digital) “the boundaries of the body” are organized as knowable components 
possessive of a legibility. This is a readability authored by operations of a standardized resource 
retrieval system. For Kittler, it is not simply that the seemingly incorruptible proximity between 
times now and before has been greatly lessened. More to the point, the very means for doing so, 
an archivo-electro-mechanicality, engages the particulars of the past as mediality-specific 
governed objects. The past is thus represented within an always-in-the-present matrix of 
reproducibility (be it by a phonograph or by filming apparatus).
119
 Accordingly, it is by a 
materio-medialitic circuitry that we may come to understand, in terms of an epistemic order and 
                                                          
117 
For paper and the book also possess a materiality and are mediums for conveyance (that is of 
conveyance/address). 
118An analysis that’s attributes are owed to the very machinery it engages the products of. 
119 See Wolfgang Ernst “Media Archaeography: Method and Machine versus History and 
Narrative of Media,” Media Archaeology: Approaches, Applications, and Implications. Erkki 
Huhtamo, Jussi Parikka eds. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011, p.250 for the 
idea of the past as form of delayed presence. 
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the always already of the to-be-new(ly) produced, the contemporary cultural experience.
120
 In 
the next chapter, in parallel with Kittler’s claim that the developments in data storage foster new 
articulations of our relations with bodies and objects, I explore the laugh track as archival system 
that negotiates past vocal effusions as a mechanicalized future occurrence. Its stored assemblages 
of dissociated source-indeterminate laughter helped re-position affects of immediacy as products 








In media-archaeological awareness, this recording 
[an early wax cylinder recording of any given song] 
primarily memorizes the noise of the wax cylinder 
itself – which is a different kind of “archive,” not 
cultural-historical but cultural-technological, a 
different kind of information about the real. Media 
                                                          
120
 Within the container-logic bounds of resource and capitalist industry the epistemic order is 
constantly under construction/determined as an atemporal temporal. Ultimately, Kittler’s account 
of media stands in stark contrast with previous accounts that situate media analysis within the 
workings of the social. Still, just as crucial to his account, we need be mindful Kittler is not 
making timeless or universal claims. The process for making immediate our senses to our senses 
(optical, tactile and acoustic) is never final. It is to be pioneered and invigorated yet again 
through restructurings and diversifications of the olden-time institutions for safeguarding and 
storing artefacts. As it has come to pass, the capacity and capability of modern archival storage 
and retrieval systems more than “guarantee the similarity of the dead to stored data.” They are 
the active mechanisms by which occurs an ongoing authorizing of sameness and difference.  
 
121
 In due course, regardless of these transformations, it was the calculated nature of 
mechanicalized laughter that drew considerable opposition from those within the broadcast 
industry. Believing the integrity of realist representation may be compromised.   
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archaeology opens our ears to listen to this as well, 
not to filter it out (as opposed to the "cocktail party 
effect" of hermeneuticized psychoacoustics). 
(Wolfgang Ernst, “Media Archaeography,” 250) 
 
 
Here, Ernst identifies the media object – a wax pressing from yesteryear – as an “archive.” It 
houses a memory available for not only formulating historical accounts of our culture, but of our 
culture’s technological past. Placing the archive in quotes, he elaborates on its divergent 
interpretation. The recording is “a different kind of archive” from the traditional archive in that 
as technologically contrived memory, this medium possesses certain attributes that, apart from 
the conveyance of information (e.g. a message in song form), organize our experience and/or 
“information about the real.” Effectively, like Kittler, departing from an interest to comb media 
for content in order to construct a story of things, Ernst seeks to explore the very technological 
conditions (its terms and rules) for content coming into being. As such, he proceeds analytically 
instead of chronologically. He deploys the archaeological method for avoiding a human-biased 
narrative. Further, Ernst develops upon Kittler’s observations concerning how data storage 
systems mediate our experience with the past. Very focused on a medium’s attributes he initiates 
a more detailed engagement with, by their different modes of quantification, the rules particular 
to these kinds of systems. We shall see more evidence of this engagement in chapters ten and 
eleven. There I examine how Ernst brings focus to contemporary databases being discrete and 
dynamic temporal media formations. I contend that his account of media formations being auto-
generative presupposes a broader universally applicable system of inheritance. As if conceived 
from within a technological gene pool, each medium derives and carries forth its generative 
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capacity due to precedent form-determining forces. For now at least, we grasp that archives take 
different forms and they do not just store and register materials.
122
 Considered from this 
perspective, media memory has the potential to be entirely recast. The archive itself, rather than 
serving an historical interest to aid our memories instead is to then be approached, independent 
of human subjectivity and universal temporal frameworks for story-telling, as distinct sets of 
rules and practices for data storage. Likewise, in the next chapter, I examine regulatory 
mechanisms that authorize and organize the laugh track as an archival formation. These 
mechanisms show in terms of decisions and practices that, often without forethought, simply 
maintain regimens of production.  
 
The actual memory the archive has is then not thought in terms of what it contains, but in 
terms of what it does by its appropriative mechanisms for maintaining information as “data.” In 
other words, the archive’s particular processes need to be examined for how they execute 
storage. Thus the media archaeologist focuses on the conditions for, or how it is, that media 
formations come to sort, order and calculate as they do.
123
 Ernst writes, 
                                                          
122We see this for instance (see last quote) with his rejection of “hermeneuticized 
psychoacoustics.” Against interpretive or ideative-driven versions of things, Ernst thus 
proclaims: “the media-archaeological approach is in fact about the unrevealing of symbols, 
signals, and information.” By the “unrevealing of symbols etc,” Ernst does not contend that the 
apparatus is overlooked or (made) hidden, as if it is its own hermeneutic horizon of presence (as 
truth), from the researcher. Rather, the media archaeologist explores what symbols, signals, and 
information, given their cultural orientation, in fact, do not reveal.  See Wolfgang Ernst’s Digital 
Memory, p.27. 
123
According to Ernst, these conditions often entail encountering media by or in step with certain 
discursive orderings of physics and mathematics. In this respect, our analyses are organized by 
various processes of mechanization and the past discursive grounding and framings of and by the 
“technological.” Our concepts, we may surmise, are quantumized in various ways for permitting 
a system’s calculability, control, form, rate and degree of expenditure. With the example of the 
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The archaeological gaze (“theory,” in the ancient sense of insight) is such 
a way of looking at media objects: enumerative rather than narrative, 
descriptive rather than discursive, infrastructural rather than sociological, 
taking numbers into account instead of just letters and images. (Wolfgang 
Ernst, 251) 
 
And in being concerned with a medium’s generativity, we not only focus on its potency of 
replication but also attend to a medium’s dynamism and possibility for transformation.124  
As we shall explore in Part Three, the systems that are identifiable as shaping our 
perceptions and engagements with the past are processes of invention that, while creating a 
mediated relation with the past, also do so at the expense of the past. In other words, we only get 
a version of what may have been. In this respect, we return to Siegfried Zielinski’s previously 
outlined opposition in chapter five to the media archaeologist’s narrow conception of the archive. 
Through Zielinski, we shall explore how the archive is not only the site for a program of 
investigation predicated on positive display. If it were so, this would be to delimit our 
engagement with the history of a medium to a discourse solely determined by calculation and 
formula. So, apart from the more immediate interest to engage the laugh track media formation 
by an archaeological method, I will come to assert that the laugh track among other media 
formations is not reducible to a predictive schedule of outcomes. Along with Zielinski, I 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
early wax cylinder recording, concepts of sound reproduction and production, given its capacity 
for replacing or representing the real, come into play. 
 
124 In effect, Ernst attunes his analysis and lexical reserve to the rules that permit a formation by 
always asking: How it is that certain discourses formed for determining a technological 
medium’s materio-physical limits? This puts in practice Marshall McLuhan’s dictum “the 




recognize that the archive also conceals the possibility of temporal regimes being inaccessible 
and defying quantifiability. To my mind, this is not a rejection of the archive. Rather it is an 
attempt to expand our notion of what the archive is (of what is put in reserve). That is, the 
archive shows in terms of what it may not hold and that there are kinds of temporal structurations 
it cannot register and retain. In this respect, we may approach technological formations such that 
quantification and the realm of predictive logics are of no use. And it is precisely in this way that 
I conceive of the laugh track as uselessness in reserve. As an archival formation at a distance 
from a discourse that subsumes a medium’s history under the quantificatory regimes of a 
technological condition. How we understand the laugh track as an instance of materio-medialitic 
circuitry is then recast. Of course, this does not mean the laugh track is outside a “technological 
condition.” Rather, that it may show its mediatic operations through a regulatory that departs 
from the calculus of its production.  However, prior to any sustained challenge to media 
archaeology’s determinations regarding the archive we need to first contend with its 
methodological import for my exploration of the laugh track. After all, in the next chapter, media 
archaeology is instrumental for, in a limited sense, clarifying the laugh track’s quantificatory 










Chapter Nine: Mechanisms of Recycling 
 
In chapter one I posed the question: What is the laugh track? This was volleyed in 
response to the standard definition and analyses that subsume the laugh track within a broader 
theory of culture. For Inger–Lise Kalviknes Bore, Brett Mills etc. the laugh track simply is a 
device. It is a technological item that is generically conceived as a “function” serving the 
transmission of comedic information. In chapter seven we see Jacob Smith and Jeff Scheible, by 
entirely divergent approaches from one another, also read purpose into the laugh track. Still, I 
use their analyses as entry for exploring the laugh track as an industrialized system of 
production. They help in taking it from being declared a function to grappling with certain details 
of how it may be constituted as a practice. However, like Kalviknes Bore’ and Mill’s analyses, 
for Smith and Scheible the laugh track, either as technological suture or textual cover-up, is 
abstracted from its material production. In contrast to all these approaches, I have set out to gain 
insight into the constitution of the laugh track as media formation that is independent of possible 
purposes for laughter. I have proposed that the laugh track be explored as a machinic operation 
that perversely archives. In this chapter I will describe how the laugh track shows as its own 
archival media formation. Apart from it being a perverse archive, a uselessness in reserve, I, for 
now, limit examining the laugh track in terms of the rules and conditions that both directly and 
indirectly register its being a particular system of archivation.  
 
Further to my rejection of various accounts of the laugh track, over the course of the previous 
eight chapters I have attempted to sever analysis of the laugh track from an inherent human-
centred registry. I have sought out alternative approaches to media that resist being filtered 
through cultural history. Appropriate to my exploration of the laugh track, I contend the media 
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archaeologist examines the rules and conditions that permit the emergence and continued 
generativity of a media formation. It is through media archaeology that we may drill down into 
the reserve of technological inventive practices. Thereby, we may attend to the regulatory 
mechanisms governing a medium’s formations. In particular, we may examine the laugh track 
assemblages as temporal configurations, storage mechanisms and calculations for forms of 
visceral effusion. Although I have dissociated my analysis from a human-centred premise, still 
the constitution of the laugh track shows in relation to non-technological regulatory formations 
and human activities. Thus, we bump up against the laugh track’s auto-generativity in relation to 
various regimes that have worked alongside it. Specifically, I explore the relevant mechanisms 
furthering broadcast industry productivity and the various discursive frameworks – linguistic and 




Broadcast Industry Terms   
 
Effects of Language: 
By the expression “laugh track” we automatically invoke industry technical terms 
relating to the effect’s type of equipment and its being a studio production.  Even the word 
“track,” independent of “laughter,” suggests its cinematic beginnings as technical convention. It 
infers the referent as an isolable audio recording. Although “track” well pre-dates cinema, within 
the discussion of 20
th
 century and contemporary media, “track” entails physically positioning a 
material carrier of sound, as a distinct or separate process of production and reproduction, 
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relative to the moving image it may possibly accompany.
125
 With respect to the “laugh track,” 
we typically refer to the recorded “sound(s) of laughter” as a particular category of effect and as 
an object of technical production. Herein, the countable noun “laugh” of “laugh track” designates 
studio performance-directed responses of laughter that have been recorded either digitally or on 
magnetic tape.   
Particular to the laugh track, as a track of sound compared to the uncountable noun forms 
“laughter,” “laughs” or “laughing,” is a grammatical distinction suggested by the noun “laugh.” 
In surveying the various literature and references to canned laughter,
126
 it is only on very rare 
                                                          
125 We may suppose “laugh track” would then appear as industry short-hand for “a laugh 
soundtrack” but given the readily known auditive character of laughter calling it this may feel 
uneconomical and redundant. 
126
 Continuing on this track of analyzing terms, we see broadcast industry expressions like 
“canned,” “sweetening” or even “de-sweetening” refer to either the form of production or the 
effect that simulates and/or augments the reaction of a live audience when mixed with laughter. 
(Specific to the audio-mixing trade, the process of “sweetening” and/or “de-sweetening” refers to 
an audio technician’s often post-performance manipulation of a live audience’s responses. These 
terms, “sweetening” and “de-sweetening,” are twofold. In one sense, they describe both the 
blended effect that a laugh track may have for the reception of a recorded performance. In 
another sense, “sweetening” and “de-sweetening” represent the actual hands-on mixing process 
of performance with audience audio whereby the audio technician adds to or subtracts from a 
present audience’s “live” reaction. Beyond providing an audience stand-in, in the form of a 
single track of composed laughter, the technician manipulates the live studio audience response 
by introducing other pre-recorded voices. Akin to mixing various spices for a cooking recipe, he 
thereby seeks to enhance a live-studio performance’s response.). The term “canned,” implicitly 
counter-poised with “live,” refers to audio such as music, crowd noise or laughter that is 
prepared in advance of the events or performances with which they are spliced. “Canned” 
connotes a generic quality. (Though it is understood that the notion of “canned” signifies a 
generic status to the laughter assembled (as the specificity of the tracks as tracks pre-disposes the 
laugh track to being a TV and radio enhancing broadcast phenomena) we should not discount 
that the (recorded) laughter that occurs within the diegesis of a TV, radio and too cinema is of a 
canned, highly scripted and generic order. Though the suggestion that studio or stage-performed 
laughter be placed in the same category as an assembly of past audience responses may raise the 
ire of the actors, directors and production managers there is little doubt that regardless of being 
diegetic or not guffaws recorded onscreen also comprise a laugh track.) It conveys the typical 
form or standard for a broadcast-produced component, which in turn may be used in varying 




occasions that laugh tracks have been referred to as “laughter” tracks.127 The common term 
found in North American dictionary definitions and glossary of terms for various broadcast 
related texts show “laugh” not “laughter” as the preferred noun form. Perhaps by naming his 
audience response machine the Laff Box, the sound technician Charley Douglass had 
considerable impact on the predominance of the institutionalized coinage “laugh track.”128 Still, 
on this track of conventions and designation, though often composed of a mix of multiple 
recorded tracks of laughter (laughs or laughing) the final studio recording, very much like any 
audio mix-down, is referred to as a single track, a laugh track. Though conceivable, the laugh 
track for studio productions (from my research at least) is never a recording of one lone laugh. 
We do not encounter it as a singly isolable and even potentially extended mono-syllabic guffaw 
(chortle or chuckle) nor, by contrast, an inimitable or distinct execution of laughing (as in: “you 
sir, have a unique laugh”). Isolating a laugh in this respect, would likely transform the production 
mechanism laugh track into a display. Rather, a laugh track is by convention considered to be a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
which carries the stigma of pejorative expressions such as “inauthentic,” “stock,” “hackneyed,” 
and “trite” registers a regime of production specific to laughter, that is in direct contrast with 
signature sounds that are considered unto themselves. Signature laughs are often character 
specific and distinct in kind, such as the inimitable laughs of: Woody Woodpecker; Bosshog, 
Beavis and Butthead; Spongebob; and, from cinema-lore, the Wicked Witch of the West’s 
cackle. Though “canned laughter” may simulate the supposed spontaneous and immediate 
reactions of an audience (chortling, giggling, guffawing at/during/in the instant of experiencing 
or being effected by a comic routine) this pre-recorded accompaniment apparently lacks any 
temporal and material connection to the source of humor to which it ultimately gets associated.  
 
127
 In Extras, “Patrick Stewart” episode 6 of Season 1 (2005), Ricky Gervais, somewhat 
derisively referring to the laugh track as a BBC 1 sanitized production trait, calls it as a “laughter 
track.” Again in season 2, episode 4 (2006) another character (at a BAFTA awards ceremony) 
also calls it as laughter track. Obviously outside of North America terms of reference vary. 
128
 One can only speculate, if, in the patent dispute with Jess Oppenheimer, the out-come that the 
Jayo-Laugher became the industry standard that the effect would be cast by what it does as a 
commercially branded form. Within the history of naming effects, there is no decisive 
grammatical form that effects’ names are given. – They are variable. Consequently, the naming 
of the “laugh track,” rather than in keeping with a lexical convention of an industry, appears as a 
term peculiar to the crafting of particular sound mixers. 
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singular recording, or at least unified presentation
129




Stepping back, the laugh track, it would seem, emerged within an industry apparatus 
complete with its own lexicon. Its discursive machinery almost instantly reduces the laugh track 
to an effect or, instead, to being within a category of effects. Simply being within a category of 
effects entails the laugh track meet the demands for maintaining the illusions of its artifice. That 
is, other than in terms of its implicit instrumentality for facilitating simulation the technological 
must be seemingly absent. Generally speaking, effects are techniques that, as mediating tools, 
conceal their effecting action. Disentangling the laugh track from the modes of industry requires 
suppressing the effects of a deeply rooted terminological framework for formalizing a division of 
labour further parsed by established skills and duties. Daunting as that seems, for my limited 
purposes, I look to investigate the orderings and elements of the materio-technological category 
that gets presupposed in the expression “laugh track.” Accordingly, the object here, in getting 
clear on the particulars of what gets presupposed, is to explore the presence or tangible modes of 
the laugh track as archival formation both within and apart from industry.  
 
 
                                                          
129
 In the making of a laugh track the various tracks comprising such need not be mastered to one 
track. 
130
 By contrast, calling this form of sound production “a laughter track” would both involve 
violating standard rules of grammar and at once impart noun-wise a category of sound and verb-
wise a category of behavioral activity. As a countable noun, “laugh” also stands in as a known 
and naturalized referent to a type of sound that has particular technical properties that, as stated 
above, blend in with other materially gathered elements of a production. Not to mention, being a 
placeholder for an index of group/audience reception. Even so, the laughter of laugh tracks is 
never just a recorded string of laughs. It is the assemblage of unitized (for giving a regulatable 
divisibility) quantified sound-bits. Either machine-spliced or digitally laced together they are put 




Bing Crosby and the Laugh Track 
Techniques and Equations:   
The first known instances from which laugh tracks were devised actually come from 
when recorded laughter itself became an object of fascination to radio programme producers. 
Prior to 1949, laughter was, among other auditory gestures such as clapping and cheering, an 
indicator of the live studio audience. However, during an off-colour routine at ABC Studios in 
Hollywood, the studio audience’s overly-exuberant response changed that.131 Though the stage 
material broke with community standards and could not be broadcast, producers saw potential in 
the accompanying and, in this particular instance, “stand-alone” recorded laughter. This put in 
motion the specific extraction and salvaging procedures that shortly thereafter led directly to the 
invention of the abovementioned Laff Box.
 
The obvious pragmatic gain for the broadcast 
industry’s switch to a system of pre-recorded laughter was that instead of relying on the pell-mell 
regulatory regime of cue cards for prompting an audience to “laugh” or “cheer” or “applaud,” 
pre-recorded laugh tracks enabled TV and radio producers to place audience response under their 
discretion and control. Thereby, pre-recorded laugh tracks could be better regulated for 
conveying what was imagined by studio producers as the appropriate audience auditory reaction 
or immediate visceral reception of a comedic action or routine. Most mechanically, in a chain 
reaction, the recorded laughter would then trigger a response of the like in the broadcast 
audience. With that said, on the face of things, extraction and salvaging appear as the primary 
acts for mechanically manufacturing laughter. That is, for making laughter into a stored, 
manipulable and isolated response. However, editing and saving techniques only reinforce the 
                                                          
131
  Show number 93, broadcast February 16, 1949. See Lionel Pairpoint’s Bing Crosby’s Philco 
Radio Time, 2000. 
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laugh track as a form of reserve. In one sense, the actual materials salvaged contain a registry of 
attributes. They are their own reserve of qualities that precede the technical procedures for 
mechanical assembly and ordering. In effect, the recorded laughs come to the sound engineer as 
spent and tested production mechanisms. They are pre-packaged quanta of effusion. The Laff 
Box, for example, is a reserve constituted by its collection of pre-calibrated (thus already 
reserved) equations of culture’s viscera. In another sense, in terms of an archival formation, the 
famed laugh track machine, though its retrieval techniques are productive in configuring more 
group laughs, is already destined to be reproductive. It is unlike the classical archive that 
preserves the discrete and unique particulars of an entity’s fonds. Thus, the laugh machine is 
only crudely understood if thought as system-host to precedent assembly mechanisms. Rather, 
the always-transforming laugh-track-producing machine maintains its own uniqueness by 
actually making laughter, whether grouped or individuated, generic. That is, it is always the 
remaking of laughter as reproducible yet again. In other words, it inexhaustibly replicates the 
exhausted in the making of its registry of exhaustion. To further bolster this point, over the 
coming chapters I will examine how, as its own archival system, the laugh machine receives its 
authority from pre-cedent and ongoing regimes of imitation.  
 
Although mechanical ingenuity may have been largely attributable to technicians, the 
broadcast industry’s “creative” types had a significant impact on advancing the laugh track.  As 
noted by many radio and TV historians, famous American singer and actor Harry Lillis “Bing” 
Crosby was instrumental for his monetary investments and innovations in broadcast production 
techniques. He prompted the transition from recording on electrical transcription discs to the 
more edit-friendly reel-to-reel tape recording technology. Crosby recognized the potential of tape 
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recording as a time-saving measure. Exploiting the early Magnetophon tape machine’s editing 
capabilities, he limited each of his studio performances to “one-offs.” Accordingly, without the 
demands of a repeat performance, a show’s recording was then re-broadcast, in the designated 
evening timeslots, to audiences in other time-zones. Specific to the development of the laugh 
track, here framed within the temporal economy of radio broadcast scheduling, Crosby was the 
first to put the laugh track to use as “audio-fill.” It stood in for lost time generated from those 
segments of a performance in which there were miscues that needed to be edited out. The laughs 
ensured a full thirty minutes of air time was met. So, although laughter simulated the “live” 
response Crosby felt appropriate for his gags, it also served a pragmatic function. Certainly, the 
laugh track contributed to a show’s overall entertainment affect, however, it may be examined 
for its significance as an auditory cover-up. In a certain respect, like M*A*S*H’s producer Larry 
Gelbart a few decades later, Crosby considers the laugh track as its own media formation. To 
solve an industry generated timing problem it was dealt with, in the form of a quantized extra-
discursive grammar of vocal punctuations, as a reserve of timing mechanisms. As much as it 
could be deployed for its content the laugh track was thus put in play for the particular 
measurable attributes of its objectness. Here, Crosby was thinking about media not only for what 
it is designed to do but for its generative capabilities. The laugh track was something other than a 
resource of laughs. However, though having some kinship with my exploration of the laugh track 
Crosby maintains the means/end proposition. The laugh track slug simply liberated Crosby’s 
programs from the constraints and program failings (often actor’s gaffs) of a live performance 





Laugh Machine as Archival Unit: 
Within the history of the broadcast industry, the laugh track has stood as its own, though 
officially unaccredited, domain of production.
132
 Generally considered, the laugh track may be 
readily distinguished from other audio effects by its function as a particular form of response, 
that of laughter, to a broadcast studio performance. Initially, as noted, recorded laughter was 
technically inseparable from a studio broadcast performance’s audio. It was sound emanating 
from a studio performance-present “live audience” that could not be isolated from the recording 
of the performance (toward which the audience’s responses were directed). Developments and 
innovations in sound technologies gave audio engineers the tools for isolating and (re)assembling 
pre-recorded laughter.
 133
 The first audience response machines were known as the affable-
sounding “Jayo Laugher”134 and by, what became the industry standard in the early 1950s, the 
“Laff Box.”135   
                                                          
132
 Unlike the famed Wilhelm scream, drum roll, punch-line drum punctuator. 
133
 Along with laughter other heard responses such as booing, cheering and applause are also pre-
recorded. Often these audience sounds are grouped together as crowd noise or, as in some 
applications of what’s called, “canned heat.” “Canned heat” may be understood as a variation on 
the laugh track with its mocking toned laughter amidst choruses of cheering and booing sounds 
that are used to augment and at times sway a live audience’s response at television program 
recordings like those of the World Wrestling Entertainment.  However, unlike laughter which is 
classified as its own individuated type of response, these elements of crowd reactions, within the 
institution of TV and radio broadcast production, have not yet been given their own category. At 
any rate, as its own category as an audio track distinct from other tracks of sound the laugh track 
is considered as separate from the source of laughter. We, as viewers of a TV broadcast, do not 
see the audience from which the laughter derives and further, presumably at least, the 
accompanying laughter is not elicited at the very instance of what gets performed. 
134 The Jayo Laugher was invented by Jess Oppenheimer (also of CBS). He put it into service in 
the famous TV show I Love Lucy, of which he created and produced. 
135
 An invention (some say intervention) by CBS sound engineer Charley Douglass. 
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Below we see the “Laff Box.”136 Invented by CBS sound engineer Charley Douglass, it 
was approximately ten times the size of its squat competitor, the six-buttoned box console Jayo 
Laugher.
137
 The Laff Box’s cabinetry, when its doors are open, reveals an elongated typewriter 
comprised of thirty-two keys along with an organ-like foot-pedal that are connected (through a 
system of interchangeable spools activated by (key triggered) rod and pulley) up to lengths of 
audiotape which contain over three hundred and twenty pre-recorded laughs (ten separate laughs 
on each of the thirty-two tape-loops). The individuated laughs, with tape locations quickly 
sourced by aid from an accompanying written registry of descriptions, provided the Laff Box 
player/technician with what ostensibly was an infinite number of combinations for generating a 
requisite pre-recorded laugh track.
138
    
              Fig. 1 
                                                          
136
 In the history of popular(ized) mechanical and electronic devices, “box” serves as a curious 
expression and marketing designate, both as ordinary object and as a container for concealing a 
machine’s (mysterious) operations. To note a few: jukebox, music box, black box, jack-in-the-
box, x box and the slang referent for TV, idiot box. 
137
 See Appendix for visual comparison. Oppenheimer was also an inventor. He held several 
patents covering a variety of devices, notably including the in-the-lens “teleprompter.” 
138
 Much of my description of Charley Douglass’ Laff Box is borrowed from Rose Kohn 





The laugh track is conceived as any other broadcast or carnival stunt-routine. Not to be too 
tangential, but for its time, it was an industry trope in form of a hypnotic mechanicalized echo or, 
if you prefer, as a mechanicalized hypnotic echo. In effect, the laugh machine acted out the 
broadcast industry dream of being an optimal magic-maker. The duplicate is not only a remedy 
to the inevitable failings of any system of preservation. The backup is transformed to a reserve of 
production that remembers the raw materials (to be nuanced and refined) and takes the studio out 
of harm’s ways. The magic of the mechanism is done in a keystroke that both remembers what it 
constitutes and, by being a faux rendition that is a faux archive, forgets that it does so. 
In its early assembly, “canned laughter” was spliced together on quarter inch audiotape 
glued to a large wooden wheel. Now of course, these pre-recorded tracks are constructed 
digitally and conveyed by electronic platforms ranging from computer software, such as CD-
ROM disks and hard-drives, of varying kinds with varying memory capacity. Still, whether on 
tape, disk or hard-drive, the pre-recorded assemblage of laughter exists as its own element of 
audio ready to be coupled with or mixed into other audio and video tracks. As such, the terms 
“canned laughter” and “laugh track” indicate the potential future relation or role of audio 
material/information to other audio and video tracks. As with Rose Kohn Goldsen’s previously 
cited observations, we are made to understand that each track of “canned laughter” is an 
electromagnetic layering of very brief instances of pre-recorded laughs. These laughs are 
gathered from the recordings of previous laughter that were directed towards other performances 
and that emanated from a whole host of unknown, or at least unacknowledged, audience 
members that may or may not still be alive. Her observations extend thinking the laugh track 
beyond its status as effect. For Goldsen we may suspect it is a self-sustaining medium fostering 
communion from beyond the grave. Though I do not pursue a spiritist analytic, the archival 
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nature of the laugh track certainly flummoxes examining it only in terms of quantificatory 
processes. In Part Three, I explore the laugh track as an archival system that defies the narrow 
calculus of its particular invention as a sound and storage technology. With that said, for now at 
least, we understand the laugh track signals the coming configurations of pre-recorded laughter 
as a recorded assemblage (on a spool of electromagnetic tape, a compact disc, computer hard-
drive, etc.). The laugh track is always already an (system) archivated process. In this respect, the 
production of physically distinct laughter encoded rolls, discs and hard-drives bare the traces 
(tracks and traits) of canned laughter organized and generated by machines dating back to the 
late 1940s. Though emerging in relation to the broadcast industry’s division of labor afforded by 
a techno-material order of isolating part from whole and re-temporalizing the supposed lived, it 
is a formation that is more than a generalized storage system. Still, for the coming chapters I 
have plenty to answer to. Mostly: how is the laugh track a perverse archivated process? 
 
 
Serious Business and Politics of Laughter  
 
Laugh Track as Suspect Simulacra: 
Producers feel the canned laughter is more real than 
“unsweetened” laughter. “Real audiences sound 
phonier than the laugh track.” “They freeze up and 
act unnatural.” “Live audiences in from the street 
are tense and nervous.” At times the live audiences 
yock it up too much.” “Audiences just never laugh 
or respond on cue, they do the strangest things.” 
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(Rose Kohn Goldsen, The Show and Tell Machine, 
70)   
Laugh tracks, pretty much from their inception in television broadcasting, have received 
mixed reviews. Contrary to the above quoted passage, the sentiment concerning their value was 
not unanimous. In fact, as previously outlined, regardless of the laugh track’s effectiveness at 
audience response simulation, many in the TV broadcast industry, at various points in its history, 
have considered the laugh track an unnecessary technical intervention. Today, that sentiment 
appears to have become the norm.  In most TV sitcoms that have been produced since the early 
2000s, the laugh track is absent
139
 and there is often much promotion and press about this 
absence.
140
  Of course, that sentiment is encouraged by other developments. With multiple 
retakes of studio performance, improved production values, advertisements etc., its pragmatic 
gain as time filler for early radio lost relevance. Instead, it became considered an intrusive 
mechanism that did not disguise the failings of artifice. It brought attention to artifice. That is, 
the laugh track was considered a reserve of artificially imposed, industry contrived tropes. It was 
thought to be a generic adornment added to the fixtures of “truer to life” performance.  
Accordingly, the laugh track did not serve to keep seamless the flow of the broadcast hour. 
Instead the laugh track dated its shows. It helped put a production in the past. Its basic inherent 
archivality (recorded old laughs repeatedly recycled) was simply a brutish presence. Unlike 
                                                          
139
 Even though in popular shows like The Simpsons and Arrested Development where there is no 
laugh track that the laugh track is entirely absent is another matter. It is arguable that the timing 
or pacing of line delivery or transitioning from act of physical humor to another is influenced by 
several decades of laugh track accompaniment to comparable gags. 
140
 Commenting on the mixed reception for this mediative supplement, sound and performance 
studies scholar Jacob Smith writes, “the laugh has been presented as the ultimate expression of 
the human, and its mechanical reproduction serves as a lightning rod for anxieties concerning 
authenticity and the social dimensions of mass media consumption.” See Jacob Smith’s “Frenzy 
of the Audible,” Television New Media, (February 2005 vol. 6 no. 1), p.23. 
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Crosby’s attempts to tap the laugh track’s generative capacity, the laugh track was seen as 
degenerative. The laugh track threatened to put the immediacy of the work with which it was 




Laugh Track as Tool of Commerce: 
One of the most famous instances highlighting the tension concerning the use of laugh 
tracks is the well-publicized quarrel between directors of the enormously popular American 
television series M*A*S*H and the producers of the series.  One may recall the serious tenor of 
the program’s storyline. Set within the 1950s Korean War, it followed the daily challenges facing 
a “crack team” of doctors deployed in the heart of enemy territory. However, although the actual 
social and political context for M*A*S*H had much gravitas for the American public – it was 
considered an allegory for American military involvement in the then ongoing Vietnam War – it 
was not strictly a drama. The script was peppered with comedic lines and antics delivered by an 
assortment of often liquored-up “odd-ball” characters. Regardless, its production team, the 
industry, and critics, considered the series a watershed moment for TV. Topics pertaining to an 
array of political issues – be they related to identity, sexuality, ethnicity, one’s religious beliefs, 
or most things of a public nature – were fair game to explore. At any rate, much like his 
artistic/content-creator brethren within the industry, M*A*S*H’s creator and writer Larry Gelbart 
faced considerable pressure from the program’s producers to deploy a laugh track. Gelbart was 
clearly opposed to using them on M*A*S*H, but, TV executives, citing their impact on test 
                                                          
141 And this is the frame of hypostatization by which theorists Kalviknes Bore, Mills et al. assess 
the laugh track’s value as function or the potency of it liveness. The terms for conceiving the 
laugh track are not simply cultural they are ontological. The being of the laugh track carries with 
it the traits of inauthenticity.  
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audiences, deemed them necessary for maintaining high ratings.
142
 Ratings aside, Gelbart felt his 
creation was cheapened: 
Our most notable loss was on the matter of the laugh track. CBS would 
never let us do away with it no matter what other compromises they were 
willing to make. So there it is, on almost every episode, a recording of 
people guffawing at material they never heard, a good many of them long 
dead. The only thing I ever learned from the track was that while I can’t be 
sure of life, we all have a chance at a laugh after death. (Gelbart Papers, 
Online Archive of California, Box 36, Folder 5, 2) 
 
 
The gravity of the subject matter and experience of 20
th
 century warfare was trivialized. The 
reputation of the laugh track was thus aligned with ways for sanitizing both art and social 
commentary. As a vacant gesture cobbled together from a cluster of voices of those well-
disconnected,
143
 even by death, laugh tracks’ reinforced commercialized entertainment 
objectives. Within popular culture lore or at least an industry-manufactured controversy, the 
laugh track represented “the alien” or intruder. More practically, within public discourse it 
became a weapon, an ideological grenade to be lobbed, at a money-hungry establishment, on 
behalf of factions advocating freedom of expression and artistic integrity.
144
 However, upon 
another read, the affects of Gelbart’s rejection may be tempered. His claims against the laugh 
                                                          
142  See Todd Gitlin, Inside Prime Time New York: Pantheon Books, 1983, p. 33 
143
 The perplexing sense of disconnection often came from the location of the on-screen action 
(for instance, a remote mountain region) being nowhere that would conceivably host a theatrical 
audience.  
144
 In the end, after years of challenges from M*A*S*H’s creators CBS producers, perhaps as 
promotional ploy to increase ratings, finally relented some. The laugh track was present in all 
scenes except for those taking place within the confines of the operating tent wherein occurred 
surgery, suffering, grappling with existence and death. 
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track indicate more than a rhetorical ploy. In the above quote, Gelbart registers the laugh track as 
reserve. It keeps alive the possibility of laughing in a future well after one is dead. The laugh 
track’s crime is that it has already condemned a sense of what is present and vital to a past that is 
preserved for times yet to come. For the producers of M*A*S*H, it was not that laughter was 
inappropriate so much as it was, by an external mediating agent of time, removed from the 
immediacy of production. Gelbart’s assertion represents an instance in which the laugh track gets 
conceived as an archivo-mechanical formation. Laughs are temporalized through an 
immortalizing mechanism. We thus reconnect with the observation of early voice (re)-production 
technologies discussed in chapter six. We recall the operations of a sound emitting apparatus 
were independent of the human arbiter. In this respect, we encounter the laugh track as a 
temporo-quantificatory recipe for making a permanent record. Moreover, in bumping head on 
with the laugh track’s medialitic circuitry we move the discussion towards the kinds of 
assessments of the temporal mechanics on which Ernst predicates his version of media 
archaeology and, conversely by which Zielinski expands the analytic. In the coming chapters, we 
shall pursue the surface/depth time problematic that plagues how we may account for 





































Introduction (for Part Three) 
In Part One I explored the theoretical backdrop in which to situate a discussion on the 
laugh track. Ironically, my navigation through orthodox communication theory, contemporary 
materialism and theories of the archive likely elicited little in the way of laughter. Further, the 
serious business of prescribing a format of analysis for exploring the making of a system of 
laughter (i.e. the Laff Box, the laugh track) appears to have infected Part Two. In typical 
theoretical humourless fashion, influenced by media archaeology, I explored the laugh track as 
its own media formation. Hardly a chuckle could be drawn by a discourse hell-bent on 
identifying regimens within the laugh track’s implicit temporal order. With that said, the 
speculative nature of Part Three promises even less chance of comic relief from the constraints 
of analyticity.  
At any rate, we now consider the laugh track, and media of the like, in terms that 
challenge the limited economy by which Ernst formulates the dynamic and potential of mediatic 
systems. Effectively, media archaeology can only carry my exploration so far. Rather, to explore 
the laugh track mechanism as un-mechanized, in conception and in (trans)formation, its seeming 
antithesis, fostered by Siegfried Zielinski, gets us to dig otherwise. In short, Zielinski’s media 
anarchaeology opens onto exploring the formations of media as deviating from the 
conservativism of efficiency and efficiency of conservativism that guides Ernst’s seen and said 
analytic. Here, Agamben’s non-apophantic thinking about gesture as pure means will be helpful. 
By Agamben we understand that what may be communicable, or an act of showing, is not only 
an instrument for communication. In other words, the communicable is not just a proposition or 
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what has purpose within a verificatory system. In effect, a thing’s communicability may defy an 
authorizing logic for determining a thing’s status or “truth.” Accordingly, it may be possible to 
experience media as un-mediated, not simply as instruments of pre-ceding technological 
conditions, but as reserves unto themselves. In step with Agamben’s notion of the gesture, 
Zielinski unfetters media from knowable and determining conditions. This means circumventing 
the archive, the material gathering point of the technological authorized to determine media as 
mediative. Effectively, Zielinski strips the archive of its presumed authority. He thus explores 
media formations unbounded by the epistemic parameters that comprise Ernst’s seen and said.  
Alternatively, but within the very operation of Ernst’s archaeological discursive, I 
examine that which does not exceed, maintain, conserve, expand or break a system’s logic. 
Rather, I explore uselessness. Conceptually slippery and often tacitly dismissed as irrelevant to 
the workings of a medium, uselessness is under-examined. However, as I argue, uselessness is 
not just to be dismissed as un-anticipated waste, by-products, deficiencies etc. of what is useful. 
It is the implicit reserve of procedures that always already occur as the pre-figured delimiters of a 
system. Consequently, uselessness may be far more a part of our media formations than accounts 
in accord with contemporary discourse permit. In fact, from my perspective on media and 
consistent with my exploration of the laugh track, uselessness, perhaps manifest as in-optimal 
performance or dud mechanism, plagues the perceived instrumentality of media. Thus, in 
attempting to account for uselessness within media formations we may come to re-conceive their 
operations otherwise to what holds true for a programmatic governed by technological order and 




Chapter Ten: The Expansive and Expanding Category of 
Machines or Dealing with Impotency 
 
In chapter eight I discussed Jonathan Sterne’s thinking on how to approach the history of 
sound technology. In his view, we need proceed analytically rather than chronologically. 
Sterne’s approach suggests that the laugh track and other media formations could be explored 
independently of a universal historical timeline. Likewise, media archaeology provides a 
complementary methodology for exploring media as discrete technological formations. It permits 
executing laugh track-specific research without a cultural rationale. The laugh track, like any 
other media formation, can then be understood as having emerged under particular technological 
conditions. Further, relying on Wolfgang Ernst’s account of media archaeology, we can 
understand the laugh track to be a self-perpetuating and transformative process.  
 
In this chapter, I examine what Ernst’s generativist account of media entails. As 
previously discussed, Ernst prompts us to be sensitive to the general idea that there are different 
temporal realities. In particular, he leads us to attend to the archival mechanisms for mediating 
perceptions within those realities. For, as Ernst would have it, the archive’s organizing formation 
guides our understanding of what comes into being. Thus it appears that media formations 
emerge within a broader system of inheritance. Media formations possess technological traits 
that permit their development and role in contributing to future formations. Certainly, 
descriptions of media are circumscribed by seemingly relevant disciplinary discourses (i.e. 
mathematics, computer science, applied engineering, etc.) Ernst’s transformative account gains 
traction, however, by positing timeless attributes that activate the archive’s affordances. 
Accordingly, I dig up the philosophical investments implicit in Ernst’s accounting for media 
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histories as being dynamic, progressive and future-determining. In turn, understanding the 
notions guiding the nature and potential that inheres in media formations we may, over the 
coming chapters, assess how the laugh track is actually a deviant formation within this program 
of analysis.  
 
History as Technique  
If we grant that this discourse unfolds under a sign 
of a desire for the real, as we must do in order to 
justify the inclusion of the annals form among the 
types of historical representation, we must conclude 
that it is a product of an image of reality in which 
the social system, which alone could provide the 
diacritical markers for ranking the importance of 
events, is only minimally present to the 
consciousness of the writer or, rather, is present as a 
factor in the composition of the discourse only by 
virtue of its absence. Everywhere it is the forces of 
disorder, natural and human, the forces of violence 
and destruction, which occupy the fore-front of 
attention. The account deals in qualities rather than 
agents, figuring forth a world in which things 
happen to people rather than one in which people do 
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things.  (Hayden White, “The Value of Narrativity 
in the Representation of Reality,” 14) 
 
Apart from being informed by Kittler and Foucault, Ernst gains his insight from Hayden 
White’s influential critique of historical analysis. He learns from observations like the one 
quoted above that our utterances and writings concerning the past have not only been packaged 
in conventional story-form. Rather, they are often reported or recorded in non-story-like forms 
organized by social and environmental forces.  
 
White’s essay "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality" contrasts three 
kinds of historical representation: annals, chronicles145 and classical narrative. He illustrates this 
by providing citations from an unknown annalist whose descriptions of events, which take place 
over a period of 35 years (709AD to 734 AD), are presented as a chronological list. The 
descriptions are mostly of battles, famine and weather conditions.
146
 It is not a commitment to a 
universal registry that supports or extends narrativization. Rather, as White highlights, our modes 
of de-scribing (past) occurrences indicate different experiences of time and perceptions of causal 
forces. White explains,  
 
Reality for this annalist wears the face of adjectives which override the 
capacity of the nouns they modify to resist their determinacy. (HW, 14)  
 
                                                          
145 “While annals represent historical reality as if real events did not display the form of story, the 
chronicle represents it as if real events appeared to human consciousness in the form of 
unfinished stories.” (Haydn White, p. 9, Critical inquiry, 1980) 
146
 It is important to note, this account does not contradict Sterne’s objection to proceeding 
chronologically. The annalist’s listing system is only a placeholder for the mechanical operations 





... the presence of these blank years in the annalist's account permits us to 
perceive, by way of contrast, the extent to which narrative strains to 
produce the effect of having filled in all the gaps, to put an image of 
continuity, coherency, and meaning in place of the fantasies of emptiness, 
need, and frustrated desire that inhabit our nightmares about the 
destructive power of time. In fact, the annalist's account calls up a world in 
which need is everywhere present, in which scarcity is the rule of 
existence, and in which all of the possible agencies of satisfaction are 
lacking, absent, or exist under imminent threat of death. (HW, 15) 
 
The annalist fails to fulfill the expectations of the classical historian. Their entry does not knit 
together “relevant facts” to support an overview with a purpose to explain or interpret what 
allegedly transpired. We are not provided with a narratively organized field of events and a 
teleology. Rather, the annalist only offers a catalogue of events which may or may not be related. 
Similarly, in the last chapter, I approached the laugh track. I avoided presenting the laugh track 
as a story or within a larger story of media. I represented events – Bing Crosby’s appropriation of 
the laugh track, Larry Gelbart’s reaction to the laugh track – as distinct modes of a formation. 
The general idea was to describe the laugh track’s emergence as its own archival system and 
time regulated operation.   
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At any rate, for White, the lack of continuities and authorial presence147 in the annalist’s 
bare-bone recordings suggests that time is a particular relation within environmentally 
determined perceptions. Further, as we read, White speculates that the annalist’s system of 
jottings is ordered by “fantasies of emptiness, need, and frustrated desire that inhabit our 
nightmares about the destructive power of time.” White suggests that the annalist’s scribing and 
lack thereof – the “blank years” – are existentially poignant. For instance, the times of food 
scarcity and subsistence resources may be told by blanks. That is, by a lack of description. 
Accordingly, one’s imaginative landscape – the annalist’s woeful fantasies and desires – is 
determined by never-ending, debilitating shortage. In a word, the actual form
148
 of entry 
indicates one’s living conditions. Still, for White, the larger point is that the annalist’s entries are 
ordered by its particular sense of time. Likewise, Ernst approaches media. Each media formation 
has its own temporal order that relates to a larger condition of technological allowances. With 
respect to expressions of fantasy however I question that the mechanism telling of a circuitry of 
perception is all that revealing. Beyond a direct telling, it might also indicate (or not indicate) 
what eludes that circuitry. Perhaps, the annalist’s entries are incomplete. Rather, the annalist’s  
lack inadvertently registers what cannot be registered. In chapter fourteen I revisit what may be 
attributed to the “blank years.” I examine how “fantasy” is neglected by Ernst. Conversely, 
fantasy inspires Siegfried Zielinski’s alternative approach to media archaeology whereby he 
explores inventions beyond quantificatory metrics. Zielinski gets us to engage media, the laugh 
track included, independently of a checklist of technological means and outcomes. Accordingly, 
I probe whether an annalist’s fantasies might also suggest lesser determined modes and practices 
that are not communication friendly. On the one hand, we interrupt Ernst’s generative discursive 
                                                          
147 That would take the form of either the historian or a historical condition. 
148
 And formlessness. 
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circuitry for conceiving the archive. On the other hand, we gain insight for engaging the laugh 
track as system of archivation lacking a generative through-line calculus.
149
    
For now though, as Ernst emphasizes, the annalist’s entries150 are all preceded by and 
presumably organized by calendar. In many instances, the annalist’s entries appear only as a 
succession of numbers (hence, “the presence of blank years”) with a written entry or noted event 
(i.e., a king’s death) graphically interrupting the list of ascending dates (for example, 1066, 1067, 
1068, etc.). Opposed to standard or traditionally “rationalist” approaches to recorded history, 
there is no universal back-drop of continuous or continued experience. The annalist does not 
gloss inexplicable gaps in the record as lived duration or more fruitfully as machinations and 
mechanism-producing events. For the annalist, and this is very significant for Ernst’s non-
narrative conception of media archaeology, “occurrence” is the event of the record. As White 
puts on display, “occurrences” are listed (as present or absent) only by means of counting. In 
essence, the act of counting, charting or inventorizing time, is “the occurrence” (one bound by 
numeric registering) of and for the annalist. And, by extension, the community or particular 
region that may be represented and recorded.  
 
A home/category for the Laugh Track? 
 
Ernst is greatly indebted to White’s idea that annals are suggestive of divergent temporal 
realities. He thus institutes, in the very mechanics of his archaeological approach, the logical 
                                                          
149
 In this sense, the laugh track’s mediative possibilities are not limited to what shows. 
150 That is, at least the ones that White documents. 
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requirement that each medium be examined as its own temporal regime.151 To advance the notion 
that modern archival technology and media, of either analogue or digital origin, are inherently 
temporally regulated Ernst contends the following: 
 
With the age of so-called analog media such as the phonograph and the 
cinematograph, signs of or in time themselves can be registered. Not only 
do they maintain a symbolical relationship to macro and micro time (such 
as historiography), but they inscribe and reproduce functions of time 
themselves. It is only with the digital computer that the symbolic regime 
dialectically152 returns, this time in a genuinely dynamic mode (which 
differentiates implementation of   software   from   the   traditional   
Gutenberg galaxy): algorithmic time and operative diagrams. (Wolfgang 
Ernst, Digital Memory, 30)  
 
Here Ernst distinguishes between two automated formats and their consequent mediatic regimes. 
The analog is conceived as the diverse mechanical operative of universal standard time 
measurement. And the digital is actually thought to be generative of time.153 Digital electronic 
media, well independent of a universal metric of time, operate by their own time(s). Just as with 
Tan Lin’s account of disco, they require being treated as inherently discrete archival processors 
                                                          
151
 Noting the critique charged by Lisa Gitelman towards Kittler’s techno-determinist historical 
account of media as ironically tending towards an ahistorical program of technology it appears 
Ernst also unwittingly makes archeology of archaeology or a formation of time outside and 
preceding historical formations. 
152
 Ernst later explains dia. See p.105, Digital Memory. 





century reproductive media technology), Ernst makes use of playing the digital off of the analog 




generative of further archiving and processing. Accordingly, like the medieval-time perception-
bound inscriptions of White’s annalist, time is grasped, through individuated processes of 
counting, as a means of accounting that occurs at some specified rate. A digital device’s 
algorithmic time acts as data rate regulator. It is a coding standard, not simply for when, but for 
how materials may be sorted and accessed. Here, space, or the place of storage for audio, visual 
and even material objects are not physical,
154
 rather, computer hardware programs archive by bit 
counters (clocking formula) determining the relation between the speed of data transfer and the 
rates system’s amass data.  
 
This new ordering mechanism recasts our conception of time and relation to media 
technology in emergent terms. Further, it inaugurates divergent epistemologies with yet to be 
conceived forms of categorization and comparison. Considerably optimistic about the future 
archive, Ernst writes of the potential that digitally configured compiling systems promise for 
experiencing media, perhaps more purely or less-narratively mediated, as media.    
 
This “archive” is no longer simply a passive storage space  
but becomes generative itself in algorithmically ruled processuality. Sound  
and images at the borderline of digital addressability can be navigated 
through large amounts of data unfiltered by linguistic words. Images and 
sounds thus become calculable by pattern recognition algorithms. Such 
procedures not only   media-archaeologically   excavate   but   also   
generate   unexpected   statements and perspectives. The audiovisual 
archive can, for the first time, be organized not just by metadata but 
                                                          
154
 i.e., a box of disks, reels, papers etc. on a shelf. 
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according to proper media-inherent criteria – a sonic and visual memory in 
its own medium. What is being digitally “excavated by the computer” is a 
genuinely code-mediated look at a well-defined number of information 
patterns that human perception calls “sound” or “images.” Contrary to 
traditional semantic research in the history of ideas, such an endogenic 
audiovisual archive will no longer list sound and image sequences 
exclusively according to their authors, subjects, and time and space 
metadata of recording. Instead, digital data banks will allow audio-  
visual sequences to be systematized according to genuinely signal-
parametric notions (mediatic rather than narrative topoi), revealing new 
insights into their informative qualities and aesthetics. (WE, 29) 
 
Ultimately, Ernst attempts to dispense with only analyzing archives as preserving “history” 
through the authority of their recordkeeping. Instead, following Foucault, archives, especially 
digitally encoded ones, need be examined as discrete technological formations (timing 
mechanisms) that generate conditions for knowledge of pasts, along with presents and futures. 155   
                                                          
155 Aside from the implications of Ernst’s conception of transformative processes, Ernst is very 
consistent in thinking through the implications of his approach. He makes us aware that in 
shifting authorizing powers to the machine, we also institute a shift in powers of observation.  
Simply, we are not independent of our machines. Further, following Foucault, the researcher’s 
status changes (or rather gets re-determined or determined differently).  From once being the one 
that interprets an archive’s holdings, the researcher/theorist is now an impressionable receiver 
whose interpretations are determined by the active transforming processes of the computer’s 
assemblage and compiling capacities. Effectively, Ernst reiterates Foucault’s point that 
“the archive is not that which, despite its immediate escape, safeguards the event of the 
statement, and preserves, for future memories, its status as escapee.” (Michel Foucault, The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, 129) While updating Foucault’s proclamation,   
 
it [the archive] is that which defines the mode of occurrence of the statement-thing; it is 




For exploring the laugh track as an archive, it is this generative aspect of Ernst’s thinking 
that is most suggestive. The paradigm of preservation limits the archive to being a records 
holder, a “memory aid,” a host to a retrievable spool of laughs, in short, a means serving an end. 
Conceived as generative, we instead attend to the archive as that which makes what is possible, 
even the archive itself. The rules of a media formation are thus in formation. This is in step with 
Agemben’s discomforting wisdom that the gesture is purely unto its own, disconnected from 
human being, purpose and appropriative mechanisms. Ernst puts in abeyance the abstract notions 
that media mediate our perceptions of things.156 Instead, things, things that mediate, can come 
alive on their own. Similarly, we may grasp this with respect to past fears over the deployment of 
laugh tracks. For M*A*S*H’s Larry Gelbart the laugh track’s operations seemingly surpassed 
perception. It not only reproduced laughter; the laugh track continued to mediate independently 
of what's possible within a human-centred timeframe. Gelbart was not only being snide and 
metaphorical about replacing the human, he was articulating the laugh machine's power and 
authority. Its temporal circuitry exceeds the limits of death. In effect, the laugh track mediates 
through death as if making a material and generative medium of an imaginary after-world.  
 
In summa, displacing human-centric narrativist strategy, Ernst re-locates the power of a 
formation to the system of its functioning. The media are the story. However, as we shall see, 
there is a rather familiar make-up to “the story.” Ernst deploys classically authorized terms by 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
said in the great confused murmur of a discourse ... it [the archive] is that which 
differentiates discourses in their multiple existence and specifies them in their duration.” 
(MF, 129)  
 




which we understand a media formation to be generative. He imparts universal traits of dynamic 
and potential to the discreteness of each media formation. In effect, he sets up accounting for 
technological allowances within a broader system of inheritance. Apart from a medium 
possessing its own attributes, it possesses traits that permit being a generative formation. 
 
Dunamis and Potentia 
 
Ernst focuses on the various formations of time-keeping, time-capsule-making, time-
extending and time-making (of and for history) by particular holding and managing protocols of 
digitalized archival systems. They are what “defines the mode of occurrence”157 of what’s placed 
in reserve.158 More to the point, reserve, in our cybernetic age, is less about storage than it is 
transferability or readiness for transit. “Reserve” is set by always altering time delineations.159 As 
“the system of its functioning” each archive, be it text-based or algorithmic, is an ever-
transforming conglomerate of discrete time de-limited configurations of data.160 Thus, by Ernst’s 
contemporizing of Foucault’s notion of the archive as active and fecund, we appear to be able to 
put the laugh track (the Laff Box and all laugh track technological configurations) in the cross-
hairs of a machine-driven logic. His logic gives place and trajectory to the techno-historical 
contingency of the laugh track’s inherent generativity and archival reflexivity. As an ever-
expanding archive, the constitution of the laugh track may then be properly researched as and 
within a field of fluctuating and displaced temporalities. Still, we are unclear as to the specific 
                                                          
157 See Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 129. 
158 We may then re-phrase White’s medieval annalist as an example of an analogue registration 
system operating by their specific temporal determinants. 
159 See Wolfgang Ernst’s Digital Memory, p. 100: “storage is a transfer across temporal 
distance.” 
160 Still, for either kind of cultural archaeologist (discourse or media) individuated temporal 
mechanisms, in essence the measure of their immanence, are thematized as the existentiel proper 
to the archives. 
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form, force and play that operationalizes this medium. In Ernst’s vision, what defines its “mode 
of occurrence” or “system of its functioning?” Is it a generic or system-specific type of 
generativity? These questions are extremely important for my exploration of the laugh track. If 
we derive the discrete operations of a system from a pool of technological traits, then we get no 
closer to encountering a medium by Agamben’s idea of the gesture. The laugh track media 
formation is simply reduced to having emerged from a normative condition.  
  
Jussi Parikka identifies “dynamic” to be an important notion for Ernst’s Media 
Archaeology. It is crucial to describing how algorithmic processes carry the always changing, 
updating and chance unfolding of a medium. Parikka writes,  
Instead of typically emphasizing machine time as repetitious, Ernst is keen 
to argue for the importance of such time regimes for our general cultural 
understanding of temporality. This points toward mathematicotechnical 
notions of time – iterations, recursions, short circuits – as a crucial part of 
how we should think “history,” too. The basis of this operational approach 
is the idea that we need to see media technologies as dynamic. They are 
active agents in participating in “media events” in the way they store, 
process, and transmit signals and act as a necessary condition of 
knowledge. Because they are dynamic, they have a special relation to 
rhythmics, sound, and in general the sonic sphere, which becomes less an 
index of a relation to the human body (Ernst often distances himself from   
any   “emphatic”   emphases   in   cultural   analysis)   and   instead   a   
way   to understand   signals   in   their   temporal   being. (Jussi Parikka - 





Ernst routinely counter-poises his account of the modern archive to its classical counterpart. His 
is a dynamic system bereft of a punctuated and demarcating identificatory scheme. Conversely, 
he declares that classical archives have been organized by “emphatic”161or storage-biased 
mnemotechnics. Emphatic memory engenders a static approach to the record, one in which 
archival systems are governed by strategies for preserving and monumentalizing the past. Ernst 
thus recasts media analysis in terms of static and dynamic formations. And, he, it appears, 
effectively re-boots the ancient philosophical quarrel between Heraclitus and Parmenides.162 To 
reckon with modern day technological systems as undergoing continual and seemingly 
unpredictable change, he proffers, as filtered through Charles Pierce,163 a Heraclitian processual-
infused form of conceptualizing.  
 
As per Parikka, we gather Ernst’s accounts of “dynamic flow,” “dynarchives,”164 and the 
“dynamic temporality of systems” to be crucial for producing an archivology of media. 
However, his vision for the archive extends beyond Hayden White’s thinking that the annalist’s 
                                                          
161
 Ernst giving emphasis to emphatic in contrast to dynamic (i.e. “There is an increasing 
spatiotemporal entanglement: the gap between traditional resident emphatic archives and ultra-
speed transfer narrows; emphatic memory is progressively undermined by a shift of emphasis 
toward memorizing, the dynamic process based on a network of micromemories and interacting 
micromemorial hierarchies.” (Ernst, DM, 100)) strikes me as ironic given that in a list of 
synonyms for “dynamic” provided by the Miriam Webster Dictionary/Thesaurus, amongst other 
words, “emphatic” is listed as synonymous with dynamic. 
162 Here, this observation is of no mere scholastic penchant for (re)turning to supposed 
beginnings or source points. 
163 Certainly Ernst’s processual-based account of media can be drawn from the responsivity 
implicit in diagrammatic reasoning advanced by C.S. Peirce but it is by Felix Guattari’s 
conceptualization of the machine that Aristotle’s thinking regarding dunamis or “potentiality” 
gets contemporized to accommodate a non-linear non-rooted but expansive account of formation, 
rather than being restricted to isolable forms. 
164
 In the next chapter we will pursue the potency of this object-oriented configuring of coming 
digital archival registries. 
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texts are contingent representations limited by a specific perception of time. Further, it 
supersedes Foucault’s notion that “the arché is the governing rule for the emergence of sensible 
phenomena.” 165 More to the point, the provisional manner by which we may investigate the 
laugh track as a media formation is in question. There appears to be a behind-the-scenes form 
determining, inclusive of the archive’s self-generativity, what the archive makes possible. The 
rules of a media formation are then in formation only on the surface of things. Rather, more than 
being the loci of rule, we may see Ernst’s richly endowed arche is the absolute and generative 
starting-point and force driving whatever media formation:  an arche-technological source 
possessive of a hard-wired genetics invested with universal form-giving powers. In effect, it 
appears Ernst re-invigorates Aristotle’s form of thinking regarding potentiality or, from the 
ancient Greek, dunamis. For Aristotle, often contrasted with energeia, dunamis refers to the 
power and capacity of a thing to effect, change or transition into different states.166 Conversely, 
energeia refers to a form’s167 “actuality,” its mode of being in which a thing can either bring 
about other things or can be brought about by other things.168 Ernst’s hereditary-based 
description of our computerized world runs parallel to Aristotle’s metaphysics. As its own active 
generative matrix of possibility, an archegenesis, it presumes a similar idealization of actuality 
and potentiality.169  
                                                          
165 See Wolfgang Ernst’s Digital Memory, p.100. 
166
 See A Dictionary of Philosophy, MacMillan Press, 1984. 
167
  We grasp from Aristotle’s physics form, in contrast with Plato’s ideatic realm of forms, is 
always wedded to matter. Accordingly, as with any physical substance, the form and matter of 
things are characterized by measurables/observables, properties specifiable in terms of quality 
and quantity. 
168
 See A Dictionary of Philosophy, MacMillan Press, 1984 
169
 We may recall that Aristotle’s cosmogenic economy yields gains grounded in two elemental 
aspects of a form: the actuality of a form by its phenomenology or attributes of presence 
(describable as facts or events) and, by contrast, the potentiality of a form as a possible becoming 
due to powers that inhere in things (the actual and in the elements of what is actualized). 
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By all appearances, Ernst’s media archaeology could readily host Aristotle’s cosmogenic 
coordinates. Generally considered, dunamis, before it shows, before it gets actualized or becomes 
energeia (in whatever the mediatic form), is the play and force of a system (or network of 
systems). Specifically, the dynamic of a computer network – the very becoming of a system’s 
own temporality – is its capacity for transformation. The tension between actuality and 
potentiality stages a never-ending process (of what’s seen and said). For Ernst, this process is 
exhibited by an ever expansive logic. Computerized counting processes are thus mechanized 
procreativity. They entail a ceaseless overcoming and renewal of recoding, rereading and 
rewriting.  
In moving forward, I consider how the reserve of the laugh track may occur within or as a 
kind of dynamic form of achivation. In essence, can Ernst’s notion of the dynamic archive 
accommodate exploring the laugh track as an unproductive formation, a uselessness in reserve? 
Still, larger questions arise: Beyond the mandate of providing a descriptive method for 
experiencing media as “media” how committed is Ernst to imputing a time-less hereditary 
structure or genetic blue-print to media? If predicated on an absolutist arche-genesis, does media 
archaeology then reduce media to being teleological? In the next chapter I will examine Ernst’s 
account of dynamic computer programs set within the ‘flow of the world.’ He sees them as 
responsive and interactive transformative systems that afford to future media a seemingly 
unlimited inventive prowess.  In contrast to Ernst’s approach that grants creative authority to 
arithmetic mechanisms, I turn to Siegfried Zielinski’s deviant version of media archaeology. He 
accounts for media invention in terms that expand the horizon of research, beyond media    
formations being quantifying regimes, to include lesser formulaic practices. For Zielinski, the 
genesis of media formations is often hodgepodge. Technological inventions, though frequently 
180 
 
executed by applied mathematics, emerge from a diverse reserve of techniques and 




























Chapter Eleven: An Always Hungry Counting System 
 
 
My version of media archaeology tries to 
carry further Foucault’s approach. My media 
archaeology is an archaeology of the 
technological conditions of the sayable and 
thinkable in culture, an excavation of 
evidence of how techniques direct human or 
nonhuman utterances—without   reducing   
techniques   to   mere   apparatuses   
(encompassing,   for example, the ancient 
rules of rhetoric as well). (Wolfgang Ernst, 
Digital Memory, 195) 
 
In the quote above Ernst states he wishes to conduct media archaeology without 
“reducing techniques to mere apparatuses.”  If formulated as apparatuses, techniques would then 
be intractable implements. Likewise, future developments of a medium would already be 
determined. However, for Ernst, “techniques” are fluid, alterable and adjustable. They are the 
responsive means of a system. In turn, a system which is constituted by technique, given what its 
materio-technological conditions permit, is also responsive. With this conception of things, Ernst 
approaches the archive. It is the arena in which the forces of technology have assembled. And 
where, to restate, media shows itself as generative algorithmic formations. Through media 
archaeological excavation, we thus may understand how systems drive production and change.  
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In this chapter I think through the consequences of Ernst’s analytical commitments 
informing a system of inheritance. I question: how dynamic is Ernst’s media archaeology? 
Where in his conception of particular dynamic systems are we permitted to reckon with elements 
within that do not necessarily achieve their supposed designed purpose? In terms of a general 
line of inquiry to account for uselessness within media formations, I am thinking of those 
elements that might be secretive, possibly incalculable, even dis-integrative and un-productive. 
Much like the ephemeral character of Eldritch Priest’s glitch, these are things that the archive 
often does not show in its production of more archive. Ultimately, my objective is to explore 
how the laugh track may be an instance of a dynamic expansive archival process. However, its 
dynamism may also involve processes that deviate from being purposive and productive. Thus, 
for the coming chapter, I will mine the “technological conditions” towards which Ernst directs 
his archaeology. In a much broader sense than a ‘description of the working rules for saying and 
thinking,’ I recast “technological conditions” to include lesser-known and perhaps indescribable 
processes. These are faulty, incomplete and without the apparent goal-oriented offerings of 
invention which known and successful media may derive and maintain.  
 
Use-Oriented Algorithms 
In a section of Digital Memory and the Archive on the future of the object-oriented 
archive, Ernst contrasts contemporary developments in search engine design to the static 
classificatory framework by which access to traditional archives were conceived. His analysis 
relies on the dynamic/emphatic opposition outlined in the last chapter. For Ernst, the 
programming languages of Java, Python and C++ enable interactive engagements with the 
archives. By these programming tools, the contemporary archive may be configured to be an 
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always in-process reconfiguration. In effect, algorithm paths, generative of different methods and 
means of classification, permit system responsiveness to the range of searches conducted or yet 
to be conducted by an archive’s user. 
Ernst tells of the art database Europeana, a website for the written, aural and visual 
cultural past of Europe.170  In this site, one may access an archive in ways that are sensitive to a 
collection having seemingly countless aesthetic properties.   
 
Dynamic information rasters and new search methods that go beyond the 
rigid indexes of traditional finding aids come into play. An exemplary 
archive pool with selected attractors provides the requisite basis. Through 
their queries, users then create further archive elements to be digitized and 
stored. With the aid of agents and filters, the object-oriented archive thus 
takes shape cumulatively, entailing a shift from read-only paradigms to a   
generative,   participative   form   of   archival   reading.   Source-oriented   
stock and classical file-oriented archive practices yield to the use-oriented 




Effectively, the new-style archive eschews logic-based programming that, operating by classical 
methodology, restricts searches to an archives finite classification or management system. 
Instead, it engages information as an ongoing process of gathering and searching. Here, Ernst 
                                                          
170
 Those being its images (paintings, drawings, maps, photos and pictures of museum objects), 
texts (books, newspapers, letters, diaries and archival papers), sounds (music and spoken word 
from cylinders, tapes, discs and radio broadcasts), videos. 
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conceives of the in quotation “dynarchive” politically, as culturally progressive, or at least 
promising being such.171 It is not the one-sided affair in which the institution and its archons, 
forever to be held beyond the reaches of public interest, delimit access to an arcana imperii.
172
 
Europeana’s collection is responsive to whatever and however those of the public may seek 
access or conceive of what materials may be found. Apart from the politic of distribution, for 
Ernst, the “dynarchive,” or at least his example of such, is dynamic, not so much due to its open 
accessibility but because of its very data-architecture. Thus, much like object-oriented program 
(OOP) language, the cultural memory to come is to be configured through algorithms that are 
continually being reconfigured to adjust to new and more data. This is a shift from a macro to a 
micro-temporal approach to indexing the past. It entails the user process or engage one’s culture, 
and their history, as if always in transition, or as Ernst puts it, (that is yet) “to be completed.”173  
 
The techniques for knowing or obtaining “knowledge” that stage and advance a 
continued expansion of knowledge have overtaken previous models that were oriented towards 
containment of things or a registry of set facts. We are less and less under the influence of the old 
                                                          
171 Certainly Ernst is not blind to media being deployed for manipulative purposes, but he does 
emphasize its liberative potential.    
172
 As an aside, we see a parallel with Charley Douglass’ plan for the Laff Box. He wanted to be 
source and arbiter of mechanical laughs. The humour of this stance need not go unnoticed. Given 
the laughs are retreads, his curatorial authority is especially caricature. Instead, against his 
archonic inclination, Douglass ultimately contributed to the dispersive and expansive use and 
configurations of laugh tracks.  
173
 Our techniques for thinking, here constructing memory according to an open-ended schema of 
digital mnemotechnics, are thus acted on in ways particular to the operations of our tools, by our 
tools. Very reminiscent of Kittler’s appropriation of an observation by Nietzsche, we pretty 
much have come to organize our thoughts very much as these OOP’ed computers that reserve or 
store through continual transfer of data. 
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belief that objects are somehow re-presentable as subjects complete unto themselves.174 And yet, 
Ernst is very clear on not fixing or making deterministic the terms of our “use-oriented” 
interactions with machines. If our new archival systems are more about the “to be completed” 
data transfer175 than as a once-and-for-all contained storage, then it is in this narrative open-
ended manner that we will interact with “our always transforming systems.” That is, our world, 
our engagement in and with it, is also in process. And by Ernst’s thinking, this gives further 
dynamic play and indeterminacy to our network(s) of systems. Thus Ernst avoids “reducing 
techniques to mere apparatuses.”176 
  
Without there being an overseeing authorizing database for our always-expanding or 
further integration of already integrated algorithmic systems, hardware re-writes and re-mediates 
itself. By this overview of “the technological conditions of the sayable and thinkable in culture” 
our world including human participants is a complex process of media and mediation. As with 
the previously quoted observation by Jussi Parikka, our interaction with media formations are 
integral to their mediation. As he puts it, “we are media and of media.” We are not separate from 
media’s workings. Still, Ernst gives much authority to the algorithm. It is the carry-over-carry-
forth operation of closed system circuitry generative of certain kinds of code and computation. It 
is what permits the growth or expansion of contemporary technological systems. Systems of 
math and their extensions in mechanization engineer what has and will be invented. In the 
remainder of this chapter and throughout the next, I turn to exploring the role of algorithms in the 
                                                          
174 A knowing that is blind to its knowing very much in the sense of what we encounter in Avital 
Ronell’s Stupidity. 
175 As in a system’s functioning, execution of rules, a system’s making gains or will to power and 
will to knowledge, “the process” as it were. 
176
 Computer hardware is but an always transforming shell that is designed to adapt as use of it 
changes. – It is thus always in process of algorithmic reconfiguring. 
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processes of invention. No doubt Charley Douglass’ Laff Box must conform to calculations 
determined by TV or radio broadcast frequency standards and, among other things, audio-tape 
technical specifications. Without compliance to principals of typewriter mechanics and the sound 
technologies, the Laff Box cannot operate. However, the Laff Box or laugh track, as I have 
argued, is not a media formation that only emerges because of developments in electronic 
engineering. There are other inventive mechanisms that have lead to its kind of formation. We 
thus come to question the media archaeologist: are inventions always the result of materio-
technological conditions? Or might inventions also generate conditions? Moreover, in what ways 
do inventions occur?   
 
The Productive Divide 
 
Unlike manual workers surrounded by their 
tools and industrial workers standing at their 
machines, photographers are inside their 
apparatus and bound up with it. This is a 
new kind of function in which human beings 
and apparatus merge into a unity. It is 
therefore appropriate to call photographers 
functionaries. (Vilém Flusser, Towards a 





In Towards a Philosophy of Photography, philosopher Vilém Flusser accounts for the 
“fundamental” frame in which the photographer operates. We grasp that the photographer is a 
part of the image-making machine. Like emissaries or state representatives sent on missions 
abroad, photographers carry out the operations of the camera. In a word, indeed a very 
mechanistic-sounding word, they are its functionaries. Generally considered, Flusser’s analysis 
outlines the divide between a tool or machine and a system of procedures, an apparatus. The 
olden-day system of relations between the worker and his tools apparently was far less 
circumscribed. Instead, these days, the worker is a technician whose tools permit an execution of 
pre-set routines. In the case of the photographer, the photographer’s production is fully regulated 
by the operations of the camera. To be sure, Flusser is neither concerned with the content of 
images nor the format of their documentation. The content could be of whatever kind or style 
and the documentation could be for whatever purpose. Rather, Flusser reflects on generating 
image content by a mechanized program that, by a set or series of computations, organizes our 
material productions.
177
 I note that we again encounter function, or at least a variant on such. 
Flusser considers the practitioner to be a part of a machine’s generativity. Akin to Foucault’s 
conception of functioning, Flusser casts the functionary as a system’s organizational proxy. In 
line with Ernst’s media archaeology, the human is an operative of media. Likewise, it may be 
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 The camera, as Flusser sees it, extends the mathematical paradigm of the Cartesian. In other 
words, it continues the Western tradition’s scientific project (Flusser cites both Descartes and 
Nicholas of Cusa) of, through numbers, “bringing thinking matter in line with extended matter.” 
(This would appear to be a slogan of the sciences by the way Flusser frames it in his text on p.31 
of Towards a Philosophy of Photography.) However, for Flusser, the camera is not simply the 
result of the digital forging new algorithmic pathways. Rather, the camera comes together under 
a host of forces. It takes form by industries ranging from: “the photographic industry that 
programmed the camera;” “the industrial complex that programmed the photographic industry;” 




inferred, Charley Douglass, whether as Laff Box archon or inventor, would have been a mere 
system assembler and button-pusher. He was an expression of the machine.  
 
At any rate, the functionary aside, unlike Ernst, Flusser examines the complex of 
industrial forces for generating a medium – here photography – as apparatuses. He does not 
consider apparatuses reductively nor leading to a reductionist account. Rather, apparatuses are 
fluid formations. Even so, Flusser elaborates on apparatuses much like how Ernst examines the 
formation of particular “techniques.” They are identifiable processes that authorize what’s 
thinkable and sayable within culture. For Flusser “the human” is at play with the apparatus. Or, 
as he declares, liberated from manual labour of past image-making production (i.e. drawing or 
painting), “they [humans] are free to play.”178 The “language of liberation” aside, as we see, 
Flusser’s conception of an apparatus as a “plaything” appears quite provocative. Whereby, 
notions of play may inspire questions pertinent to the processes and stages of inventions. For 
instance, about what playfulness may go on in the stages of generating code for a computer’s 
hardware and software. However, Flusser’s account is not so play-ful. He writes:  
These reflections make it possible to attempt the following definition of 
the term “apparatus:” It is a complex plaything, so complex that those 
playing with it are not able to get to the bottom of it; its game consists of 
combination of symbols contained within its program; at the same time 
this program was installed by a metaprogram and the game results in 
further programs; whereas fully automated apparatuses can do without 
                                                          
178
 See Vilém Flusser’s Towards a Philosophy of Photography, p.29. 
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human intervention, many apparatuses require the human being as a player 
and a functionary. (VF, 31) 
 
The depth of an apparatus’ symbolic ordering exceeds its “player’s” comprehension. A “player” 
and, as he tells us, a programmer, only gains access to what they can play with. Players and 
programmers are restricted to playing with a small element of a greater and expansive system. 
There should be little doubt then that “the functionary” is entirely circumscribed. More 
significantly, the invented precedes what will be realized by the productive metrics of an 
apparatus. For Flusser, an apparatus, though likely concretized and knowable through the 
operations of machines, is a seemingly un-bounded formation. That is, an apparatus is open to 
generating more apparatus that may, like a snake shedding its skin, transform into another 
version of itself. In a more localized sense, I have similarly accounted for the laugh track. 
Though restricted to practices mostly active within the broadcast industry apparatus, the laugh 
track archival system generates more laugh track. Ultimately though, the laugh track provides a 
study in contrast. The laugh track is corrupt in the gains it makes, in how it quantifies. Unlike 
Flusser’s conception of apparatuses, its rules are not additively oriented. For how I understand 
the laugh track, “more” and “generative” do not signify progression. Rather, the laugh track’s 
expansion occurs due to an endless loop of repetition. The laugh track always makes more laugh 
track by being a replay of an already replicated formation. Its system of archivation multiplies 
the repeating of a repetitive process. Unlike an innovating and transforming apparatus, instead 
the laugh track media formation paradoxically is a productive imitation of redundancy. 
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At any rate, Flusser contends that, once upon a time, machines were “invented to 
simulate specific thought processes.” 179 But now, as parts of an apparatus (which could be a 
camera, computer, the state, etc.), we need to understand the machine’s purpose beyond the 
confines of the proverbial tinkerer’s workshop. “Extended in matter,” the always counting 
systems, the active hungry number, without interruption play on by their own rules that are, in 
turn, predicated on a more complex order of rules. At the so-called “meta” level, it would 
appear
180
 the numeric regime unceasingly generates more rules and formulations of rules for 
continued operation. A program’s functioning, operates by and within an order that, through 
selective processes entailing negation, adds and progresses. Ultimately, for Flusser, the invention 
process of modern systems is entirely bound by rules. Play only occurs nominally. It is a highly 
insular “to and fro” action occurring within a computational system whereby programmers 
calculate accordingly within that system.  
In all, the main difference between Flusser’s conception of the apparatus and Ernst’s 
describing of techniques is that Ernst considers the relationship between computer systems and 
users to be interactive. For Ernst, auto-generative processes are predicated on a system being 
responsive to its user. Of course, Flusser was writing at a time before the wide application of 
Object-Oriented-programming. Flusser’s treatise on photography came out in the 1980s. Object- 
Oriented-programming was more in an experimental stage at that point. It was not until the 90s 
that it became the standard in programming. However, though the generative mechanism of a 
responsive algorithm is missing in his account, Flusser, much like Ernst, asserts a partition 
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 Ibid. p.31. 
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 I say appear because Flusser declares meta-programming as open – “the hierarchy of 
programs is open at the top” (Towards a Philosophy of Photography, p.29). – Which could mean 
open to not generate more rules.  
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between the designated system and its user. They both conceive of technological systems as 
independent complexes of computational workings to be, in whatever contained and controlled 
form of productiveness, purely at work. Likewise, Ernst and Flusser have conceived of the 














Chapter 12: Dynamism and the Abyss  
As I move into the final chapters, I seek alternative concepts and approaches for 
expanding upon Ernst’s limited economy of inheritance to include formations of media that are 
disinherited and lack hereditary traits. For this, Siegfried Zielinski’s divergent approach to media 
archaeology, called variantology, is vital. As the term indicates, Zielinski’s objective is to 
provoke a varied study of media formations, regardless of whether the studies will deviate from 
identifiable courses of invention. This, as Ernst himself declares, “advocates an anarchival 
history of forgotten or neglected media approaches.”181 And, I would go further, Zielinski 
advocates for a media that never held the possibility of being generative. Actually, in exploring 
the laugh track as an instance of uselessness, Zielinski’s anarchival approach to history permits 
encountering structural defunctness. Rather than for re-confirming an idealized technological 
order, the laugh track may then be examined as a reserve that deviates from behaving like one. 
More generally considered, we may thus investigate the traits, integral to a broader and perhaps 
lesser determined technological condition, that ensure a system of archivation is inaccessible.  
In this chapter, I explore deviations to and within systems thought to be predicated on 
uninterrupted optimal performance. We see computational systems are not as immune to 
uncertainty as Ernst and Flusser would have us think. Ultimately, as Zielinski prompts us to 
understand, focusing on rules overshadows what may not have been so discursive. That is, 
against what techno-centric media archaeology would have us believe, inventions are not only 
about what may be within the overt determining of mechanization and mathematics. In fact, there 
might be more to rules than the logic and principle they appear to convey.  
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 See Wolfgang Ernst’s Digital Memory, p. 195. 
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Programmed Aporias – Easter Eggs, Glitch Areas and The Donkey 
Kong “Kill-Screen”  
 
From an earlier chapter, Eldritch Priest accounts for “the glitch” as a micro-moment of 
chaos. It interrupts the contemporary computer system’s tasks and idealized presentation. Often, 
the source or reason for this kind of interruption, though very present audibly or visually, appears 
inexplicable.  However, the glitch is not the only instance in which some form of system 
deviation occurs that may be hidden to those operating the program. Within the history of 
computer programming, as with various other media (be it DVD, broadcast, etc.), there are a 
whole host of hidden or secretive elements embedded within the logic of executable code. For 
instance, many of us, through an inadvertent downloading of malware, are likely all too familiar 
with the feeling that our computer navigation systems have been hijacked by a troublesome 
element that lurks within the system. For the persistent layperson, it often takes hours to track 
down and delete such a scourge.  
Perhaps less disruptive than plagues of unwanted advertisements are the various forms of 
deviant code that have been written into program language. Apple and software companies such 
as Microsoft have routinely sold products to the unassuming consumer containing what are 
commonly referred to as “easter eggs.” Whether in software, or a personal computer’s hardware, 
the “easter egg” is apparently an “unauthorized” message or routine.182 Often some form of a 
joke (perhaps only funny amongst programmers), they are keyboard-triggered commands to 
which the manufacturer has not assigned or sanctioned a particular command set. For example, 
when using a routine function key (f1-f12) or entering a query in the navigator search-box, the 
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 That is not authorized by the manufacturer of the product. 
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results yield what appears to be the predicted or “to spec” outcome. However, in certain 
keystroke combinations or for a particular type of query, the results may lead the user down an 
unexpected pathway.
183
 In the history of “easter eggs” we come across puzzles, puzzling images, 
sayings, arcane messages and humorous tidbits. Notable deviations are the hidden flight 
simulator in Microsoft Office’s 1997 version of its Excel program and the inexplicable presence 
of a pinball game in Microsoft’s version of Word. In the world of video-gaming, the “easter egg” 
takes on its own complications. It often represents complex and rarified challenges that, to 
further make the point, break from the manufacturer’s “authorized script.” In short, secretive 
easter eggs
184
 violate a system’s testing protocol and thereby undermine a design’s pre-
programmed capacity. I would not say that such craft or subversion was ever applied to laugh 
tracks. However, the length Charley Douglass went to keep the workings of his Laff Box a 
complete secret from either the public or those in the broadcast industry gives one cause to 
wonder. In certain respects, his secrecy is parallel to how computer programmers commandeer 
code. Douglass’ formula for laugh tracks were not only patent protected he religiously treated his 
Laff Box as ‘one of a kind,’ as if it was immune to external alteration and corruption. Thereby, 
within the broadcast industry, a Laff Box audience response stood as a unique or specialized 
production distinct from a generic collection of recorded laughs. Douglass, like rogue computer 
programmers to come, preserved his own secret within a broader set of rules and routines. With 
that said, the laugh track, as I have been exploring, is less about the purposes one may have for 
it. Instead, my focus is on how the laugh track is a quantificatory regime. And how, given its 
particular archival structuration, it also deviates from a quantificatory metric.    
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 In these instances might we say that the programmer make a disfunction key? 
184 Easter eggs often go undetected and are tripped upon by an errant keystroke.  
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As the student of computer programming may learn, the history of programming from 
workplace to gaming is filled with the production of hardware and software that contain 
minefields of yet-to-be detonated rules deviating from rule.
185
 For good or for ill, the bored rule-
governed programmers’ logic bombs underscore a system’s hidden processing as well as the 
limits of a computational system. Of course, the limits of a system are not necessarily final, and 
certainly, in thinking with Flusser, are not known by programmer or system designer. Actually, 
within the history of computer programming, right up to recent times, a system’s capacity or 
threshold point suggest a confused and potentially disabling mathematic, that is, a mathematic 
that does not compute. In other words, at the threshold of a system, computing can be highly 
variable and uncertain. It is widely known within the computer sciences that faltering 
computations often occur when the register width of a processor (for instance a 32-bit or 64-bit 
processor)
186
 is exceeded by the total of an arithmetic operation. In these instances, by what is 
referred to as “integer overflow,” a computer’s behaviour deviates from standard operating code. 
The computer scientist is without a mathematical solution and simply declares this behaviour 
“undefined.” The idea I am driving at is that Flusser and Ernst’s accounts even after delving into 
micro-elements of system’s quantificatory regimes, overlook the excesses and unavoidable 
computational error that may inhabit a medium’s productive and positive display. They don’t 
address the things that are really of no apparent use and confound problem-solving.
187
  
Nintendo’s early 1980s Donkey Kong “kill screen,” at least in the gaming industry, stands 
as a famous instance of this kind of broken calculus. The game’s eight-bit counter exhibits its 
                                                          
185 Perhaps some may argue an expansion and expression of a system’s general rules.  
186 In either case the width determines the amounts of data that can be numerically represented 
within a computer’s storage capacity. 
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 Where, in various instances, buffers and stopgap measures – sawdust and bubblegum 
solutions – suffice to permit continued system functioning. 
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computational oversight at its level twenty-two, the game’s highest level of achievement. The 
“kill screen,” however, is not by design. Due to a mathematical formula for calculating point 
totals,
188
 when at the game’s highest level of achievement, the Donkey Kong processor permits 
exceeding its computational capacity, its highest fixed value of 256, by 4. The game’s counter 
(its processor), in overflowing by the remainder of the 4 value, unfairly leaves the player with the 
values’ time equivalent, a meagre 7 seconds, to achieve the new level to which they have 
advanced. The behaviour, though “undefined” or un-programmed, of course may be criticized as 
a design flaw. The particular manufacturer had no executable code in place that would have 
maintained the flow of the game after level 22. With that said, after all these years since the first 
version of Donkey Kong, the general phenomena of undefined behaviour and integer overflow 
have not gone away.  Although processor capacities have exponentially increased, systems are 
still at risk of exceeding their computational thresholds.  
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Fig. 2  
To avoid these mathematical conundrums, our new systems are programmed with logic 
buffers designed to counter-act or at least mitigate computational confusion that ensues when a 
system generates a potentially unavoidable arithmetic overload. With contemporary (life)-
support systems – from ground to sea to air – so intricately integrated, the consequences of an 
un-programmed digital illogic far exceed the disappointment of a player experiencing the 





 In effect, the readily identifiable concepts, mechanisms, techniques, and 
mathematics of invention hold potential for a deviancy from planned outcomes. In one sense, we 
are really in no position to assume that the terms of a media invention are themselves, as Ernst’s 
and Flusser’s teleological thinking presumes, a fait accompli. Perhaps we then need other 
concepts appropriate to a media formation’s being unplanned. In another sense, we are provided 
with instances supporting the main idea guiding my exploration of the laugh track. Within the 
workings of a system, there are unspecifiable and unproductive elements. For a lot of things, this 
point appears trivial as long as a system achieves its planned outcome. However, this is in fact 
how the laugh track is constituted as an archival system. The laugh track as system of registry is 
a formation of confounded planning that has formed through a precedent repetition. To be sure, I 
am not commenting on the audio technician’s poor archival skills. Rather, the laugh track 
confounds the logic of progression. It is an archival formation that expands its domain of 
production by already being an artefact of itself. That is, by its having already been spent.
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Paradoxically then, its repetition precedes its formation for being an archive – for what permits 
the laughter of the laugh track to be repeated.  
Further to a general exploration of design flaw or, in the instances of “easter eggs,” 
hidden program messages, we may also encounter (en)coding limits in other ways. Certain forms 
of “system crash” also point to programming limits. Within any given computer game exist a 
program’s deficiencies otherwise considered as glitch areas. Again, we recall Eldritch Priest’s 
work on the computer glitch, focused on the commonplace micro-instances of sudden 
                                                          
189 To the pessimist these internal contradictions are orchestrated by a programme of planned 
obsolescence. 
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 In effect, the laugh track’s archivation has already been archived. The laugh track repeats 
what it does prior to being a system for archiving. 
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unexpected disruption or system malfunction. This time the term “glitch” is extended in scope to 
refer to an un-programmed area outside of the game’s main map. Still, the notion that the 
computer user experiences some form of disruption holds. We see that once having entered into a 
glitch area – an out-of-bounds region of a game – the unsuspecting gamer is trapped and lacks 
resource to return to the flow of the “authorized” manufactured game. Often glitch areas are 
visually manifest as an incomplete terrain, a fragment of terrain or even a wall of colour in which 
there are no graphics. Within a glitch area, often the gamer is rendered impotent. There is no 
game logic in place within this hidden region of the programmed.  In effect, the gamer has 
chanced upon an un-programmed pothole, an algorithmically supported deficiency within the 
programmed that triggers a system crash.  
Given that “easter eggs,” glitch areas along with its abysses, are the programmer’s 
executable manipulations, we are disinclined to put these phenomena in the same category as 
Priest’s glitch. They are not system defects. However, though not defects, as computational 
divergences, they underscore algorithmic variability. More to the point, these kinds of 
divergences support my general idea of putting into question how with any certainty we conceive 
of a particular medium and specifically how it may be formed. Broadly speaking, we here 
contend with “notions of the computational” as somewhat atypical to how the media 
archaeologist accounts for media. The computed is never just optimal or without flaw. Within the 
very genetics of a system, unexpected deviancy from an ordered plan occurs. Are these 
deviations simply to be cast as the alter-media of a broader technological condition?
191
 Or, do we 
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 Instead, one may suspect, programming shenanigans and various forms of system meltdowns 
merge the theorized divide between content production and media formation. Likewise, the logic 
of a system may be exploited to usurp the marketed intended use for graphic display (text 
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need to approach inventions as potentially incomplete and uncertain formations? To explore the 
laugh track as an archival system, we may certainly make gains from the discursive orderings of 
physics and mathematics. These generalized theories and formulations permit accounting for a 
technological system’s form of calculability and material generativity. However, from my 
exploration of the laugh track we hit a dead end if we are restricted to the media archaeologist’s 
concept of technology that posits it as progressive and generative. 
 
Exploring the Abyss within and of Media Archaeology  
In exploring media as historical formations, we need be sensitive to what is not overtly 
governed by a system’s practicable category of rules. As the contemporary thrill-seeking 
programmer that mischievously nests “easter eggs” within computer software, we suspect that 
the mediatic inventions of the distant past were also imbued with or informed by flights of fancy. 
Deviating from a standard methodology, their formulations may occur by peculiar and un-
chartable circuitries of thought. Following through on the more extreme implications of 
Foucault’s genealogy and archaeologics, Siegfried Zielinski formulates an approach to media 
archaeology that, contrary to Ernst, gives no sustained authority to the archive. Nor to that which 
may be ordained as directive or discursive permitting experimentation for what forms as a 
medium. I believe Ernst’s notion of discrete temporality proves to be helpful for grasping media 
as auto-generative. However, as I have been working through over the last few chapters, his 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
included) and become another computational mechanism for making play of whatever kind on 
goal-oriented logic.  
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conception of media formations being dynamic processes presupposes them to be possessive of a 
pre-destined transformativity. And this, for Ernst, is apparently knowable by the authorizing of 
the archive. Against this I contend that this thinking constrains exploring media, in particular the 
laugh track, by rules that inscribe instrumentality and purpose. Instead, we need other approaches 
that permit exploring media without adherence to the authority of the archive. Towards which 
Zielinski presents a worthwhile alternative.  
Ultimately, Zielinski’s objective is for broadening the economy of archivation. 
Commenting on his diversified study of media formations called variantology, he states,  
Variantology for me is some kind of an operation to deal with the complex 
issues of the past and connect them as I said at the beginning to a possible 
future. I do not look at the past with the interest to find out what but with 
the intention to find out what might have been instead. Also, the 
alternative of and so on. The single investigations, the tactics which form 
the imaginary sum of variantologica I call genealogies which is not a 
neologism on inventions by myself - that comes from Nietzsche ... the 
most important point is in the context of Nietzsche very closely connected 
with your subject [the conference’s topic of “error”] ... combining the 
concept of genealogy very strongly with the concept of error and mistakes 
... [Zielinski then quotes Michel Foucault] “Genealogy does not go back 
into the past, to erect a large continuity beyond the diversion of forgetting 
... To follow the complex string derivation (Herkunft, not origin) means 
much more ... to grasp what has happened in derivation: incidents, ... 
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breaks, errors, ... false bills, which generated what exists and has value for 
us.” (Siegfried Zielinski, 2010 lecture in Torino Italy, 
https://vimeo.com/17301176 , time: 46:05 - 48:36)  
 
Zielinski has us trained on different temporalities that lack or deviate from positive display, 
quantification or presence. Instead, he opens onto another economo-theoretic realm that permits 
encountering non-generative, un-testable, idiosyncratic, arbitrary aspects of the often diversely 
media influenced functionary/programmer/inventor. Thereby, Zielinski attends to the discrete 
instances of experimentation that may be frivolous or lead nowhere. Accordingly, leveraging off 
of Zielinski’s extra-archival methodology, we in effect expand our conception of the archive that 
permits an unrestricted exploration of the laugh track as system of reserve. It is not restricted to 
what shows.  
 
It is not that Zielinski puts invention back in the hands of inventors (thereby restoring 
“the human element”). Rather, it is that invention can be thought of as more than formulations 
with specific goals governed by technologically appropriate disciplinal discursives.192 Instead, he 
gets us to explore more subterranean investments: 
Cultivating dramaturgies of difference is an effective remedy against the 
increasing ergonomization of the technical media worlds that is taking 
place under the banner of ostensible linear progress. (Siegfried Zielinski, 
Deep Time of the Media, 259) 
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 Or, in grander terms, as a particular ‘mediating complex’ (i.e., the military complex from 
which Kittler’s account derives so much authority) for guiding social activity. 
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Following this he reminds us of the reality of ‘garden variety’ commercial products: 
 
The manufacture of appliances is confronted regularly with its own 
“periodic infertility,” which becomes more apparent because the 
accelerated tempo of manufacture perpetually forces prevention of 
inefficiency (in the products) and this invariably drives it in the direction 
of wastage. The experiment, which is the precondition of efficiency, 
presupposes the wasteful mistake. To explore in experiments what may 
result in profitable production is geared to the elimination of infertility in 
the product but at the price of wasting material and human labor 
(production costs). (SZ, 279) 
In each instant of mediatic formation, whether put in practice, aborted, unfinished or left to 
imagination there are other elements not so typically elemental to productivity. For Zielinski, 
such potentially impotent and useless elements are actually the pre-condition of experimentation 
and, we may suspect, the archive itself. Consequently, we open onto the broader thematic for this 
discussion. How to account for uselessness in media? 
Broadly considered, Zielinski identifies a dis-connect within the study of archived media 
practices that cannot be accounted for by media archaeology. This disconnect arises from only 
treating inventions as formations that operate within the goals of practices, techniques and 
technological ideals. Even though a medium’s historical progressions may yet be known, it is 
readily assumed, within, by and of broader technological processes that they will be 
communicable. That is, media inventions are pre-authorized by terms – or technological 
conditions as Ernst calls them – that permit them to mediate. For Zielinski, this is a significant 
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point of contest. Although my paradoxical conception of the laugh track interrupts the circuitry 
between technological conditions and individual media formations Zielinski’s anarchaeology 
directly challenges the entire basis for the circuitry. Conversely, he attends to inventions as their 
own practices, techniques and possible ideals that may in no way have anything to do with 
ergonomic or optimal design for achieving system functionality. In effect, Zielinski eschews 
principals of usability. Likewise, within the inventive process, he encounters possibilities of 
defunctness. This is not to say he discovers that particular media may become defunct, unusable 
or obsolescent. Rather, unusability is a possibility of an invention.
193
 Thus, there is reason to 
speculate that for Zielinski, “invention” occurs as an always already or pre-ceding defunctness. 
Contrary to Ernst’s dynamic transformative account, media invention entails non-generative 
elements in which inarticulable sensations of the dream and unquantifiable zeal of imagination 
authorize and haunt the procedurality implicit in any archivo-temporal or historical-making 
regime. In this sense, the defunct might be considered as the archi-expenditure of a media 
formation. Speculation aside, for Zielinski, within the genesis of any media formation
194
 is the 
potential for an unaccounted-for and inexplicable impotency. Put more positively, the joys of 
incommunicability and arcane tail-chasing encryption also inspire invention. Divergent from a 
system of inheritance is the possibility of un-inheritable formulations. These are often elements 
that simply confound quantificatory standards. That is, whether by design or accident an inventor 
                                                          
193 Zielinski is interested in the whims of invention.  In frivolous or half-baked ideas that emerge 
in the likely, at times, desultory thought processes of an inventor, a programmer, a functionary. 
Even though, in the end, such frivolity may not be put to “the count.” Still, as Zielinski would 
have it, these processes cannot be readily discounted. 
194 Which are circumscribed by the metrics of particular computations or temporalities. 
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In Zielinski’s account of media anarchaeology there is no sustained analysis of the terms 
impotent and the friable. Even so, these kinds of notions give shape to the anarchegenetic make-
up of the media he explores, and further, to how I conceive of the laugh track as an archival 
formation. In looking ahead to the would-be next chapter, I will pursue the significance of dead-
end terms denoting uselessness for a certain system of knowledge-making. Presented as an 
unmarked chapter,  “A Pre-Programmed Abyss” is a deadspot, a textual “easter egg” 
circumscribed by the pointless subject of uselessness. In kind, I examine Etienne Bonnot de 
Condillac’s relatively obscure old chestnut of a thesis wherein he establishes the frivolous at the 
originating moment of the linguistic sign. Condillac’s linguistic system represents a rare 
occasion in which the frivolous is overtly examined and explained. Aided by Jacques Derrida’s 
deconstructive navigations through Condillac’s confounding logic, I thus stage alternative ways 
for, in the concluding chapter, engaging Zielinski’s anarchic approach to media and the laugh 
track. His media anarchaeology is not a counter formation to media archaeology rather its 







                                                          
195 That is, a secret that may never be known to be a secret. 
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A Pre-Programmed Abyss...  
 
In the previous chapter I explored deviant elements within the progamming logic of 
computer games.196 Even though “abysses” and “glitch areas” are in zones remotely accessible to 
a game’s player, it appears they are a part of a software program’s architecture. Much like the 
“Off-Limits” areas of  a ski-hill that play host to unreckoned dangers for even the most skilled, 
these zones are barely navigable and often quickly lead to a gamer’s sudden demise: a Game 
Over! that is not a game over or finality reached within the rules of the game proper.197 We thus 
encounter “highly discrete” instances of a breach of procedure imbedded in the process of the 
main computational objective. These breaches are not a hidden subtext nor a trap-door leading to 
the game’s other  (a perverse turn on virtuality). Rather a game screen abyss is uncharted terrain 
– a wasteland or no-man’s land within the programmed that indicates other procedures may be at 
play. Just as the game proper of Call of Duty has it own timing or even gameplay timings,198 
these aberrant procedures, though perhaps not fully formed, may possess their own temporal 
order.199 The general point is that ways of considering function and use may be expanded. Within 
the purported functioning elements of a system are other-functioning, perhaps non-functioning, 
elements. What functions is not only to be reckoned with in terms of a system’s designed 
operations. Perhaps we may understand a system’s workings, whether or not by design, by its 
non-transformative elements. Of course, this is what I have been attempting to do through an 
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 These deviations indicate a temporal distress. This distress may be experienced as a lacking of 
finiteness, continuity and relevance connected to (within the parameters of the programming 
software) the apparent/marketted outcome or even the affect of computated play. 
197
 Of course, what is the game proper and parergonal to the game proper comes into question. 
198
 Given stages of accellerated and decellerated play are often features built into a game’s 
progression.   
199
 These are tacitly/discretely zoned off areas that contains a game’s divergent logics of often 
partial, inadequate and even faulty interfacing. (Yes, rationally written off as the digital 
workbench exhibiting an unfinished game’s peaks and plateaus).   
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exploration of the laugh track as an archival media formation. I have been trying to articulate 
how this particular technological formation deviates from its technological condition: That it 
does so through a preceding authorization of a redundancy function. Thus, in step with 
Zielinski’s exploration of never-functioning and defunct media, I ask: is a function only that 
which, well, functions? How might function be thought non-instrumentally?  
As stated in the last chapter, Ernst’s media archaeology does not accommodate the 
unergonomically designed media formation. For Ernst, media, in order to be media, needs to 
demonstrate traits redolent of broader organizing technological conditions. Alternatively, 
whether drawing from Agamben’s non-apophantic notion of pure means or Zielinski’s discourse-
breaking anarchaeology,
200
 I attempt to explore the laugh track along with other media as 
formations that are not authorized by a programmatic of instrumentalization. In step with this, for 
this (un)chapter, I attempt to get a handle on how use and uselessness may not be in opposition. 
Thus, way we may account for media in a way that entertains frivolity without commitment to a 
use/useless binary. What has to be made clear is that media formations that deviate from 
quantification or a system’s goal may not be just a deviation in the oppositional sense. Rather 
they may occur within rules and may do so most uneconomically. Accordingly, we may need to 
invent ways to somehow grapple with how uselessness may not be the product or by-product of 
any system of expenditure.  
The frivolous would appear to represent the opposite to that which is essential and 
significant to the workings of things. Thanks in part to Susan Sontag’s account of camp, the 
frivolous is commonly thought as designating activity that is silly, deviant and/or superfluous. 
Accordingly, we have come to readily assume its status in pop culture, and culture more 
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 Which is, no doubt, another discursive that piggy-backs on other discursives. 
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seriously-considered, as being oppositional. However, and to repeat the above point, perhaps the 
frivolous, if indeed there is a connoted category (at best likely an empty one) may not be so 
readily framed in terms of the implicit binaric pairing: serious vs. silly; nor by a more widely 
applied useful vs. useless. As for a concept of the frivolous considered in relation to discourse, 
knowledge production and critique we may look to Jacques Derrida’s Archeology of the 
Frivolous: Reading Condillac. Derrida’s deconstruction of Condillac’s account of the origins of 
knowledge brings clarity to how the specific structural features that impute to a particular 
philosophy of knowledge its use and value also,201 by necessity, circumscribe a role for the 
frivolous. It is at the vulnerable seams of the logic of Étienne Bonnot de Condillac’s empirico-
linguistic philosophy that Derrida identifies the counter-weaving of what has to be repressed by 
the functions of that logic, which is to say, for managing what is frivolous and worthless to a 
discourse on knowledge-making. Perhaps being somewhat frivolous, for the moment at least, I 
indulge in this play or slippage of logic that entails the frivolous.   
 
On the Origins of the Frivolous  
In The Archeology of the Frivolous: Reading Condillac, 202 Derrida conducts an 
intertextual analysis with 18th century French empiricist philosopher Étienne Bonnot de 
                                                          
201 In terms of: contradictions; abysses; and deficiencies. 
202
 Written four years after Foucault’s The Archaeology of Knowledge, with the use of the word 
“archeology” (sans the dipthong/ligature “ae”), we note Foucault’s text as being a possible 
influence on the title of Derrida’s text. Apart from potentially representing a philosophical 
engagement or perhaps quarrel with Foucault’s practice of “archaeology” as well as his notion of 
“knowledge” neither Derrida’s usage of “archeology” nor his deconstructive reading of what he 
refers to as the “archeology of the frivolous” appear to, overtly at least, have any affinity nor to 
be in direct contra-position to Foucault’s approach to analyzing the formations of knowledge and 
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Condillac’s various writings in ways that raise questions about how they should be read. Derrida 
draws on texts by Condillac that range from an anti-Cartesian materialist grounding of 
epistemology to tracts on commerce and government to an assembly of a dictionary of 
synonyms.203 In effect, Derrida looks to trace to the point of their very undoing the intricacies of 
the logic and language – the very discursive order – by which Condillac’s discourse and the 
constructions of his texts are organized. Derrida takes Condillac’s main task to be locating the 
originating terms for knowledge in the formative elements and workings of language. To this 
end, Condillac writes, 
The circumstances favourable to the displaying of genius, are always to be 
come upon in a nation, when the language begins to have fixed principles 
and a settled standard: such a period is therefore the epocha of great men 
... If we recollect that the habit of the imagination and memory depends 
intirely [sic] on the connexion of ideas, and that the latter is formed by the 
relation and analogy of sign; we shall be convinced that the less a 
language abounds in analogous expressions, the less assistance it gives to 
the memory and the imagination. Therefore it is not at all proper for the 
exertion or display of talents. It is with language as geometrical figures; 
they give a new insight into things, and dilate the mind in proportion as 
they are more perfect. Sir Isaac Newton’s extraordinary success was due 
to choice that had already been made of the signs, together with the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
discursive practices. More to the point, “archeology” is restricted to a study of origins whereas, 
in Foucault’s case at least, archaeology delves into the archival record of past human practices.   
203 The Dictionary was published in 1754. 
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contrivance of methods and calculation.(Jacques Derrida, The Archeology 
of the Frivolous: Reading Condillac, 66) 
Against a tradition steeped in Aristotelian metaphysics, for establishing his Lockean-derived 
empiricism, Condillac grounds the forming of our ideas in the sign.  However, as Derrida 
reveals, what Condillac declares to be the conditions that support and perpetuate productive 
forms of thinking also leads one to deviate from such. In other words, stemming from the same 
organizing mechanisms that give origin to human knowledge emerges the counter-occurring 
pursuit of what Condillac declares as the frivolous. Accordingly, in his Dictionnare des 
synonymes (1751) Condillac defines frivolous as an adjectival variant of useless by which, in the 
remainder of this text, I accordingly restrict my use of the term. Condillac writes, 
Useless: adj. vain, frivolous, futile. Useless is said of things which serve 
no purpose, are of no use. If they appear to have some utility but are 
fundamentally useless, they are called vain. If their utility bears only on 
objects of little consideration or worth, they are frivolous. As for futile, it 
adds still more to frivolous and is said chiefly of reasoning or arguments 
which bear on nothing. (Jacques Derrida, The Archeology of the Frivolous: 
Reading Condillac, p.118) 
 
Actually, Condillac was concerned that frivolity may lurk within his own mode of thinking. He 
thus attempts to rationalize misguided degenerative pursuits of “knowledge” as historically 
anomalous musings of a few malcontented geniuses.204 Of course, he did not include himself in 
                                                          
204 Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge,  p.193. 
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that grouping. Derrida, however, surmises otherwise. Condillac’s own discourse for describing 
regressive pursuits entailing endless repetition of stagnant notions, terms and philosophical 
propositions of the deviant is not above committing these violations. Derrida contends,  
A philosophy of need – Condillac’s – organizes all its discourse with a 
view to the decision: between the useful and the futile. A philosophy of 
the sign – Condillac’s – always threatens this decision but also expends 
and multiplies itself in order to reduce the threat, always adds “too many 
signs” in order to efface the gap or fraction ... Constantly resorting to the 
values of the same, of analogy, of analysis, of the identical proposition, 
Condillac had to guard his discourse from frivolity as if from its infinitely 
alike double. Resembling it, reassembling it, the analog was that positive 
which produced its negative, the analog of the analog, the useless and vain 
semblance of discourse, chitchat, the idle tale. Condillac’s method 
consequently consists in indefinitely recharging signs, in saturating 
semiotics with semantic representation, by including all rhetoric in a 
metaphorics, by connecting the signifier. (JD, 119) 
 
Ironically, by the very mechanisms that Condillac generates a linguistic cleave between 
knowledge and the frivolous, Condillac’s form of analysis concerning the origin of a positive and 
productive human knowledge fall victim to the same fate. Here, the very operations of 
Condillac’s analysis of meaningful philosophical pursuits are themselves plagued by a frivolity 
and deviation from the rules of his semiotic system. His discourse implicates his own linguistic 
empiricism as actually being formed by what it allegedly stands in opposition to and intends to 
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elide. As by the turns of reason, and in his defence, we might instead read Condillac most 
metaphysically: that Condillac’s logic is a priori and outside of the conditions for the empirical 
generating of logic. However, as Derrida reads things, to draw that conclusion ignores the 
productive functions of Condillac’s discourse, 
First let us remark the value of the “force of connection.” Condillac does 
not insist on this, but it is an active spring of his discourse. The passage 
(continuity and/or rupture) from one operation or structure to another and 
the articulation, then, of their concepts always amount to a difference of 
force, of the quantity of force. But – such is the universal law of analogy 
which dominates this whole set of problems – quantity of force is always 
quantity of connections … Force is first determined as force of connection 
and its quantity as quantity of connection. What is quantity of connection?  
Perhaps this question, which Condillac never seems to answer, could 
guide a deconstructive reading of the Essay [on the Origin of Human 
Knowledge]…In this reading, we can ascertain that the system of this 
articulation or this increase regularly produces a silent explosion of the 
whole text and introduces a kind of fissure, rather fission, within each 
concept as well as each statement. (JD, 1980, 72-73)205   
                                                          
205 Though pointing to breaches in Condillac’s system of  logic, Derrida is cautious to not portray 
his own deconstruction as being an abstracted observation (or one that is outside of the text) of 
Condillac’s work. His deconstruction is not to be construed as a methodologically justified 
“objective reading” of the text; rather, it is also a text that is yet another construction (of the 
text). Consistently, through repetition of a reflexive tone and strategy, Derrida’s account of 
Condillac’s philosophy makes apparent to the reader that they are reading a particular reading, 




Derrida, in accounting for the generative mechanisms at play in Condillac’s discourse, leads us 
to the point of an unaddressed question: “What is quantity of connection?” He unravels the text 
to its built-in presuppositions where, in this particular instance, Condillac’s discourse can be 
examined at the point of an oversight, specifically an inattention to what constitutes a concept’s 
formative processes within the generating of analogy or statement on experience. An 
inexplicable gap within reason occurs. This oversight takes place right at the point that 
Condillac’s discourse inscribes a system of connections between our perception and our 
articulation of it. For Derrida, this moment of inattention over the specificity concerning a 
connection’s quantitative value (within the formation of new analogues) invites his 
deconstructive strategy for identifying the seams or divisions within Condillac’s text. The text’s 
implicit limits on reason and method are thus seen to generate their own counter-movement.  
In the next section we will see that the very logic of the sign from which knowledge 
comes into being actually betrays both Condillac’s explanation for the emergence of the 
frivolous and, more importantly, the solid ground upon which Condillac premises the origin of 
human knowledge. Here though, we may note a parallel between Zielinski’s approach to media 
and Derrida’s deconstruction of Condillac. Zielinski deploys an anarchaeological approach to 
media that exposes media archaeology’s presumed discursive ground. Like Derrida’s probing of 
Condillac’s premise for the origin of knowledge Zielinski questions: what authorizes the archive 
as authority and then, in turn, gives authority to the archaeological method? “Technological 
conditions” are vague, insufficient and yet why are they given such authority? With that said, it 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Condillac’s discourse Derrida also reminds the reader that his own text and analytic are always 




should be clear, even though Zielinski questions what authorizes systems for knowledge 
production (even his own formulation of such questioning) he never presumes that there is no 
authority. Media anarchaeology is not the contradictory proposition of there being a non-
authoritative authority. This is quite important for how Zielinski conceives of anarchaeology. 
Although media archaeology must presume the anarchive as independent of the archive’s 
registry and rule Zielinski does not characterize the “anarchive” as a knowable domain, nor as 
the archive’s opposite. I will expand on how Zielinski keeps his terms so wide open in the next 
chapter. Further, as we shall see, parallel with how I entertain the formation of the laugh track 
Zielinski goes against all rationalist based premises for accounting for media. He concedes to a 
sense of puzzlement as the premise for exploring any medium’s rules.  
 
The Frivolous (im)proper 
 
[The man “of genius”] tries a new road. But as 
every style analogous to the character of the 
language, and to his own, hath been already used 
by preceding writers, he has nothing left but to 
deviate from analogy. Thus in order to be an 
original, he is obliged to contribute to the ruin of a 
language… The ease there is in copying their 
defects, soon persuades men of indifferent 
capacities, that they shall require the same degree 
of reputation. Then begins the reign of subtil and 
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strained conceits, of affected antitheses, of specious 
paradoxes, of frivolous turns, of far-fetched 
expressions, of new-fangled words, and in short of 
the jargon of persons whose understandings have 
been debauched by bad metaphysics. The public 
applauds: frivolous and ridiculous writings, the 
beings of the day, are surprisingly multiplied… – 
Étienne Bonnot de Condillac 206  
 
From this excerpt from part II, section I of Condillac’s An Essay on the Origin of Human 
Knowledge, Derrida declares that for Condillac, “the archeology of the frivolous is this deviation 
of genius.” Periodically straining to think outside of one’s nature, language and history, or rather, 
the archaeology proper to it, “the man of genius” attempts to devise original signs and forms of 
analysis. For Condillac, these forays represent retrograde departures that, in the end, have the 
unfortunate consequence of laying down fruitless tracks of inquiry that are then pursued by the 
“impressionable many.” Ideally, the man of genius deviates very little, if at all, from the already 
well-developed semiotic program – specifically of the carefully conceived analogs or sign-chains 
of meaning – that he inherits.207 At best, he generates new “turns of expression” that remain 
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 This is a quote extracted from a footnote in Derrida’s The Archeology of the Frivolous: 
Reading Condillac (p.68) that directly quotes Condillac’s Essay on the Origin of Human 
Knowledge: Being a Supplement to Mr. Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding. As the 
translation for Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge (Aarsleff, Hans trans.  Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), which is listed in my bibliography, differs from Derrida’s I instead 
opted to work by the translation of his text. 
207 The man of genius inherits it from the tradition of western philosophical empirical inquiry. 
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within the set trajectory or bounds of a particular analogical progression.208 For Condillac, the 
attempt at being original or giving origin to another form of analogy is simply a hubris-driven 
perversion of one’s language, one that may have destructive implications for the right path to 
knowledge, as it can only get stuck in a dead end. As such, “this deviation of genius” represents 
the trifling and inconsequential inquiry into a groundless new start – the studious pursuit of the 
origin, the arché, of what is of no use: “the archeology of the frivolous.”  
For identifying the originating moment of an “absolute impertinence” or frivolity itself, 
Derrida seeks out the mechanisms that must be at work within Condillac’s system of signs. We 
grasp that Condillac is not simply casting aspersions on those “fancy-tongued” elocutionists of 
his day. Instead there is a structural basis from which the deviancy is formed. Derrida writes, 
 
But under what conditions is frivolity possible? The form of this question 
lets itself be disintegrated simply by the very semblance of its object. 
Frivolity consists in being satisfied with tokens. It originates with the sign, 
or rather with the signifier which, no longer signifying, is no longer a 
signifier. The empty, void, friable, useless signifier…The sign is 
disposability: if through the imperceptions and the absence of the thing 
(time) the sign assures our ideal mastery, puts (as Condillac says) “at our 
disposal,” the sign – fragile and empty, frail and futile – can also, 
immediately, lose the idea, get lost far from the idea, this time, and not 
only from the thing, from sense and not only from the referent. 
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Consequently, the sign remains for nothing, an overabundance exchanged 
without saying anything, like a token, the excessive relief of a defect: 
neither merchandise nor money. This frivolity does not accidentally befall 
the sign. Frivolity is its congenital breach: its entame, archē, beginning, 
commandment, its putting in motion and in order – if at least, deviating 
from itself, frivolity, the sign’s disposability, can ever be or present itself. 
Since its structure of deviation prohibits frivolity from being or having an 
origin, frivolity defies all archeology, condemns it, we could say, to 
frivolity. (JD, 118-119) 
 
For Condillac, the “useless signifier,” that which is detached from the inherent progression of an 
analog, has lost the function of signifying. Nonetheless, by his thinking, the sign is that which is, 
in its very design as a sign, to be disposed of after use. What is important to grasp here is that 
built into the very structure of the sign is that it is both “useful” and “useless.” Thus, the sign’s 
detachment from an analog does not result from a sign having gone astray. Rather for Condillac, 
due to what inheres in the structure of the sign, it is actually the very possibility of a sign that a 
sign is not of use. That it may not have any bearing on things.
209
 This means that the “useless” is 
then a part of ‘the structure of the sign’ (or more functionally rendered – it is ‘the structure of 
disposability’). In contradiction to the character of the frivolous, the frivolous actually has a 
purpose. So despite his characterization of frivolous as utterly pointless in his Dictionnare des 
                                                          
209 The structure of the sign is analogous with what occurs with the “deviation of genius.” As 
such, we understand that the “deviation of genius” is not an action that is outside or independent 
to one’s nature, language or history. The deviation is possible because it is a structural feature of 
analogy. The “man of genius” after “every style analogous to the character of the language, and 
to his own, hath been already used,” or disposed of, can do nothing but deviate. 
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synonymes, Condillac tells us, the frivolous is the sign’s “congenital breach.” It is somehow 
generative. It is the birth of a lack, that creates the need for and by which the sign, as that which 
is itself disposability, occurs or has function (that it has use). However, although “the useless” is 
implicitly assigned a function in the sign’s capacity to order and have the powers of signifying 
(something), Condillac considers “the useless” to have no part in the purposeful process of 
signifying. Even so, we must take note that regardless of the whereabouts of the useless when a 
sign signifies, by Condillac’s own formulation, it is the sign’s very structure (the inherent and 
form-giving mechanism by which a sign can deviate from signifying) that makes the frivolous 
frivolous. In its lack, in its unquantifiable uselessness and impotence, the frivolous’ potency (its 
significance with respect to giving form and origin in the structuring of the sign) has to always 
be nominally factored as being “the useful’s” counterpart, as being useless no less.  
Derrida, through his reading of Condillac, traces the frivolous to being a self-
contradicting function of the signifier. He tells us that the frivolous is somehow, in its 
uselessness, of a sign that comes to signify nothing. And that placed outside of, but relative to the 
useful, the frivolous is both by definition useless and, in that it is of the sign, structurally 
purposeful (admittedly indeterminately and contradictorily).210 It is in this sense that I have been 
exploring the laugh track system of production. As archival formation the laugh track is 
constituted as a conundrum. Laughter is made purposeful by making useless its being purposeful.  
To simulate the immediacy of laughter, through the very referencing mechanisms for archiving 
it, the laugh track makes an artefact of laughter. Which means: to be presented as laughter, 
                                                          
210  Here, looking for use in all this: Derrida’s deconstructive analysis is highly instructive for 
reminding us that our philosophical constructions, regardless of their rigor and logicality (and too 
as with mediatic formations), are not tidy affairs. Rather, they are often entanglements for 




laughter must then already be spent. Within the system of the laugh track’s functioning laughter 
is thereby already put in reserve. Which, in preceding chapters, I have argued follows from the 
repetitive formation for its reproducing what it already is. More to the point, with respect to 
Condillac’s contradictory account of the sign, within the laugh track system, laughter is 
instrumentalized as useless. Here, laughter in being a tool is what’s paradoxical. It is uselessness 
in reserve. More specifically, it is a uselessness of a potential use. Its repeated functioning must 














Chapter Fourteen: The Un-category of the 
Frivolous (dubious title) 
In the preceding thirteen pages I explored an instance in which uselessness is integral to a 
philoshophical system of knowledge.  As Jacques Derrida accounts for, uselessness is 
paradoxically central in the originating formation of Étienne Bonnot de Condillac’s linguistic 
empiricism. Accordingly, my idea was to examine both uselessness’ relation to what is thought 
to be useful and to arrive at some understanding of what uselessness might be. For the former, it 
is unclear that there is a relationship. As to the latter, we are held in check by its contradictory 
character. Uselessness is implied by Condillac to be an empty signifier – it is without 
clarification or epistemological verificatory means and yet designates what is entirely without 
purpose. However, as empty and without purpose, uselessness is a useful signifer. It has the 
use211 of pointing to “itself” or a supposed category of the useless as being “useless.” So, 
although marked off and against the “useful,” the frivolous is paradoxically never entirely 
frivolous. Apart from contradictions or contaminated logic, Derrida also gets us to grapple with 
the archeological mechanism by which Condillac formulates the embryonic stages of his 
linguistic empiricism. Prior to any possibility of cross-pollination, at the origin of the sign, in its 
structural making and germination to follow, Condillac institutes the friable as necessary for 
there to be any “sign.” 212 For Derrida’s Condillac, “uselessness” is integral to the formative 
processes of our linguistic constructions. Whether or not Condillac would agree with Derrida’s 
account is not the concern. Rather what is important, beyond the confines of a linguistic system 
and for what may be extended to an analysis of media formations, is that “uselessness” is given 
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 Constatively and performatively. 
212
 I emphasize, the sign (within the system of signs) is inherently of use and signifies that 
something is or may be of use. 
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non-binaric play. Regardless of being a mistake within one’s logic, uselessness is part and parcel 
of the useful and visa versa. Here, the intuition for media being contained and having identifiable 
system operations is pulled at in every direction. We are thus challenged by the extra-ordinary 
possibility of exploring usefulness beyond the typically use-regulated bounds of a medium’s 
designed purpose. In effect, what’s considered useful may, in less positivist terms, be recast 
within an expanded economy that it is not limited to a medium’s utility.   
In this chapter I examine the implications of merging usefulness and uselessness for the 
laugh track as archival formation. Specifically, I focus on how the system’s reserve itself may be 
constituted. I hereby extend my analysis to now explore how it is a quantificatory regime and, at 
the same time, deviates from such. Still, consistent with my analysis so far that the laugh track 
media formation is a system that paradoxically reserves or archivates, its being a quantificatory 
mechanism is not a totalizing account. Here, Zielinski’s anarchaeology is prescient. Zielinski 
disrupts the media archaeologist’s discursive circuitry that ensures what’s seen and said will be 
productive in describing media formations. But as I stated in Chapter Twelve, his media 
anarchaeology is not a counter-formation to media archaeology. It is not inversely conceived 
relative to the strictures of memory nor the generativity of systems. That is, Zielinski does not 
simply pursue “the forgotten” over “the remembered” nor “the abandoned” instead of “the 
maintained.” Zielinski’s anarchaeology is not antagonistic to archaeology so much as it 
represents an attempt to expand an understanding of media beyond the percieved limits or base 
coordinates of quantificatory systems. Instead his approach activates an anarchegenesis or 
radical substraction (an indeterminate mathematics) in the make-up of the archive. Certainly, 
within the archive one may suspect trace formations of what is absent or omitted from the 
archive. However, Zielinski’s subtraction is not only a reference to what is missing or excluded 
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from the archive, rather it is about what eludes the archive. Thus, as with uselessness, we blindly 
pursue what might never be known nor be a thing of discourse and disclosure.  
 




... the presence of these blank years in the annalist’s 
account permits us to perceive, by way of contrast, 
the extent to which narrative strains to produce the 
effect of having filled in all the gaps, to put an 
image of continuity, coherency, and meaning in 
place of the fantasies of emptiness, need, and 
frustrated desire that inhabit our nightmares about 
the destructive power of time. In fact, the annalist’s 
account calls up a world in which need is 
everywhere present, in which scarcity is the rule of 
existence, and in which all of the possible agencies 
of satisfaction are lacking, absent, or exist under 
imminent threat of death. (Hayden White, “The 





As we have seen in previous chapters, having learned from Hayden White, Wolfgang 
Ernst prompts us to be aware of both the general idea of there being different temporal realities 
and, more specifically, the specialized archival mechanisms for mediating the perceptions that 
are set within those realities. He gives the archive pre-eminent powers in guiding our 
understanding of what comes to surface as discourse and media (even as their own form of 
archivation).  Accordingly,  although White makes the point that the annalist’s “blank years” 
may indicate “the fantasies of emptiness, need, and frustrated desire that inhabit our nightmares 
about the destructive power of time,” Ernst, as we have seen, limits his reading of White’s 
sample of annals as contained, complete, and merely as illustrative of a numeric inventory 
process. – Ernst makes much of the so-called “blank years” not being quite blank. Precisely, 
these entries are not simply just a non-meaningful void.
213
 The system registry is a marking that 
permits a non-entry corresponding to a number and its system of ordering. The entries reveal a 
perception of time oriented by numerical succession. In short, for Ernst, there is much order and 
rule in the annalist’s blank or content-less entry. However, in Ernst’s media archaeology we have 
no sense of “fantasy,” or at least, nothing of the non-recorded variety – of time wasted or 
squandered, in short without purpose. Instead, according to his approach to media archaeology, 
these kinds of archives are complete. Simply, the annalist’s “the blank years” is an entry 
authorized by other systems or systems in the making. It is a form of code and encryption that 
circulates the procedural traits of a technologized or mechanical design authorizing a subsequent 
seen and said. But one may ask: why would “the blank years” only register a system’s capacity 
or incapacity for expression? Perhaps, and I speculate that Zielinski might contend, “the blank 
years” are not so ordered by conventional mechanisms. Rather, in White’s examples, code and 
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 It is uncertain what just being blank might mean. Here, in its emptiest conception, “blank” 
might be the mark of no mark. 
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encryption may be less about communication and more about secretive practices, personal 
fantasy, etc. In effect, there is the possibility that, by other lesser-known or unknown terms, 
communication is being ex-communicated from these anonymous entries. So even if “the blank 
years” are telling of a medieval machinery for expression, we need consider that the blanks may 
then archive or be another kind of archive made of inaccessible, perhaps indecipherable 
processes. Likewise, Zielinski’s variantology is designed to bring focus to these extra-archival 
possibilities.  
In the coming section, we shall work through the potential for discovery that variantology 
may lead towards. For certain, we are not led to conclusive and definite findings that reinforce a 
theorized governing technological paradigm. If anything what we learn is that a technological 
invention reflects what eludes control and use, including the inventive process itself. 
Accordingly, we are thus prompted to broaden our understanding of the mechanics of the laugh 
track archive. Although I have accounted for the laugh track as an auto-generative formation the 
laugh track archive cannot be abstracted from its distinct history and specifically its form of 
preservation. It is not only a proliferating storage system of mechanical assemblage. That is, the 
laugh track would not be the reserve it is, it would not preserve as it does, were it not for Charley 
Douglass’ fanatical secrecy. Apart from playing up its mystique as a system of illusion the Laff 
Box was deemed the official mechanism that consigned laughter to institutionalized confines. In 
one sense, the Laff Box helped to systematically re-inscribe the value of “spontaneous” visceral 
response for the broadcast experience. In a more significant sense however, the Laff Box, 
beyond a preservationist rationale for aiding memory and access to past tracks, kept containment 
and control of laughs as technically readied for communication. As system of calculation and 
accrual, the Laff Box thwarted potential ill-timed, ill-toned, inappropriate excessive vocalizing. 
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The Laff Box tamed laughter. It was order in a box. Against the threat of perceived unruly 
audience effusion – presumably an incommunicable anarchivo-LaffBox, 214 the Laff Box offered 
predictability and direction to the broadcast experience.   
 
Flights of the Un-Ergonomic  
As already outlined in Chaper Twelve, Zielinski’s media (an)archaeology practices a 
cross-disciplinal
215
 approach he calls “variantology.”216 In a nutshell, variantology permits 
approaching media in ways that diverge from the singular authoritative vision that conceives of 
media as platforms of communication or communicable technological formations. Processes of 
invention are in some way or another influenced by an array of interests, practices and concepts 
that are not necessarily connected to overarching physical, mechanical and electronic principles 
of (a medium’s) engineering. Archaeologies of media need not be restricted by material findings, 
or at least what is archived as “researchable material.” Thus Zielinski  asks us to venture into the 
murky realm of invention that, apart from being guided by mathematics and machinic operations, 
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 I borrow the notion anarchive from Jacques Derrida’s psychoanalytic reading of the archive in 
his text Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression. The notion relies on Sigmund Freud’s 
formulation of how thanotos or the death drive as component of our psychic economy, manifest 
in an individual's dangerous desire for aggression, gets tamed, gets civilized. For my purposes, 
the anarchic and anarchival represent violent forces which in some form or another lead to chaos 
and loss that the archives, in the ordering and giving of foundation to our public and private 
affairs, are designed to violently frame out.   
215 Effectively, disciplinal violence. 
216
 This is in no way to wrestle authorship from the machine. Rather it opposes tidy formulations 
of media as being predicated on a mathematical-cum-mechanistic conception of “the 
technological.” For Zielinski, media inventions (successful or ‘dead in the water’, it really 
doesn’t matter) involve processes that may not be documented, scripted or encoded in any form 
that is sayable, “thinkable” (as prescribed process) and readable.  
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Zielinski’s form of archaeology pursues the implicit aspects of “the seen and said.” His 
findings are oriented  by the merely possible and indicate what might have been. For instance, 
the very form of fantasy for which White’s annalist’s numbing enumeration records. 
Accordingly, Zielinski aspires to understand media formations as inventions that are discrete to 
the point of unknowability. They may have nothing to do with mediating. Rather their formation 
does not show or tell. In effect, Zielinski’s media anarchaeology entertains the possibility of 
media, of whatever kind, being incommunicable and secretive. 
 
One may question if Zielinski is merely inverting Ernst’s account of media archaeology. 
As a response, Agamben’s idea of gesture may hold the key to understanding how Zielinski 
treats incommunicability and the possibilities of “the secret.” Agamben’s account of gesture 
articulates the experience most proper to our poetic dwelling in language. It brings attention to 
the lesser-determined, inconclusive, perhaps un-co-optable and fleeting moments that constitute 
our practices. Gesture eludes calculability and points to aspects of our experience that exhibit an 
indeterminate play of life-forces. Thereby, Agamben declares gesture to be a moment in our 
experience that is uncontaminated,   
Gesture is the name of this intersection between life and art, act and 
power, general and particular, text and execution. It is a moment of life 
subtracted from the context of individual biography as well as a moment 
of art subtracted from the neutrality of aesthetics: it is pure praxis. The 
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 Recall Heidegger (Essay Concerning Technology) who was not referring to poetry but the poetic.   
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gesture is neither use value nor exchange value, neither biographic 
experience nor impersonal event: it is the other side of the commodity that 
lets the “crystals of this common social substance” sink into the situation. 
(Giorgio Agamben, Means Without Ends: Notes on Politics , 80)  
 
In this instance, gesture slips the fetters of capitalist instrumentality and sidesteps being rendered 
a use-function within modern art practice.  Instead, by the “crystals of this common social 
substance,” gesture materializes the traits of our linguistic being so-glimpsed within an un-
mediated thrown-ness of unscripted play. Considered more broadly, gesture, always as its very 
own uniquely affective poetic flash, both haunts and breaks the knowable and narrativized space 
of all human practice. Thus, as with Agamben’s notion of pure means, Zielinski’s (pure) secrets 
of media may never be knowable or of any use. Media may thus then be liberated from the media 
theorist’s often assumed programmatic of instrumentalization. That is, media formations, and 
how they are made secret may forever go undetected, unseen and unsaid. In this respect, “the 
pure secret” occurs within an unknowable economy of inheritence. We may have something, but 
we just cannot know.  
 
Here Zielinski’s media anarchaeology prompts thinking about what secrets the laugh 
track archival system might hold. Boiling things down, we may say that the laugh track’s 
potential is always delayed time (the immediacy of laughter is re-stored/held as a calculus). It 
represents, and discretely re-presents as artefact, the potential of the immediate. However, as 
quantifiable repetitive form the laugh track also unavoidably guts laughter of its guts, its 
potency. Accordingly, this moment of gutting and cutting (the timing element of mechanisms of 
assemblage) is not just a productive act of the editor. Assemblage and editing also represents 
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what is severed from production. These actions represent the irrevocable delayed force of 
laughter. In step with Zielinski’s analysis I would thus argue that this eviscerated laughter is a 
secreted element within an invention. It is the anarchive of and within the laugh track archive. 
That is, the void and uselessness that is and of the laugh track archive is a laugh that can never be 
quantified. To wit, this other laugh of the laugh track is a hidden registry that eludes the gaze of 
the media archaeologist. It cannot be measured as a frequency and as having a tempulated pulse.   
 
Effectively, Zielinski’s media anarchaeology allows for invention to defy registerable and 
retrievable materio-technological formation. Within any system of invention there is the 
possibility of incalculable otherness and uselessness integral to the useful, calculable and 
known.218 Accordingly, for so many instances of inventions219 Zielinski permits glimpsing 
poeticization within the encrypted. Thus we may explore an inventor’s various arcane systems 
more as open-ended artistic inventions than productive quantificatory mechanisms. Sure, they 
are systems, and likely would have emerged within broader applied media for message-making.  
However, as I have been arguing for the laugh track and various other media, inventions do not 
simply aspire to the idealized transparent terms of mathematics or universal systems of 
communication. Rather, media formations may be approached as having their own equations and 
communication systems, destined to conceal or render secret.   
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 Thus, Zielinski resists the form and force of the discursive regimen of media archaeology. He 
sees past the potent technodeterminist interpretations of Martin Heidegger and Claude Shannon 
that organizes Kittler’s analysis and greatly influences Ernst. In kind, Zielinski reminds us of the 
play inherent in both Shannon’s love of puzzle-making and puzzle-solving and of Heidegger’s 
recasting of techne within the incalulable existentiel to and fro of concealing and revealing. 
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By exploring a media formation’s temporal discreteness in terms of what the archive does 
not and cannot contain, Zielinski’s variantology inspires new discourses on media that both 
grasps media and puts media at risk of un-predictably being re-invented or re-mediated. 
Variantology, though a strategic approach to discourse, is also to be reckoned with as a peculiar 
form of mediation. Accordingly, I speculate that Zielinski’s conception of variantology is its own 
secreted formulation. I volley this because, on one hand, he conceives variantology much like an 
un-writable rule.220 While on another hand, he advances it as a rule that is necessary for the 
broader discipline of media archaeology. Perhaps one may conclude, Zielinski’s formulation of 
variantology eludes rule and remains in the dark. – Just like a secret, it has never been 
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 By which Foucault gets us to consider the being and becoming of the archive. 
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 Fig. 3 
Appendix: Licenses, Litter, Loops, Laughs, Lineages – 
a proverbial archive of the proverbial Laff Box 
 
Herein, I present an archived packaging of the history of the laugh track, and in particular 
Charley Douglass’ Laff Box. By the strictures of enumerative, descriptive, infrastructural 
showing of a medium’s formation I re-assemble the Archive of American Television’s (A.A.T.) 
archived discussion between interviewer Karen Herman and laugh track audio effects engineer 
Carroll Pratt (in his Archive of American Television interview). This institutionally mediated 
archivation of an historical account of the laugh track is structured as a Laff Box designed as its 
own archive. Yes, an archive of an archive. Here, my idea is to put into play Ernst’s reflexive 
methodology such that the discourse of media archaeology is implicated in the temporal 
configuration of the laugh track. Simulating the mechanical workings of the Laff Box, the 
appendix’s parts, as if tracks of audio (taken from the interview), are organized, numerically. In 
parallel to the array of recorded tracks to be accessed by the Laff Box, each track contains the 




 Fig. 4 
Descriptive Summary 
Karen Herman conducted the interview with Carroll Pratt in Philo, CA on June 12, 2003. 
Title:  Carol Pratt, Sound Effects Engineer 
Date (inclusive): June 12, 2003 
Collection number:  
Creator: Pratt, Carrol, 1921-2010 
Extent: 6 part, two-and-a-half hour interview 
Abstract: Carroll Pratt talks about his start in feature films at MGM in the sound department. He 
speaks in great detail about the audience reaction (laugh) machine created by engineer Charley 
Douglass, for whom Pratt worked after leaving MGM. Pratt describes the device and the types of 
responses that the machine was capable of doing, from whistles to belly laughs. Pratt describes 
the updated version of the laugh machine, which he created with his brother John in the 1970s, 
when he split from Douglass, and started his own company called Sound One. Pratt talks about 
creating laugh tracks for numerous television series throughout the years (including the longest 
laugh he ever recorded, The Mary Tyler Moore Show), until his retirement from Sound One in 
the mid-'90’s. Language: Finding aid is written in English. 
Repository: Television Academy Foundation’s Archive of American Television, Television 





Physical location: http://www.emmytvlegends.org/interviews/people/carroll-pratt  
Administrative Information: 
 
Restrictions on Access and Reproduction: 
Complete transcripts of most Archive interviews are available for a fee, for research purposes 
only. Our transcripts have copyright and may be quoted from, with permission. 
 
Biography: 
Carroll Pratt was born in Hollywood, California in April 19, 1921. After serving in the US air-
force during the 2
nd
 World War he began working as a sound engineer for MGM studios. At 
MGM Pratt met Charley Douglass, inventor of the analogue tape Laff Box and eventually went 
to work for him at Douglass’ company Northridge Electronics. There Pratt worked on several 
TV shows such as Leave it to Beaver (CBS, 1957–58; ABC, 1958–63), Dennis the Menace (CBS, 
1959–63). Pratt and his brother John while working on shows also helped Douglass build and 
rebuild equipment. Carroll and John left Northridge Electronics in 1977 forming their own 
computerized audience response effects company Sound One. Pratt retired from managing 
Sound One in 1989. He continued to consult with other editors on shows until 1995. At age 89, 
on November 11, 2010 in Santa Rosa, California Pratt died of natural causes. 
Subjects: 
Carroll Pratt, 1921- 2010 
 
Genres and Forms of Material: 
People 




Track  Fig. 5  
Time: Part 1 of 6 parts. 25 minutes, 28 seconds to 25:39 
Sayable  
Herman: What exactly is a laugh machine?  
Pratt: What is the laugh machine?! Whoa, ahh, can we just now and then call it the “audience 








Track Time: P1. 23:06 – 23:48 
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 No doubt a possible precursor to the household hands-free product “The Clapper.” It 






Herman: How did you meet Charley Douglass? 
 
Pratt: I was working at MGM on  several shows ... immense box and it was heavy ... all the re-
recording rooms were upstairs ... I felt so sorry and they were terrible stairs too ... when it was 






Track Time: P1. 25:08 – 25:19 
Sayable  
Herman: What was his [Charley Douglass] background in terms of the technology? 
 
Pratt: He was a mechanical engineer who was called during the war (World War II) went into the 
navy was called back to Washington to help develop the radar system.  
Description 
- The object of radar 222 is to overcome unwanted signals (defined as signal to noise ratio 
(SNR)) permitting a military faction (air, land or sea) to focus only on the targets of 
interest or attack.  
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 In certain respects, Douglass invented a responsive mechanism akin to a radar detection 
device for locating and isolating laughter (making it a predictable response that live audiences 
were not able to generate) and thereby ensuring the precisionism of a verisimilitudinous 




Track Time: P1. 25:50 – 27:35 
Sayable  
 
Pratt: He was working at CBS as a technical director ... There had to be someone bridging those 
cuts ... He developed primarily a big wooden wheel with a piece of quarter inch tape glued to the 
outside of it it’s about a 328 diameter inch wheel. He glued this tape on that had the recording of 
laughs of certain sizes and I I believe and this was before my time but I believe it was sort of a 
medium laugh tape and the wheel would have a key that every time the key was pushed it would 
go onto one more detent on the wheel so that you got a complete laugh and you’d be ready for 




Track Time: P1. 27:40 – 28:22 
Sayable  
 
Pratt: Then he built an expansion of that which and it was then a series of magnetic tapes that 
went across the board from chuckles to belly-laughs to applause to whistles and cheers ... 






-   The “Laff Box,”223 invented by CBS sound engineer Charley Douglass, was 
approximately 10 times the size of the squat 6-buttoned box console Jayo Laugher.
224
 The 
LaffBox’s cabinetry, when its doors are open, reveals an elongated typewriter comprised 
of 32 keys along with an organ-like foot-pedal that are connected (through a system of 
interchangeable spools activated by (key triggered) rod and pulley) up to lengths of 
audiotape which retained over 320 pre-recorded laughs (10 separate laughs on each of the 
32 tape-loops). The individuated laughs, with tape locations quickly sourced by aid from 
an accompanying written registry of descriptions, provided the Laff Box 
player/technician with what ostensibly was an infinite number of combinations for 
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 In the history of popular(ized) mechanical and electronic devices “box” serves as a curious 
expression and marketing designate. – Both as ordinary object and as a container for concealing 
a machine’s (mysterious) operations. To note a few: jukebox, music box, black box, jack-in-the-
box, x box and the slang referent for TV, idiot box. 
224
 Oppenheimer was also an inventor. He held several patents covering a variety of devices, 
notably including the in-the-lens “teleprompter.” 
225
 Much of my description of Charley Douglass’ Laff Box is borrowed from Rose Kohn 












Track Part 2. 02:40-03:20  
Sayable 
Herman: Now, how were those things (laughs) cued for you? 
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Pratt: Of course, ours were cued by a keyboard ... Originally, we took the platens out of an old 
Royal typewriter
226
 to make each one of the boards and strung them across so that they were in 





                                                          
226 Connecting the moving-image to the typewriter in the history of films, Kittler in 
Gramophone, Film, Typewriter  observes,  
To the poetic intellect, the unassuming media link of silent film and typewriter, 
image flow and intertitles, was nothing short of desecration. In order to save the 
Soul of the Film, Bloem decreed: “Emotion does not reside in the titles; it is not to 
be spoken, it is to be embodied mimic ally. Yet there are directors who do not shy 
away from blaring out ‘I love you’ (the most fiery and tender possibility of this 
art) in a title.” (p.180)  
 
Further, Kittler writes, 
 
The typewriter became a discursive machine-gun. A technology whose basic 
action not coincidentally consists of strikes and triggers proceeds in automated 
and discrete steps, as does ammunitions transport in a revolver and a machine-




To locate the archive Laff Box media-archaeologically does not necessarily mean to find it or 
supports for it within the reserve of an archive proper. Samples of the laugh track, whether just 
as laugh track or as track electromagnetically married to other studio recorded programs and 
documents pertaining to contracts and discussion are there. More so, our digging into the Laff 
Box as media, as with Kittler’s thinking on the kinds of mechanisms (from military to poetic) 
informing the history of the typewriter, gets us to question regimes of classification. (We may 
explore the mechanisms of other classification and category, not simply sound recording 
technology, by looking at other similar mechanisms vis a vis carnival toys and casino games 
(slots), vending machines, even the jukebox. The slot and juke possess the similar mechanical 
routine as the Laff Box in their mechanical alignment/configuration of moving parts. Further, the 
jukebox stands as an archive. However, it does not make one, it is not auto-generative.). 
Disclaimer alert! Incidentally, the Laff Box’ history is not its own history. (Of course this might 
be said of any media). The Laff Box occurs with, by and within other proximate histories that are 
also their own form of make-believe instituted by a pragmatic-minded industry of illusion, of 




Track P2. 05:02 – 06:39 
Sayable 
Herman: So how did you know which sounds to use? Were you told or did you look at the film 
and decide? 
Pratt: There many rehearsal for getting these things done ... they got to know you knew business 
they micro-managed less, less and less ... I started cueing myself with a little laugh inwardly. 
That would sort come out as a sort of a choke laugh ...You have to lead the joke from the time 
the brain gets the finger to push the button and the button gets the tape to go you had to 







Track P2. 08:39 – 09:30 
Sayable 
Pratt: There are two kinds of comedy shows on television. One is in front of an audience. Which 
is a multi-camera show ... everything is done in one pass. The whole show is performed like a 
stage show, in that case you’re more or less governed by the audience you listen to ... In the case 
of single-camera shows which are shot motion picture style, that are shot without an audience 
and there were multiples of those you had to create an entire audience. 
                                                          
227  With respect to Pratt’s laughter as an instinctive appropriate response we note that the 
mechanization of laughter has taken on new forms in which language scientists, through 
computerized phonetic transcription programs (of laughter), attempt to precisely transcribe the 








Track  P2. 11:20 – 11:50  
Sayable 
Pratt: M*A*S*H ... in the operating room for example, you would tone way back. You would 
play it in just in the chuckling area ... At least one show a season or a couple season they had two 






Track   P2. 12:24 -13:15  
Sayable 
Herman: Let’s go back to those early years of the audience response machine. Talk a little bit 
more about Charley Douglass. 
Pratt: I told you more or less about the history and development of the machine ... Charley was 
my mentor, my hero and a very kind man and he uh he developed the style ... The first two years 
he spent sort of putting me onto, remember we used to have integrated commercials on shows 
actually the actors many times would do the commercials on the shows and so he’d put me on 







Track P2. 16:30 - 16:48 
Sayable 
Herman: Did you ever have to sign a kind of confidentiality agreement saying you wouldn’t 
divulge that you were using them [laugh tracks]? 
Pratt: No. I can’t ever remember being asked to do that. But uh I didn’t go around crowing on 





Track P2. 16:47 – 17:54 
 
Herman: What about TV critics did they point out when they [laugh machines] were being used? 
Pratt: Most of the media people that came and sat in on and saw what was being done realized 
the necessity if now that the American public was sort of indoctrinated in laughter ... that you 
couldn’t cut them off ... Most of the media people that came in or interviewed us or sat in wrote 








Track   P2. 19:06 - 20:23 
 
Sayable 
Herman: What do you think of the purpose of the laugh machine? 
Pratt: Back in the Dennis the Menace days ... Quite a few houses in Hollywood especially ... 
When a show was finished ... They would run it before an audience with some kind of audience 
reaction device ... The bad show with the laugh track took head and shoulders over the good 
show that didn’t have one. So I thought well maybe the people that are watching like the feeling 




                                                          
228 Commenting on the social nature of laughter Ambrose Bierce, in his satirical The Devil’s 
Dictionary, defines laughter as, 
Laughter n. An interior convulsion, producing a distortion of the features and 
accompanied by inarticulate noises. It is infectious and, though intermittent, 
incurable. Liability to attacks of laughter is one of the characteristics 
distinguishing man from the animals — these being not only inaccessible to the 
provocation of his example, but impregnable to the microbes having original 
jurisdiction in bestowal of the disease. Whether laughter could be imparted to 
animals by inoculation from the human patient is a question that has not been 
answered by experimentation. Dr. Meir Witchell holds that the infectious 
character of laughter is due to the instantaneous fermentation of sputa diffused in 
a spray. From this peculiarity he names the disorder Convulsio spargens. 
http://www.thedevilsdictionary.com/?l=#!) 
We also recall Bergson’s account that laughter thus serves as a counter-regulating mechanism for 
ensuring a semblance of the human and thereby relieving an anxiety that may come to threaten 
the certitude of unification and authority necessary for the functioning of a society. Responding 
to Bergson’s general declaration that for “understanding laughter” “it must have a social 
signification” the young Georges Bataille, grapples with both the objectifying of laughter as that 
which is an event externally determined to the experience of the one that laughs and how in all 
seriousness or lack thereof laughter “must not” be a rational construct, and ascribed a social 
signification.   
The strangest mystery to be found in laughter is attached to the fact that 
we rejoice in something that puts the equilibrium of life in danger 
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(Georges Bataille, “Nonknowledge, Laughter, and Tears,” Unfinished 
System, 144)  
As breach from seriousness and order its affectiveness is inexplicably inaffectual. Laughter, at 
once, is felt and dissolves the very source and ground of its being felt. A feeling that empties as it 
feels fulfilling. As Jacques Derrida in addressing Jean Paul Sartre’s misread of Bataille puts it: 
“Laughter is not the negative [of a Hegelian system] because its burst does not maintain itself, is 
neither linked up to itself nor summarized in a discourse: laughs at the Aufhebung” (p.463, WD, 
Derrida). Bataille addresses Bergson’s giving “isness” as place and design of force to laughter as 
having  a purpose within the frame of the social by questioning from where it emanates  and 
shifting the focus to what laughter does. We see Bataille very much borrows from Friedrich 
Nietzsche,  
 
Epilogue.  But as I finally slowly, slowly paint this gloomy question mark and am 
still willing to remind my readers of the virtues of reading in the right way – oh, 
what forgotten and unknown virtues they are! – it strikes me that I hear all around 
myself most malicious, cheerful, and hobgoblin-like laughter: the spirits of my 
book are themselves descending upon me, pulling my ears and calling me to 
order. ‘We can’t stand it anymore,’ they shout; ‘stop, stop this raven-black 
music!’ (FN, 247) 
 
 
In a play on announcing the materio-textual closure of his book The Gay Science with, if 
we are to take laughter seriously, the hopeful possibility of being read in other yet-to-be 
determined ways Nietzsche invokes the auditory beckoning by a particular realm of the spectral. 
The invisible and haunting forces of the text gather to, through a mixture of laughter, sharply 
command a rendering of his process of inquiry as final, as identifiable as its own self-contained 
print-production. The time is up for this brand of perspectivist analyticity imbued with moro-
philosophical reflexive manoeuvring and literary hijinx. Just a few sentences after setting the 
ghosts’(apparitions’) immortalization in print, Nietzsche, in obeyance with their carping laughs, 
brings The Gay Science to its end.  
 
At first blush, Nietzsche’s spectralizing of an editorial presence represents an instance in 
which the source of the editing consortium’s grievance, in the form of varied laughter, emanates 
from outside the body (yes, in the body of the text no less) and in relation to, as direct 
commentary on, the productive apparatus of which it is a part. Laughter of a particular kind – a 
textualized kind, though by a certain disciplinal inclination may be characterized as poetic 
device, portends a pragmatic resolution to make the text graphically concrete. In one sense, the 
menacing chortles signal the text as a world unto its own. Not simply an involuntary giggle but 
well independent of its “author” this passage, among others, is acted on and influenced by other 
forces so inhabiting, driving and generating the logic(s) and language that permits a specific 
text’s or type of book’s construction.  And, in another sense, the laughs, as editorial collective 
clamp-down on its wayward author, also sound the final buzzer on a commitment to print – to be 
submitted as material offering to its destined readers (of whom Nietzsche hopes are 
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extraordinarily adroit in the art of reading). Again from the Gay Science, but this time from the 
entry that actually heads Nietzsche’s text. 
This house is my own and here I dwell, I’ve never aped nothing from no one and 
– laugh at each master, mark me well, who at himself has not poked fun. Over my 
front door. (FN, un-paginated) 
Largely governed by the spirits of light feet, joyous song, playful mockery, comic forces and 
unbridled laughter the text itself as if mechanism of a philosophical production and industry, the 
canon as it were, plays host to running gags dressed in the seriousness of longstanding hard-
earned propositions regarding human experience, systems of belief and of understanding. The 
spirits governing the Gay Science cued by each proposition and discursive order permitting its 
logic expose the reader not to the makings of an alternative critique but to experiencing our 
world anew or at least at a distance from certain authorities. After several pages of jokes, quips 
and poetic phrasings in the opening section or prelude to Book One of  The Gay Science 
Nietzsche, as if reading history as a screenplay, a theatre script no less, introduces the figure of 
laughter as antedote, a break from and a breaking of a litany of delimiting valuations concerning 
the “purpose of man’s existence.”  The text reads: 
Foolish and fanciful as his inventions and valuations may be, badly as he may 
misjudge the course of nature and deny its conditions – and all ethical systems 
hitherto have been so foolish and contrary to nature that humanity would have 
perished from every one had it gained power over humanity – all the same! Every 
time ‘the hero’ appeared on stage, something new was attained: the gruesome 
counterpart of laughter, that profound shock that many individuals feel at the 
thought: ‘Yes, living is worth it! Yes, I am worthy of living!” Life and I and you 
and all of us became interesting to ourselves once again for a while. There is no 
denying that in the long run each of these great teachers of a purpose was 
vanquished by laughter, reason and nature: the brief tragedy always changed and 
returned into the eternal comedy of existence, and the ‘waves of uncountable 
laughter’ – to cite Aeschylus – must in the end also come crashing down on the 
greatest of these tragedians. Despite all this corrective laughter, human nature on 
the whole has surely been altered by the recurring emergence of such teachers of 
the purpose of existence – it has acquired one additional need, the need for the 
repeated appearance of such teachers and such teachings of a ‘purpose’. (FN, 28-
29) 
Routinely, for breaking the authority of rationalist understanding and moral responsibility with 
laughter, or of what many famous thinkers actively excluded as a dead-end, Nietzsche makes 
caricature of the western logos respecting philosopher. Notably, Immanuel Kant had asserted: 
“Laughter is an affection arising from the sudden transformation of a strained expectation into 
nothing.” (Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgement 1911 [1790], First Part, sec. 54, James Creed 
Meredith (tr.), Oxford: Clarendon Press. Further this conception of laughter as a radical 
incongruency plays first fiddle in a theory of humor and laughter for philosophers such as Beattie 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
Science activates laughter as if it were an undetectable force haunting the positivism of 
enlightenment rationalism and empiricist thinking. As if, being mediated by his newly purchased 
Malling Hansen typewriter (as Friedrich Kittler has us attend to Nietzsche’s musings on our 
techno-material conditions or more specifically with his offerings (perhaps those of The Gay 
Science)), “our writing tools are also working on our thoughts.” (We must be clear Nietzsche 
was not advancing techno-determinism but bringing to the fore with this observation that 
machines among other things may be determining in some fashion how it is we may compose 
our thoughts. Further this was an observation made prior to the publication of The Gay Science.). 
Instead of, as Kant would have it, a mere by-product of reason leading nowhere Nietzsche gets 
us to consider laughter as preceding perhaps, at the risk of proposing an absurdist physiological 
inversion, as somehow actively determining or giving presence and order to the ever-so-serious 
measurings of a system. (Perhaps as repetitive, in kind, as ordinary factory machines.). 
 Systemically, almost making sport of the repetitive structurings of our cosmological theatre,  
The Gay Science, through giving a prominent but varying role to the typically marginalized 
fleeting “incongruent” feelings of laughter (as there are many kinds of laughter), cracks open 
epistemological investments and the unquestioned discursive or perspectival order by which they 
thrive. Laughter, for Nietzsche, represents the playful unruly forces – that feared abyss – against 
and ironically by which such serious-minded constructs and systems are organized. (This is how 
Nietzsche, I suspect, very much invigorates a young George Bataille's opposition to Henri 
Bergson's mechanistic social sanctioning explanation for laughter. Conversely, Bataille 
conceives of laughter as sovereign to the human understanding so-constrained within prejudices 
of constructs of morality and systems of beliefs and of thinking in general.). For prefiguring a 
discourse on the laugh track, that takes it up in terms of how it may be a techno-archival media 
formation (rather than proscribed by a rationale for it being a media), the unruly laughter of and 
by which Nietzsche writes – in a sense as performs as divergent perspectives – gives cue to how 
to explore the laugh track as possible archive(s) of uselessness (not to be confused with 
meaninglessness).  
 
At one time a figure marginalized with respect to the philosophical canon, Nietzsche has since 
become often declared, as its founding father, a trope or nom propre of the post-modern, not to 
mention as, cheekily declared by Kittler, “the first media theorist.” (See Kittler, Gramophone, 
Film, Typewriter (p. 79) commenting on a passage on poetry in The Gay Science.). At the grave 
risk of further reinforcing this trope and media archaeological lore (Here another trope, no less as 
“Marshall McNietzsche,” intact as the key find of an archaeological dig. It appears for Kittler 
McNietzsche comes to be seen as authorizing force for his particular formulation of and 
approach to media. – At least so it goes for his craftily conceived highly influential media piece 
Gramophone, Film, Typewriter.) much like the disembodied echoing laughs recycled, 
reassembled, recorded effectively typed anew per TV production by the cannibalized Royal 
typewriter activated Laff Box, the textual representation of an archive, at its various thresholds, 
“pushes at buttons” that opens onto registries, perhaps also a pre-programmed operation, for 
experiencing and thinking what’s permitted within our conceptions of and knowledge making 









Track  P2 23:34 – 24:58 
Sayable 
Herman: Going back to Charley Douglass. He had a reputation for a certain secretiveness about 
the work? 
Pratt: ... there were two gigantic locks on it [laugh machine] ... I’d have to climb a circular 
staircase to go into the woman’s room above me at three o’clock in the morning to change the 
tracks because he wouldn’t allow me to do it in public or even in front of the technician ... At 
first I thought this secrecy is a little bit overboard ... maybe it was the underplay intrigue that 









Track   P2. 26:12 – 30:23 
Sayable 
 
Herman: Was there competition in this industry? 
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 Northridge Electronics appeared to operate by the “black-box” concealment motif for creating 




Pratt: Not in the beginning ... competition really didn’t start in fact we were my brother and I 
when we spun off in pursuit of a better way to do it ... sort of catching up with the technology 
where Charley’s was sorta falling behind ... it was time to move up into another area and we 
became Charley’s competition ... Bobby [Charley’s son] is now the competition of the company 
we formed ... there are two new games in town one of the boys does mainly game and some 
audience reaction shows of specials ... but now with computers, synthesizers its quite easy to 
pick up an audience record it and replay it. 
 
Herman: In the early days how did you do it? Oh let’s stop here to change the tape. Now you 
know my next question. 
 
Description 
 Fig. 7 
A hybrid of Douglass’ machine, the Mackenzie Repeater was used by Hanna-Barbera for its 
animation productions in the early 70’s. Five tapes were loaded into machine and simply played 
repeatedly. 
 




Herman: In the early days how did you record your audience? 
Pratt: ... We’d get the audience tracks from the show before it was cut before it was assembled 
and use those with their permission in our library ... the reverberence of the venue and the 
enthusiasm of the audience was the big part ... we’d use tracks from different series and different 







Track  P3. 01:30 – 01:58  
Sayable 
Herman: How did you get the recording? 
Pratt: It was the mixers job or a mixer usually two on an audience show to record the audience 





Track P3. 02:05 -03:14  
Sayable 
Herman: What made up a good audience reaction? 
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Pratt:  ... they would bring in busloads of seniors from rest homes and seniors centres and didn’t 
get the humor too well on a lot of the really funny stuff maybe but it must have been too late for 
the reaction ... kids who didn’t dig the senior attitudes and didn’t understand enough of the back 




Track  P3. 03:43 -04:43  
Sayable 
Herman: Did you find audience members once and a while hamming it up? 
Pratt: Jim Brooks [Producer for Mary Tyler Moore] had a very different laugh ... as did Dezi ... 
they were right up in front by the cameras and they knew what was coming ... and they’d start 
laughing in a very distinct loud laugh on mic that we’d have to usually have the mixer pull down 





Track P3.05:03 – 05:26  
Sayable 
Herman: Were there applause signs used? 
Pratt: Oh yeah ... and stage managers and stage directors waving for more and more applause all 








Track P3. 05:26 – 05:55 
Sayable 
Herman: Did you ever have anything to do with audience warm-ups? 






Track P3. 05:57 – 09:55 
Sayable 
Herman: Could you elaborate on why you decided to leave Charley Douglass?             
Pratt: Magnetic tape had a certain hiss to it and our technology was falling behind ... it started to 
be the point when you started to hear the laugh coming in by the hiss ... we [Carroll and his 
brother] packed up we were working with an engineer ... he found a new computer device that 
would key on for the computer recording and stop recording with a sub-aural tone down around 
150 cycle ... using that as a leader between laughs on a small cassette these were on regular 
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cassettes ... we would be able to put on four tracks of laughter of different sizes ... using the 
leader of the tone we could stop and go in that matter by every time you pressed the key.
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Herman: Did your machine play more sounds?  
Pratt: Yes, it’s capacity was much larger and instead of going in the back room changing tapes ... 
you’d take out the cassettes that fit the venue and the show and pop in the new cassette. More 





Track P3. 21:01 – 21:58 
Sayable 
Herman: Were your answers [input on shows] ever incorporated into future shows? 
Pratt: Oh Yeah ... To me as a first time audience things weren’t apparent ... Sometimes you could 





Track  Part 4. 01:31-01:55  
                                                          
230
 In 1977 Carroll and his brother John Pratt formed their own audio effects company, Sound 




Herman: What kinds of laughs would be in that bank for physical? 
Pratt: Sudden square front ends, explosive, punch-lines also get ... when a punch-line blows your 






Track  P4. 04:15 - 04:51 
Sayable 
Herman: Over the course of a series then would a laugh track change depending on what you 
knew of the characters? 
Pratt: I think so ... by the time the series is under way they are prepared for what’s coming and 




Track P4. 11:47 – 13:03 
Sayable 
Herman: Would you ever get screen credit for your work? 
Pratt: ... before I was on the board of governors of the academy technicians had requested that 
technical credits be given. Prior to that only artistic credits were given – producer, director, 
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writer and then they enlarged it for musical direction and then technicians started requesting 
some time which was good for them to assemble a background and reference and so on ... they 
didn’t know what to call me ... by special effects or by audience effects, nobody ever used laugh 
track ... in the awards that I was fortunate enough to receive I always received it as a part of the 




Track P4. 14:33 – 19:57 
Sayable 
Herman: Is there such a thing as regional laughter? Does a New York audience laugh differently 
than a California audience? 
Pratt: Canadians like ribald humor  ... so it was easy to get explosive laughs ... 
Herman: What about within the United States? 
Pratt: ... by now television, everyone sees it all over the country and they’re exposed to every 
feeling if you know what I mean other than the ethnic qualities [differences in laugh] I haven’t 
seen much ...  
Herman: What about shows for international export – did you every have to change a laugh 
track? 
Pratt: usually when they take out the dialogue track they have to take out everything ... it was a 






Track P4. 23:16 – 23:40 
Sayable 
Herman:  I don’t even remember a laugh track on it [Eight is Enough]. 
Pratt: ... when people don’t remember the laugh track then you’ve done your thing right. 231 
Description 
- Techniques of seduction 
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 One may wonder about this type of archival system: Is it more about the memories made or 
the making of systems that materially unmake, that makes mechanical procedure and history 
logging materials of a production’s by-product? Or is it more about time as material or material 
as a time apparatus in the form of memory and the making mechanism of memory (which would 
be a system of archivation that as temporal registry never registers in time as it is always post, 
always in delay of by-product and reproduction – from the moment of the first tape use to 
infinite combinations of complex metrics for no track)? The archive laugh track is not in the 
archive rather the laugh track archive is always archivated without a proper measure of 
calibration, be it time-wise or as repository. To go into the archive per se is to overlook, or rather 
involves one in an overlooking of the very system that the laugh track (vis a vis Laff Box, 
Jayolaffer, McKenzie Repeater, Phonetic Transcription Device) rules are governed and made by. 
– It becomes an imitation of storage and reproduction. It is no doubt an Archive and of the 
archive and archives, but it is always outside and spent prior to the authorizing mechanism of 
memory aids and management of which the archive is materially ordered. For certain, an 
industry procedure, however the industry is also a procedure that is an industry. The 
files/documents are always faux (a questionable time a quasi time a play on time as counting or 
ordering or affect and affect of an affect too) they must be so in their very mechanicality and 
production and system of archivation of a system generating laughs. They are themselves 
laughable unregisterable documents. Its mechanicity is to follow no rule but it is ruled to only 
reinforce what it cannot rule, that it cannot rule. Thus, is there any truth to the notion of the 




Track  P4. 24:15 – 24:58 
Sayable 
Herman: Talking about finding a sympathetic character, is that something you have to look for 
within the creating the magic of the laugh track? 
Pratt: I like to have one sane person in a plot who has, who is lovable and likeable and one you 




Track  Part 5. 00:22 – 01:48  
Sayable 
Herman: Let’s focus on the craft of being a sound professional. What are the most important 
elements of sound design? 
Pratt: No longer are people like I was called mixers they’re called sound designers ... it’s still the 
same job ... the one thing that is a variable is microphone placement ... it’s the only place now 
where there can be a physical error ... and from that point on it’s pretty much taken care of by 





- Categories of sounds/laughs suggest a preceding discourse, independent of the laugh 




Track P5. 02:23 – 03:59 
Sayable 
Herman: Why didn’t you like it [digital sound]? 
Pratt: Especially at the time I left the business ... there was a falseness at both ends top end and 
bottom end that was very tiring to work in that the frequencies were not natural frequencies. 
There were fraudulent frequencies in music especially but now they have methods of improving 
that enhancing that.  
Herman: In your business today do they use digital? 
Pratt: Yeah its computer but the original tracks are recorded on digital 
Herman:  Can you tell the difference? 
Pratt: In dialogue not so much once it’s gone out into an acoustical situation the ambience of the 
surrounding sorta swallows its up when its gone directly from synthesized or real music and its 
right from instrument to recording medium I don’t think I can tell it [difference of analog to 




                                                          
232 Kittler, for example, on “noise”: “First noise itself had to become an object of scientific 
research, and discourses "a privileged category of noises.” A competition sponsored by the Saint 
Petersburg Academy of Sciences in 1780 made voiced sounds, and vowels in particular, an 
object of research, and inaugurated not only speech physiology but also all the experiments 
involving mechanical language reproduction.” (p. 25, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter) 
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Track P5. 05:08 – 06:11 
Sayable 
Herman: What does a re-recordist do? 
Pratt: which is now what they call a sound designer who works as I did behind a console and I 
say it’s usually a three man team plus if it needs an audience reaction machine a four man team 
and they take the original tracks that the recordists have done ... from the live set or the live 
situation, they’re the ones that takes those tracks that are provided and treat them with reverb or 
with some kind of change of tonality to bring them to match or to restriction of the windows they 




Track P5. 09:41 – 11:21 
Sayable 
Herman: In your early television career did you have to make any kinds of adjustments for the 
television sets speakers in someone’s home? 
Pratt: Unfortunately that wasn’t our purview ... When I was mixing for television there was an 
iron clad rule of what they call limiting or compressing ... you can only put so much level 
loudness on a television transmission and you can only put so low a sound to have it heard so 
that by the time you finished with what we thought was an acceptable product ... television 
station ... and be squashed so badly that the producer would come back and say “what about the 
gun shots you put in they sound like caps gun going off” because all the big gun shots were 
down to zip and canon shots ... anything where all in this fine range that was reserved for 
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dialogue. And then you probably have heard and I have, to the point of distraction working on a 
lot of applause shows, that when you hear them on air you hear a pumping of the applause that’s 




Track P5. 11:23 – 12:26 
Sayable 
Herman: Did you have to modify your equipment once television went to stereo sound? 
Pratt: ... throw out all the old pre-stereo mono ones and go to stereo and in which case took one 
track now took two. So it was an expansion yes. 
 
Description 
-Track Time: P5. 15:14 – 16:01 
Sayable 
Herman: How closely did you work with a director? 
Pratt: ... in the beginning the director was very involved ... nowadays ... the directors have sort of 
backed off and knowing if there is a mistake or something they don’t like they can bring it back 






- Track P5. 16:57 – 17:47 
Sayable 
Herman: For each show that you did, did you have to take your equipment to the production 
facility? 
Pratt: Yes ... my big problem with Mr. Douglass’ machine cos it was a monster ... when we built 
our machine we built it with that very much in mind ... on all the machines I put trommel wheels 











Track  P5. 20:58 – 22:18 
Sayable 
Herman: What do you think is your greatest career achievement? 
Pratt: ... Charley Douglass who died at 93 having laughed a big part of his career and my having 
laughed for gee thirty-seven, thirty-nine years I think that laughing is a big achievement that it 
sort of extends your life, I think. It can’t all be genetics. 
 
Description 
- Bridging the mechanical. 
 
Track  P5. 22:23 – 22:13 
Sayable 
Herman: How many hours of television do you think you’ve sat through? 
Pratt: I was tryin to add up ... I know that the amount of shows television breaking it into half 
hour segments (although some are an hour) ... I figured somewhere in the 30,000 total half hours. 









Track  Part 6. 07:56 – 
08:55 
Sayable 
Herman: Do you think the laugh track will ever become obsolete?
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 Seven years after this interview with Pratt, in the same year Pratt died, a scavenger named 
Mike Molina purchased the Laff Box, along with the various contents of an abandoned locker, 
from an auction. As the story goes,  
“Historic TV Technology Found in Abandoned Storage 
Mike Molina makes a Southern California living by selling tools, couches and exercise bikes left 
behind in defaulted storage units. Professional storage unit buyers travel the circuit, bidding on 
units and selling off the contents. The buyer’s wager is to resell the furniture, tools, clothes and 
refrigerators at flee markets for twice the cost. Many items are tossed. Unlike the glamour of 
antique shows, it is dirty work, hauling, haggling and hustling. One joy is the storage industry’s 
version of the treasure hunt. Sometimes, jewelry, money, a painting, memorabilia or a stamp 
collection hikes the resell value. Rarely, history is discovered in a leather box.  
In 2010, Mr. Molina said he surveyed a unit before auction and saw a music amplifier. He has 
had success reselling gear to musicians so he was high bidder at $650. He spent two weeks 
selling and trashing the contents before returning to the amplifier. His first impression, and 
second, didn’t divulge the extraordinary find. Mr. Molina told me, “The next time I looked at it, I 
was going to throw it away because it looked like a broken typewriter. But as I looked at the 
personal journal, I suspected something more was going on.” The paperwork revealed his 
rediscovery of television audio technology history abandoned in an Anaheim, CA storage unit. 
Mr. Molina’s gamble enabled him to tell a remarkable work story to his wife and three small 
children. He uncovered Charlie Douglass’ 1953 “Laff Box,” the one-of-a-kind device heard on 
1950 sitcoms including Bewitched, The Munsters, Get Smart, M*A*S*H, The Beverly 
Hillbillies – and many sitcoms and movies since. Mr. Molina took it to a June 2010 episode of 
the Antiques Roadshow where expert appraiser Gary Sohmers was astonished that it had been 
abandoned. On the air from San Diego, Mr. Sohmers appraised it at $10,000. Mr. Molina has 
received several offers for the device, but has bigger plans. 
Mounting a coup d’état on 1950s, TV and film canned audio technology, Mr. Molina attended 
Don Presley’s June 25-26, 2011 sale of exquisite antiques and fine art. Mike walked away with 
the “Jayo Laugher” invented by I Love Lucy’s legendary producer Jess Oppenheimer. Douglass 
and Oppenheimer were locked in a patent battle in 1953 which Douglass won. Douglass 
cornered the laugh track business for the next two decades while Oppenheimer focused on his 
Emmy Award winning show, whose hilarious housewife headlined the most watched show in the 
United States at its peak. 
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Pratt: ... I don’t think it [the laugh track] will because it is much cheaper to film a stage type 
comedy ... with an audience. The audience being the driving force for the characters and all and 
that will always take at least technical enhancement by a machine ... script torn asunder so that 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
Mr. Molina has grown his collection of canned guffaws and belly laughs to include an early 
prototype built by Charlie’s son Robert who continues the family tradition from his company 
Northridge Electronics. Improving upon his father’s invention, Robert invested heavily into 
modernizing components, especially the storage mechanism. He introduced what is probably the 
first use of computer hard drives dedicated to TV audio production. By then, the Laff Box was 
no longer the only prerecorded audio affects TV audiences enjoyed. 
George Lucas’ Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope (1977) convinced Toon Town’s titans that 
CGI was profitable and Tron (1982) revolutionized the TV and motion picture visual effects 
industry, proving that technology had caught up with scriptwriter fantasies. Lighting, audio and 
film are technologies of higher and broader significance, but the Laff Box and Jayo Laugher 
eliminated the requirement for a live audience, pioneering the era of producing the entire 
celluloid on a closed lot. 
This marks the first time all three iconic sound devices have one owner. Mr. Molina’s collection 
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